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Laughter Louder Than Bombs: American Anti-Nuke Satire 
In the Cold War, 1946-59 
Brandon Webb 
 
This study investigates US political cartoons during the 1940s and 1950s that critiqued 
“Cold War culture” by incorporating nuclear themes into their satire. The cartoonists analyzed in 
this study—Herbert Block of the Washington Post and the Village Voice’s Jules Feiffer—used 
“the bomb” as a framing device to explore contested issues related to the arms race, civil 
defense, and atmospheric testing. In doing so both Block and Feiffer forged a “visual 
vocabulary” that reimagined the sources of conflict between the Soviet Union and the US as a 
self-imposed struggle that informed Americans needed to confront in a critical matter. In this 
way both cartoonists re-appropriated the bomb’s projection as a cultural symbol of postwar 
American power, and refashioned its symbolic meaning to read as a threat to individual liberties 
in order to register their objections to US nuclear policy. The critiques embedded in their 
cartoons also furnished a sub-culture of humorous dissent that signalled to readers that satire 
remained an effective means of voicing opposition and venting frustrations during the Cold War 
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FIGURE 1: “Salute To Bikini,” Washington Post, November 7, 1946. 
 
Introduction 
1.1: Dirt, Shovels, and Excavating Cold War Humor 
In the autumn of 1981 Ronald Reagan’s Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategic 
Nuclear Forces, Thomas K. Jones, or T.K. Jones as he liked to be called, caused a public stir 
after revealing his views on civil defense to journalist Robert Scheer. Excerpts from the 
interview were later published in Scheer’s Los Angeles Times column in which Jones was quoted 
as saying the US could expect “recovery times” ranging from “two to four years” following a 
nuclear attack on its soil.1 His estimate, which was a throwback to civil defense discourse in the 
1950s, was predicated on the belief that effective public preparedness could significantly reduce 
casualties in the event of a nuclear war. Jones, who had lifted some of his ideas from Soviet civil 
defense manuals, explained to Scheer how Americans could survive nuclear attack:  
“In essence you dig a hole, take lumber, small saplings or something like that, and build 
this thing and cover it with dirt…[Americans] could make very good sheltering by taking 
the doors off your house, digging a trench, stacking the doors about two deep over that, 
covering it with plastic so that rain water or something doesn't screw up the glue in the 
                                                          






door, then pile dirt over it…The dirt really is the thing that protects you from the blast as 
well as the radiation, if there's radiation. It protects you from the heat. You know, dirt is 
just great stuff…” 
 
So convinced was Jones of his plan for civil defense that he told Scheer: “It’s the dirt that does 
it…If there are enough shovels to go around, everybody’s going to make it.”2  
Instead of shovels Jones’ remarks were met with pitchforks because his comments raised 
troubling questions about the Reagan administration’s grip on reality in pursuit of their hawkish 
nuclear policy. The timing of Jones’ remarks coincided with a new wave of anti-nuke activism. 
Dormant for two decades, this resurgent movement seemed to be awakened by the new president 
who touted the “fantastic” notion of a “winnable” nuclear war while on the campaign trail in 
1980.3 The American public, once so susceptible to the scare tactics rooted in civil defense 
propaganda that was ubiquitous in early Cold War culture, was no longer willing to accept the 
shaky premise that nuclear war could be fought and won. The New York Times glibly asked, 
“Who is this Thomas K. Jones saying those funny things about civil defense?” Lampooning 
Jones’ alleged $252 million plan for civil defense the Times mischievously remarked: 
“Evidently, most of that money will go for shovels.”4  
Congress, too, turned on the Reagan administration’s ideological fixation with “nuclear 
Armageddon.” Not long after Jones made his incendiary remarks Democratic Senator Paul 
Tsongas (Mass) said Jones “ought to be committed” while the senator held a hearing for 
Hiroshima survivors. Under the threat of subpoena a chastened Jones eventually testified on 
Capitol Hill. His testimony managed to avoid the apocalyptic fantasies he conveyed to Scheer   
but Jones’ carefully constructed answers did not prevent the Washington Post’s Mary McGrory 
from describing the Pentagon official as, “[looking] like your uncle who ran away to the sea and 
came home with tales beyond verification.”5 
                                                          
2 Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush, and Nuclear War (New York: Vintage Books, 1983), 18-26. 
3 See Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels, 66-82. Scheer’s chapter, “The Window of Vulnerability,” details the 
Reagan administration’s belief that as a result of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT I and II) treaties (the 
second of which was never ratified by Congress) the US was locked into “a position of strategic inferiority.” Given 
this premise the administration worked hard to secure more funding for the defense budget with a significant 
amount allotted to developing more sophisticated weapon systems.   
4 “The Dirt on T.K. Jones,” New York Times, March 19, 1982.  






Ridicule of Jones was revealing. In an earlier phase in the Cold War Jones’ misplaced 
faith in what Scheer described as “the powerful defensive possibilities of dirt”6 would not have 
appeared so far-fetched. Indeed, Jones’ comments resembled the instructions found in 
information packets that agencies like the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) 
produced throughout the 1950s, albeit in cruder form. To a younger generation of activists who 
comprised the Nuclear Freeze Movement in the 1980s Jones may have appeared like a relic from 
an age rife with paranoia. But to an older generation weaned on animated shorts of “Bert the 
Turtle” explaining “duck-and-cover” drills to nervous schoolchildren,7 Jones’ calls for “dirt” and 
“shovels” may have sounded more like an echo—a discredited remnant from a bygone era. 
This study is interested in exploring how ridicule and mockery of civil defense plans and 
support for nuclear weapons production were formulated during an earlier period in the putative 
Cold War struggle against the Soviet Union—at a time when Jones’ civil defense views were 
commonplace. In 1982 Jones’ comments were widely mocked because American public opinion 
towards civil defense and nuclear weapons had shifted considerably by the early eighties. What 
explains this change in public attitudes?  
* * * * 
 
FIGURE 2: “Bert the Turtle,” Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1951. 
                                                          
6 Scheer, With Enough Shovels, 19. 







In the 1950s civil defense authorities composed a plethora of pamphlets that stressed the 
importance of Americans taking part in “periodic drills and test exercises”8 in order to prepare 
for a possible nuclear attack. Tracy Davis describes this effort as inherently “performative” and 
reliant on “an embodied mimetic methodology” that was “theatrical” in nature. For Davis, using 
“rehearsal” to describe civil defense preparations is not a “metaphoric motif”; rather, Davis 
employs the term to address how civil defense rehearsals in the Cold War era were “a technique 
and mode of being” that allowed planners to glean important insights from their “pageants of 
angst” while also instilling behaviours.9    
Mocking and ridiculing these “pageants of angst” during the early Cold War era appeared 
to be a formidable task. While the potential for dark comedy was apparent to some, to most the 
darkness remained just that: dark. As one FCDA pamphlet from the 1950s worded it, America 
could be attacked “at any time.” The only way to prevent a calamity was through “public 
education, training, and organization.”10  
In order to achieve these three goals the FCDA worked in tandem with local authorities 
to cultivate a culture of “preparedness” that monitored each stage of response in the event of a 
nuclear attack. The FCDA also collaborated with a wide array of professional organizations, 
including the American Medical Association (AMA), in its effort to maintain a wide network of 
professionals devoted to the task of coordinating shelter construction, evacuations and medical 
care during and after an attack.  
In the 1950s many medical professionals who were keen advocates for civil defense 
aided the FCDA’s goal of preparing the public for nuclear attack. Paul Boyer writes that the 
medical profession as a whole worked diligently to “cultivate an aura of mastery and total 
assurance” in preparing for the massive medical emergency which would follow an attack.11 In a 
                                                          
8 New York State Civil Defense Commission, “Medical Aides,” in Michael Scheibach, ed., “In Case Atom Bombs Fall”: 
An Anthology of Government Explanations, Instructions and Warnings from the 1940s to the 1960s (Jefferson, NC: 
McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2009), 69-72. 
9 Tracy C. Davis, Stages of Emergency: Cold War Nuclear Civil Defense (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 
2007), introduction, 1-5.  
10 Federal Civil Defense Administration, “This Is Civil Defense,” in Michael Scheibach, ed., “In Case Atom Bombs 
Fall”: An Anthology of Government Explanations, Instructions and Warnings from the 1940s to the 1960s 
(Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2009),  5-9 
11 Cultural historian Paul S. Boyer has done much to further our understanding of how nuclear weapons have 
animated postwar American culture. In the historiography of “atomic culture” Boyer’s research remains an 
important starting point. He will be quoted extensively throughout this study. For a larger discussion of the role 






1950 article in Today’s Health, Dr. George F. Lull, secretary of the AMA, wrote that physicians 
occupied a “leading role in national preparedness for an atomic war,” and needed “the help of 
every American” to ensure “smooth-operating” during an attack. In order to “help” those in need 
of medical attention, Americans needed to first “control [their] fear with reason instead of 
exaggerating it into hysteria.”12    
A 1950 pamphlet from the New York State Civil Defense Commission adopted a 
similarly measured tone as Lull’s terse prose. At times pamphlets like these could intone banal 
advice. People who showed “any signs of radiation sickness. . . [needed to] go to a medical 
station at once,” instructed the pamphleteers. If such stations were unavailable then the pamphlet 
urged readers to “keep warm” and “stay in bed if possible.”13  
On the surface such instructions seemed prosaic but embedded within the subtext was a 
tacit admission that in the event of an attack civil defense authorities would be unable to provide 
the requisite facilities needed to care for scores of injured victims. Because of this lack of 
resources, civil defense planners needed to project a coordinated response that was dependent on 
individualized action. “Each of us must have a job to do if trouble comes . . .” the FCDA 
instructed its readers.14  
Women played an important role in coordinating local responses and were reminded that 
“Civil defense begins at home.” Women’s “first duty” was to “educate” their families and make 
the home “safe as possible from possible attack.” Their “second duty” was to participate in a 
“community civil defense organization.” Without these “fully organized communities,” one 
FCDA pamphlet claimed, there could “be no adequate national civil defense program.” By 
consigning women to the role of “medical aides” civil defense authorities reinforced the 
gendered thinking typical of many Cold War discourses.15 In doing so they also sent signals that 
the “rehearsal” of civil defense was closely linked with inscribing “performative” habits.   
                                                          
Nuclear War,” in Fallout: A Historian Reflects on America’s Half-Century Encounter with Nuclear Weapons 
(Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1998), 61-86. 
12 George F. Lull, Today’s Health, 1950, as quoted in Boyer, Fallout, 79-80. 
13 New York State Civil Defense Commission, “You and the Atomic Bomb: What to Do in Case of an Atomic Attack, 
Public Pamphlet No.1,“ in Michael Scheibach, ed., “In Case Atom Bombs Fall”: An Anthology of Government 
Explanations, Instructions and Warnings from the 1940s to the 1960s (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 
Publishers, 2009),  25-29. 
14 Ibid. 
15 FCDA “Women in Civil Defense,” in Michael Scheibach, ed., “In Case Atom Bombs Fall”: An Anthology of 
Government Explanations, Instructions and Warnings from the 1940s to the 1960s (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & 






In the mid-1950s rehearsal was put into practice on a nation-wide scale during simulated 
nuclear attacks that were part of the Operation Alert project. As Guy Oakes writes, Operation 
Alert was designed by civil defense planners in order to “test preattack plans for survival by 
fabricating . . . the actual conditions of a nuclear attack.” This “yearly ritual,” which ran from 
1954 to 1961, summoned massive resources and was conducted as “an elaborate national 
sociodrama.” President Eisenhower’s participation in Operation Alert 1955’s “ambitious 
enterprise,” which included the participation of over two hundred cities, underscored the 
importance of the exercise in cultivating a perception of “nuclear mastery” that such a crisis 
would require if lives were to be saved.16 
Operation Alert became a media event that the new medium of television was well-
equipped to handle. Media executives suggested to the event’s planners that the president give 
“live radio and television” updates from his underground quarters in order for the “theatrics” to 
more closely resemble the conditions of an actual attack.17 Through his participation, 
Eisenhower, who Thomas Doherty describes as “the reigning master of television and politics” in 
the 1950s,18 lent considerable credence to exercises like Operation Alert despite his misgivings 
about their efficacy. His role in Operation Alert’s “sociodrama” also had a political dimension.  
In the mid-1950s the adoption of “massive retaliation” as a military strategy was part of 
the administration’s “New Look” defence policy which James Patterson argues relied heavily on 
the ability of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) to react to crises with a nuclear response. The 
“New Look” anticipated emerging military technologies, namely “missiles carrying nuclear 
warheads,” or what would be called Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), and which 
became “main-line military weapons” in the years ahead. In formulating the “New Look” 
Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles recognized how the new policy was 
“politically attractive” in that it sidestepped what they believed was Americans’ “aversion to 
large standing armies in times of peace.”19 These domestic considerations were important for 
                                                          
16 For more insight into how civil defense planners prepared and propagandized subsequent Operation Alert 
exercises see Guy Oakes, The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture (New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994), ch.3, 78-95. 
17 Ibid., 88. 
18 For more on Eisenhower’s mastery of the medium see Thomas Doherty, Cold War, Cool Medium: Television, 
McCarthyism, and American Culture (New York: University Press, 2003), ch. 5, 96-104 
19 For a larger discussion of how “massive retaliation” and the “New Look” defense complemented Cold War aims 
while remaining “politically attractive” see James T. Patterson, Great Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974 






procuring support for the administration’s shift to reorienting defense spending towards greater 
nuclear weapons production. As Guy Oakes observes, confronting the “problem of national will” 
could only be waged effectively if Americans accepted “the logic of keeping peace by 
threatening nuclear war.”20 The public’s acceptance of “massive retaliation,” and the build-up in 
nuclear arms this would entail, was predicated on a belief that survival of an attack was possible 
if individuals made the necessary preparations. Thus, the link between civil defense rehearsals 
and support for “massive retaliation” complemented the administration’s goal of avoiding war by 
preparing for it.  
In adopting a defense policy that increased pressure on the Soviets to keep pace in the 
arms race, the Eisenhower administration relied on discourses from the Truman era which 
imagined the Cold War rivalry as a “struggle” between “slave world” and “free.” This 
Manichean way of viewing foreign affairs is described by Susan Carruthers as a “dichotomy 
between mobility and captivity.”21 While cold warriors imagined Marxist ideology and Soviet 
foreign policy working in tandem to hold millions of eastern Europeans “captive,” they also 
projected an image of “mobility” for Americans by proclaiming a “declaratory language of 
freedom” in their rhetoric.22   
Within a cultural climate riven by anticommunism rhetoric that demarcated nations as 
“free” and “slave”, how was ridicule of civil defense and US nuclear policy formulated? Did it 
change people’s perceptions of what contemporaries referred to as “the bomb”?23 And if so, did 
this humor galvanise social protest of nuclear weapons or did it become a substitute for struggle?  
This study will engage these questions by analyzing political cartoons from two leading 
cartoonists from the era, Herbert Block from the Washington Post, or Herblock as he was known 
to his readership, and the Village Voice’s Jules Feiffer. Both Herblock and Feiffer drew nuclear-
themed cartoons with a regularity that suggested the issue was pressing for both cartoonists. As 
will be explained further in following chapters, their cartoons also adopted characteristics more 
commonly associated with satire which, Stephen Kercher defines as “those forms of humor 
which are spurred by anger or by other moral motives and which use irony to criticize, provoke 
                                                          
20 Oakes, The Imaginary War, 165. 
21 Susan L. Carruthers, Cold War Captives: Imprisonment, Escape, and Brainwashing (Berkley and London: 
University of California Press, 2009), introduction 1-22. 
22 Ibid., 20. 
23 This study will adopt “the bomb” because contemporaries in the 1940s and ‘50s often used the colloquial 






thought, and raise awareness.”24 The satire discussed here takes the prefix “anti” to highlight 
how “anti-nuke satire” assumed an oppositional stance to a host of issues related to the nation’s 
burgeoning nuclear weapon arsenal, including the entrenchment of a nuclear arms race, civil 
defense exercises, and the unlimited atmospheric testing used to test the efficacy of new 
weapons.   
The term “visual satirist” will often be used to describe the two cartoonists whose anti-
nuke cartoons will comprise this study. The term is not meant to obfuscate; rather, “visual 
satirist” more accurately reflects how Herblock and Feiffer, fit together within a comparative 
framework. Because of the relative differences in their publications—Herblock was a daily 
cartoonist responding to events as they unfolded, while Feiffer worked for a counter-culture 
weekly publication and avoided topical issues in his cartoons—referring to both collectively as 
“political cartoonists” is misleading. The term visual satirist better describes how Herblock and 
Feiffer used an established forum—political cartooning—to satirize larger socio-political 
developments in order to advance important critiques.25   
In the 1940s and 1950s Herblock and Feiffer did not write weighty treatises or moody 
meditations lamenting the nation’s current state of intellectual conformity; rather, they illustrated 
cartoons that effectively mocked and ridiculed important assumptions undergirding support for 
US nuclear policy. They accomplished this by forging a “visual vocabulary”26 that reimagined 
the sources of conflict between the Soviet Union and the US as a self-imposed struggle—one 
entirely dependent on viewing all forms of Soviet aggression as proof of international 
communism’s inexorable march. In this way both Herblock and Feiffer re-appropriated the bomb 
                                                          
24 Stephen E. Kercher’s 2000 dissertation, “The Limits of Irreverence: ‘Sick’ Humor and Satire in America, 1950-64,” 
(Indiana University) offers keen insights into satire’s political dimensions during this period. This research 
developed into his monograph Revel with a Cause: Liberal Satire in Postwar America (Chicago: IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 2006) Kercher’s definition is worth noting because of the overlap in themes and periodization this 
study shares with his ground-breaking work. While there are similarities in the source-base the hope here is that a 
different analytical focus will render some already discussed sources fresh.  
25 For a larger discussion of how political cartoons operate in authoritarian regimes see Patrick Merziger, “Humour 
in Nazi Germany: Resistance and Propagnda? The Popular Desire for an All-Embracing Laughter,” Humour and 
Social Protest Marjolein’t Hart and Dennis Bos, eds. (New York and Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 2007), 
275-290.   
26 The idea of “visual vocabulary” will be elaborated more in chapter one. The term is adopted from Michael 
Cohen’s recent research into radical socialist cartoonists from the Progressive era. See Michael Cohen, 
“’Cartooning Capitalism’: Radical Cartooning and the Making of American Popular Radicalism in the Early 
Twentieth Century,” in Humour and Social Protest Marjolein’t Hart and Dennis Bos, eds. (New York and Cambridge: 






as a cultural symbol of postwar American power, and refashioned its symbolic meaning to read 
as a threat to individual liberties in order to register their objections to the drift in US nuclear 
policy in the 1950s. In doing so, they carved a space within Cold War culture to wage important 
criticisms of their government’s evolving nuclear policy, and asked readers to critically reflect on 
Cold War orthodoxy. The critiques embedded in their cartoons also furnished a sub-culture of 
humorous dissent that signalled to readers that satire remained an effective means of voicing 
opposition and venting frustrations during the era’s stultifying political climate.    
But how effective was anti-nuke satire in changing public perceptions of a contested 
issue such as the nuclear one? Laughter rarely transfers neatly from one historical context to 
another. The public response to Jones’ remarks on civil defense in the early eighties reveals a 
historical shift in public attitudes towards nuclear warfare—a shift that can be detected through 
analyzing how humor satirized the US government’s nuclear policy during the first two decades 
of the Cold War. Ridiculing civil defense advocates was not without precedent; indeed, mockery 
of public officials is as old as the republic itself.27 But in the late 1940s and 1950s individuals 
who ridiculed the culture of “preparedness” ran the risk of being labelled “un-American.” 
Understanding how Herblock and Feiffer escaped the censoring tendencies of the era requires an 
analytical focus that places humor in the forefront, rather than in the background.  
In 1958, in the first issue of the underground humor magazine the Realist, editor Paul 
Krassner quoted his fellow satirist Jo Coppola as saying: 
“For comedy is, after all, a look at ourselves, not as we pretend to be when we look in the 
mirror of our imagination, but as we really are. Look at the comedy of any age and you 
will know volumes about that period and its people which neither historian nor 
anthropologist can tell you.”28 
The following study hopes to amend Coppola’s insight some. Historians who analyze 
“the comedy of any age” have long understood how historical actors gazing into “the mirror” of 
their “imagination” often used humor as a framing device. During the 1940s and 1950s Herblock 
and Feiffer looked into the mirror of their culture’s imagination and saw the era’s ubiquitous 
mushroom cloud—“how does one tell a joke about that?” they may have pondered. The fears and 
                                                          
27 In fact the tradition of American political cartooning predates the republic. Debates still continue over who drew 
America’s first political cartoon. A popular candidate is Benjamin Franklin. For more on the roots of political 
cartooning see Donald Dewey, The Art of Ill Will: The Story of American Political Cartoons (New York and London: 
New York University Press, 2007), introduction, 1-73.  






anxieties associated with the bomb did not easily lend itself to humorous portrayal. The 
following study will discuss how Herblock and Feiffer overcame this aesthetic hurdle by 
injecting their satire with trenchant criticism of US nuclear policy.  
* * * * 
This study addresses two emerging scholarly fields. Within the vast historiography of 
Cold War studies the bomb figures prominently. However, most scholars have focused their 
efforts on understanding how nuclear weapons influenced defense spending and military 
strategy. These histories, while crucial to our understanding of the role nuclear weapons played 
in the Cold War drama, have been written from a diplomatic or political historiographical 
perspective. Less attention has been paid to how the bomb inspired what Boyer dubbed “atomic 
culture.”29  
In the postwar years this “atomic culture” made its presence felt in fashion (the new two-
piece “Bikini” swimsuit took its name from a series of atomic tests conducted at Bikini Atoll in 
1946) in popular song (Amos Milburn’s 1950 hit “Atomic Baby” among many) in consumer 
goods (action figurines proliferated, many carrying mini-Geiger Counters which could be found 
in cereal boxes) and in film (a host of science-fiction movies featured mutated monsters who had 
been exposed to radiation).30 While intellectuals like Norman Cousins wrote wearily of nuclear 
weapons making modern man “obsolete,”31 cultural producers, marketers, and manufactures 
were busy incorporating the atom into consumer and popular culture. 
Boyer’s research into the creation of an atomic culture in the 1940s and 1950s has 
configured the bomb as a source of fear and anxiety that left an indelible mark on postwar 
American culture. In his first monograph on the topic, By the Bombs’ Early Light: American 
Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age, Boyer connects the burgeoning nuclear 
ephemera that constituted this atomic culture with larger socio-political debates centered on the 
movement for international regulation of atomic energy in the late forties. These debates also 
                                                          
29 For a larger discussion of how a “nuclear consciousness” led to an atomic culture see Paul Boyer, By the Bomb’s 
Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985).  
30 The website CONELRAD: Atomic Platters is an excellent source for “all things atomic.” In addition to collecting 
and archiving a number of Cold War pop culture sources, CONELRAD’s web masters have compiled an exhaustive 
list of “Cold War music from the golden age of homeland security.”  <http://www.atomicplatters.com/index.php> 






stimulated larger discussions of the nation’s postwar role in shaping what Garry Wills calls “a 
peace to be based on a weapon.”32 
Many recent studies of the bomb’s cultural history have registered a partial dissent from 
some of Boyer’s claims. In his discussion of “atomic bomb cinema” Jerome Shapiro argues that 
films which incorporated nuclear themes into their narratives were part of a longer tradition of 
apocalyptic narratives. For Shapiro the cultural marketplace of atomic bomb cinema in the 
postwar period, and Hollywood’s relative steadiness in producing bomb films, confirms that 
narratives preoccupied with the destruction of the world have always proven popular across 
different cultures.33   
These debates revolving around the cultural impact of the bomb mirror a larger debate 
within Cold War studies centered on conceptual distinctions and periodization.34 A number of 
recent scholars argue that the trends that were constitutive of “Cold War culture”—the postwar 
economic boom, anticommunism, the arms race—had their roots in the Second World War, 
making the application of the term problematic.35 What is more, recent historiography has 
questioned the impact the Cold War rivalry had on the daily lives of Americans in the postwar 
period. 
Peter Filene has argued that historians’ use of the term “Cold War culture” has become an 
“all-purpose interpretation” that has skewed our understanding of what Americans cared most 
about in the postwar years.36 For Filene, “the Cold War was fought primarily at an elite level,” 
while most Americans continued defining “their world in personal terms.”37          
                                                          
32 Gary Wills, Bomb Power: The Modern Presidency and the National Security State (New York, NY: The Penguin 
Press, 2010), 41. 
33 Shapiro’s insights, namely his argument that atomic bomb cinema reflects popular engagement with an 
“apocalyptic imagination” will be discussed in chapter two. See Jerome F. Shapiro, Atomic Bomb Cinema: The 
Apocalyptic Imagination on Film (New York and London: Routledge, 2001), introduction, PDF e-book.  
34 Recent debates within Cold War historiography have centered on periodization and definition. For two 
contrasting looks at this methodological and conceptual problem see Anders Stephenson, “Cold War Degree Zero,” 
19-39 and Odd Arne Westad, “Exploring the Histories of the Cold War: A Pluralist Approach,” 51-59, both in 
Uncertain Empire: American History and the Idea of the Cold War, eds Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2012).  
35 Essays from the Rethinking Cold War Culture Peter J. Kuznick and James Gilbert, eds. (Washington, D.C.: 
Smithsonian Books, 2001), will be cited throughout this study. Each contribution engages questions surrounding 
periodization, methodology, and terminology but within a framework of each contributors’ own research. “Cold 
War culture” is also not synonymous with postwar culture. As a number of scholars argued in Rethinking Cold War 
Culture many postwar trends had their roots in the Second World War, if not before.  
36 Peter Filene, “’Cold War Culture’ Doesn’t Say It All,” in Rethinking Cold War Culture Peter J. Kuznick and James 







Filene is right to remind us that not all Americans, or even most, were preoccupied with 
the Cold War rivalry. As Filene’s research suggests most Americans were more likely to rank the 
economy’s health a more pressing concern. But this view is limiting when trying to understand 
the ubiquitous Cold War cultural signs and symbols that contemporaries encountered in their 
daily lives. However much the Cold War struggle may have been fought at an “elite level,” it 
was experienced on many levels that included all strata of postwar American society. Many 
ordinary Americans still shared the same social and political assumptions regarding international 
communism as elites did. What is more, the consumer culture they participated in reinforced 
these views. Work, family life, and leisure may have been their main priorities but this did not 
mean these private concerns were exempt from Cold War culture’s considerable reach. Seen this 
way, when historicizing the cultural products of Cold War culture, it does not really matter if a 
majority of Americans ever listed the so-called “superpower” rivalry as their main worry; anti-
Communist discourses ensured the Cold War struggle would continue informing their daily lives 
in countless ways.  
* * * * 
Given the historical sources used in this study, the following analysis also places itself in 
conversation with another scholarly field that bears mentioning, the relatively recent field of 
humor studies. Following the “cultural turn” in the mid-eighties scholars from disciplines outside 
the humanities—sociologists, linguists, psychologists—began subjecting humor texts—jokes, 
cartoons, film parodies, satiric literature—to scholarly scrutiny and through these efforts a 
burgeoning field of research emerged. Few historians of the Cold War, however, have shown 
interest in treating humor from the period as “a category of historical analysis.” This is an 
unfortunate gap in the historiography of the Cold War and perhaps reveals a disciplinary bias 
that needs to be addressed. As Martini Kessel reminds us “humor and laughter have not figured 
high on historians’ agendas.”38 Much of this reluctance stems from the conceptual difficulty of 
studying the fleeting nature of laughter.39 Recent trends within humor studies have shifted the 
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focus from defining laughter’s innate characteristics to asking how consumers of humorous 
content read humor texts.40  
Recent research into how “joke-scripts”41 operate in authoritarian cultures demonstrate 
how studying laughter can yield similar insights to the historical study of emotions. Like other 
emotions, laughter can be viewed as a “thermometer” indicating what motivated historical actors. 
However, as humor scholar Christie Davies notes, the difficultly in historicizing humor stems 
from researchers’ imposed dichotomy that assesses humour with oppositional characteristics as 
either a form of “resistance” or as a harmless “safety valve” that authorities tolerate because it is 
“counter-productive” to suppress it.42 A third category has recently emerged that posits that 
humor aimed at authorities can have the unintended effect of facilitating “escapism and 
acquiescence.” In this third formulation humor is viewed as a “surrogate for conflict” that runs 
counter to political aims.43  
This raises several questions that will be addressed throughout this study: did readers in 
the 1940 and 1950s adopt a different perspective on the nuclear issue after encountering a 
Herblock Mr. Atom cartoon in the Post’s editorial section? Did Feiffer fans imbibe his 
irreverence towards civil defense and the implications of Eisenhower’s “New Look” defense 
policy when reading his comic strip in the Voice? Or did Herblock and Feiffer address 
readerships who already shared their outlook in regards to the nuclear issue? The archival record 
has many gaps and silences that make these questions difficult to answer. However, by 
connecting anti-nuke satire with socio-political developments, some tentative conclusions can be 
ventured. By posing these historical questions this study will address how readers invested their 
own meaning into humor texts that may have conflicted or confirmed the views of their authors. 
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Cambridge, 2007), 12. 
40For a larger discussion of the development of humor theory see Arthur Asa Berger. “Coda: Humor, Pedagogy, and 
Cultural Studies.” In A Decade of Dark Humor: How Comedy, Irony, and Satire Shaped Post-9/11 America. Eds., Ted 
Gournelos and Viveca Greene (Jackson: University Press of Mississipi, 2011), 233-241.  
41 “Joke-scripts” refer to the structure of a joke. Recent research in humor studies has focused on how historical 
actors import their own concerns into a “joke-script” in order to address larger socio-political debates. 
42 For a larger critique of tendencies within humor studies to view humor texts as subversive see Christie Davies, 
“Humour and Protest: Jokes under Communism,” in Humour and Social Protest, Marjolein’t Hart and Dennis Bos, 
eds. (New York and Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 2007), 291-305.  
43 Nathanial Hong, “Mow ‘em All Down Grandma: The “Weapon” of Humor in two World War II Occupation 
Scrapbooks,” HUMOR: International Journal of Humor Research 23, no.1 (2010): 27. Hong’s conclusions will be 






Ethan Thompson’s work on subversive humor in 1950s television culture has provided 
some methodological guides to approaching how historical actors read humor texts. In his 
discussion of MAD magazine Thompson argues MAD encouraged its readers to use “decoding 
strategies” in order to critique the targets in their parodies. Understanding what made a MAD 
parody funny required going “outside the text.” Thompson argues once readers adopted this 
reading practice they were “armed with protocols” that allowed them to fashion their own 
counter-narratives.44 This study will adopt Thompson’s focus on “refunctioning” and 
“restructuring” in order to explain how Herblock and Feiffer encouraged their readers to adopt 
similar discursive practices in order to create counter-narratives of the bomb.  
Thompson’s methodology dovetails with recent scholarship that has refined approaches 
to studying humor by incorporating the concept of “framing” into humor studies. As an 
analytical tool framing helps elucidate how Herblock and Feiffer defined, articulated, and 
translated “ideological beliefs into an existing, practical framework” while also giving meaning 
to “events and experiences” as they unfolded.45 By applying the concept of framing to 
Herblock’s Mr. Atom cartoons and Feiffer’s nuclear-themed cartoons we can uncover the 
discourses embedded in their work.  
Chapter one will discusses how Herblock used framing strategies to formulate a coherent 
and explicit editorial position on the issue of “world atomic control.”46 One year after Hiroshima 
Herblock introduced a character that his readers came to know as Mr. Atom. From 1946 onwards 
the anthropomorphic Mr. Atom would appear in the Post’s editorial section with increased 
frequency as the movement for international control of the atom began losing steam. In these 
cartoons Herblock often placed his towering Mr. Atom next to cowering politicians and 
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accompanied these illustrations with a brief text that ridiculed the inefficacy of the Atomic 
Energy Commission (AEC) and its UN equivalent, the United Nations Atomic Energy 
Commission (UNAEC). A Herblock Mr. Atom cartoon reminded Post readers that the failure to 
establish a plan for international regulation of atomic energy would have grave consequences. In 
this way Mr. Atom became an important cultural symbol for the liberal goal of international 
cooperation on the nuclear issue. When the Soviets successfully exploded their first nuclear 
device in 1949 Herblock responded with one of his most iconic cartoons. An analysis of this 
cartoon, along with several others that appeared in the Post between 1946 and 1955, will form 
the basis of chapter one.  
Chapter two will focus on innovative cartoonist Jules Feiffer, who in the mid-fifties, 
began experimenting with long-form comics whose subject matter touched on many facets of 
postwar American culture. In 1956 Feiffer was hired as the editorial cartoonist for an upstart 
avant-garde weekly called the Village Voice. Thereafter Voice readers could find Feiffer’s 
Freudian characters grappling with a host of issues associated with modernity, including the 
theme of “atomic anxiety.” Feiffer’s anti-nuke cartoons suggested that Americans, who wistfully 
participated in the postwar economic boom while turning a blind eye to the militarization of 
America’s hinterlands, were repressing subterranean fears nurtured by the Cold War rivalry and 
its attending arms race. In addition to analyzing four anti-nuke cartoons that appeared in the 
Voice between 1956 and 1958 this chapter will also subject two of Feiffer’s long-form comics, 
the unpublished Rollie which dated from this time, and Boom, published in 1959, to close 
readings in order to show how their author explored the theme of “atomic anxiety”47 in his satire.  
Like all bracketed dates, the ones chosen here are somewhat arbitrary. Nineteen forty-six 
seems like a logical starting point given Herblock’s debut of Mr. Atom in that year. Likewise, 
1959 was chosen as an end point because in that year satire fans could finally read Feiffer’s 
previously unpublished Boom. As the epilogue in this study will discuss, by the 1960s other 
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satirists practicing “sick” humor took up the nuclear theme in their work.48 By then much was 
changing in Cold War culture. As Stephen Whitfield notes the postwar trends which shaped this 
culture had, by the mid-sixties, “decomposed.”49              
Decomposition, however, is rarely visible to those witnessing it. Often, it is slow, subtle, 
and hard to detect. To contemporaries in the late fifties it may have seemed the inverse was true. 
Civil defense continued insinuating itself into many pockets of American life. Private bomb 
shelters proliferated in the late fifties while Eisenhower’s “New Look” defense policy directed a 
greater share of defense spending to nuclear weapons production. The widespread fear that 
hydrogen bombs tests were releasing potentially lethal amounts of radioactive fallout into the 
atmosphere further added to the sense of foreboding engendered by the bomb. 
Within this cultural climate humor thrived because it offered a venue to explore these 
contemporary concerns. In arguing for humor’s place as a “category of historical analysis,” this 
study follows Joseph Boskin in claiming “considerable cultural power for humor.”50 As 
numerous scholars have noted, humor has the capacity to offend, enrage, and provoke, but it also 
can ask people to rethink what Warren Susman argues are the “fundamental assumptions” and 
“implicit knowledge” embedded within every culture.51 
 In the 1940s and 1950s “implicit knowledge” often found expression in anti-Communist 
discourses that stressed the immutability of Soviet aggression and Marxist ideology. These 
“fundamental assumptions” within Cold War culture were challenged when “implicit 
knowledge” was subjected to explicit criticism. 
* * * * 
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1.2: The Age of Anxiety? 
What contemporaries in the 1950s referred to as the “Age of Anxiety” took its name from a 1947 
W.H. Auden poem that Cammie McAtee claims lamented the “heightening anxiety and stress” of 
the postwar period. Arthur Schlesinger’s influential 1949 book The Vital Center: The Politics of 
Freedom, reified Auden’s insight, by naming one chapter title, “Politics in an Age of Anxiety.” 
A year later existential psychologist Rollo May borrowed from Auden’s language in his 
pioneering work The Meaning of Anxiety. For May, Americans had many reason to feel anxious 
in a postmodern world but one source of contemporary anxiety stemmed from fears “of the 
uncontrolled atom bomb.”52    
From its inception deep within the armed fortress of Los Alamos to its first explosion 
within the dusty hills of New Mexico’s Jemez Mountains, the atom bomb has inspired the kind 
of anxieties that Auden, Schlesinger, and May referred to in their works. The successful Trinity 
test at Alamogordo in July, 1946 moved “father of the bomb,” physicist Robert Oppenheimer, to 
recite the Hindu proverb: “I am become death, destroyer of worlds.” Harry Truman had a less 
poetic response but equally revealing one after he authorized the use of the two remaining bombs 
in the US’s arsenal on Japan. While sailing home from the Potsdam Conference on August 6, the 
new president learned one bomb named Little Boy had successfully exploded over Hiroshima. 
Truman exclaimed to a group of sailors, “This is the greatest thing in history!”53 Three days later 
a second bomb, Fat Man, laid waste to Nagasaki. Fearing more atomic reprisals on their shaken 
population, Japanese leaders finally surrendered. The war was over.  
Truman’s comments, however, did not reflect his complex relationship to the bomb. In a 
diary entry written after he learned of the successful Alamogordo test, Truman ruminated that the 
“most terrible bomb in the history of the world . . . may be the fire destruction prophesised in the 
Euphrates Valley era, after Noah and his fabulous Ark.”54 Critics did not reflect Truman’s 
biblical language after learning of Hiroshima but they did express similar concerns. With fires 
still smoldering in the two devastated Japanese cities American editors and intellectuals began 
dissecting the moral dimensions of Truman’s decision to drop the bomb. In the coming weeks 
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many were moved to write essays and columns that sharply contrasted with the celebratory 
mood. Norman Cousins, editor for the Saturday Review of Literature, spent the night of August 6 
writing an essay entitled, “Modern Man is Obsolete.” The liberal New Republic opined that a 
nuclear war would leave only “scattered remnants of humanity living on the periphery of 
civilization.” Even the conservative Chicago Tribune, anticipating the nightmare scenarios a 
future arms race might facilitate, speculated that nuclear warfare would reduce the earth to “a 
barren waste” forcing survivors to “hide in caves or live among ruins.”55 Such conclusions were 
formed in the absence of scant photo evidence as the US Army barred any release of footage 
detailing the destruction at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.56    
“A barren waste” was hardly the image the Truman administration wanted to project for 
the future of atomic energy. In its first press release following Hiroshima the administration 
linked the two atomic weapons used on Japan with the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor—a link 
that for many Americans justified the massive Japanese civilian causalities.57 Also embedded in 
these war-sloganeering paragraphs, however, were peppy phrases which depicted a bright future 
for the atom. The “greatest scientific gamble in history” had paid off; “harnessing the basic 
power of the universe” and opening unlimited possibilities.58 Soon the AEC began projecting 
“the soothing image of a peaceful atom”59 while former Manhattan Project veterans began 
rallying around the banner of World Government in the hopes of submitting their new 
Frankenstein creation to international controls under the auspices of the newly-created United 
Nations (UN).  
Within this cultural climate “anxiety” became a recurring theme that intellectuals like 
Schlesinger and May incorporated into their critiques of postwar American culture. Herblock and 
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Feiffer made use of the “anxiety” theme in their satire by exploring the bomb’s tightening grip 
over Americans’ imaginations. Because Herblock and Feiffer’s careers started at slightly 
different times, and under different circumstances, they also enter the debate on anti-nuke satire 
at different moments in the evolution of the topic. While their careers overlap Feiffer did not 
achieve national notoriety until a full decade after Herblock got his start with the Post, at which 
point anticommunism had lots some of its intensity. In this climate Feiffer could adopt a more 
critical stance towards postwar American culture without fearing a backlash from ardent Cold 
Warriors. The liberal Herblock meanwhile established himself as a cartoonist just as 
anticommunism was gathering force in the late forties, prompting him to illustrate anti-
Communist cartoons of his own.60   
Analyzing both Herblock’s and Feiffer’s satire invites us to compare how each man 
approached the question of “anxiety” in their cartoons. Such comparisons offer an opportunity 
for contrast. While Feiffer admired Herblock, the former’s Village Voice cartoons broke with 
previous cartooning traditions by introducing a narrative structure into his work that allowed 
Feiffer to explore more complex themes. In a Feiffer cartoon a character’s inner monologue 
would be explored in a multi-frame lay-out that allowed for a story to emerge. Herblock, on the 
other hand, held fast to the tradition of illustrating a single-frame cartoon whose text was limited. 
As an editorial cartoonist expected to deliver cartoons on a daily basis, Herblock’s work also 
reflected a more topical approach to cartooning that emphasized pithy commentary on current 
events. 
Other examples distinguishing the two men abound. Their differing positions along the 
ideological spectrum invites analysis of how their politics informed their assessment of the role 
of satire in American politics.61 Stephen Kercher’s study of “liberal” humor and “sick” humor 
during the postwar era is an important entry point in any discussion of the period’s changing 
notions of humor. For Kercher liberal humorists like Herblock espoused a “traditional civic 
idealism” that expressed faith in established American institutions. By the mid-fifties this liberal 
approach to satire was being eclipsed by “sick” humor, which emphasized more critical 
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perspectives on previously taboo subjects.62 As will be explored more fully in chapter two, 
Feiffer’s role in popularizing “sick” humor helped expand American satire’s topical terrain. His 
satire did not provide easy answers; instead it raised questions that few cultural creators at the 
time were willing to ask.    
It is important to remember the debates over fallout in the mid-1950s took place during a 
time of retreat for anti-Communists. The constitutive structure of Cold War culture was 
changing, and many cracks and crevices previously sealed from scrutiny appeared to be opening. 
It is unlikely that Cold war culture could have sustained its strength without the support from an 
influential and diverse group of shareholders who benefited from it. Scholars have used the term 
“Cold War consensus” to describe the outlook held by diverse policymakers, defense contractors, 
and rabid anti-Communists who facilitated the Red Scare and sanctioned the excesses of 
McCarthyism. The anticommunism espoused by this Cold War consensus, not to mention the 
many ways in which it manifested itself in the postwar period, breathed life into Cold War 
culture throughout the fifties, even as McCarthyism ebbed mid-decade.  
The Cold War consensus also threw firm support behind the US’s evolving nuclear 
policy. Boyer that argues in the 1950s “most Americans concluded that safety lay in possessing 
more and bigger nuclear weapons than anyone else.” The “terrible simplification of Cold War 
thinking”63 which motivated such conclusions ensured continual support for increased nuclear 
weapons production and future research into developing a hydrogen bomb, the so-called “super” 
bomb. Even in periods when the Cold War seemed to be thawing nuclear weapons remained an 
enduring reality. In 1961 Americans could read a letter from President Kennedy in Life magazine 
that called for a national program of shelter construction.64 None of this seems possible without a 
vigorous Cold War consensus emphasizing that the struggle against international communism 
must be sustained.  
                                                          
62 The epilogue of this study will briefly discuss “sick” comics such as Lenny Bruce and satirical writers such as Paul 
Krassner. This new form of humor circumvented power structures by critiquing anti-Communist hysteria, the 
rigidity within postwar gender politics, the injustices of racial inequality, and the dictates of consumer culture.  
63 Boyer, Fallout, 172. 
64 Kennedy’s letter prefaced an in-depth article on how to survive an atomic attack. One section concentrated on 
shelter construction. Most assumed a nuclear attack could be survived with sufficient preparation. See LIFE, 






For Kessel studying historical humor texts can lead us to discover “a cultural practice that 
both organized social order and revealed shared assumptions about society and politics.”65 
Scholars who dismiss the importance of this “cultural practice” in the Cold War miss an 
opportunity to see how humor is often “constructing and deconstructing identity, disputing 
boundaries, and negotiating appearances.”66 
 At various points in the Cold War a “cultural practice” emerged that challenged official 
discourses. In the late 1940s, Herblock’s Mr. Atom cartoons help construct a liberal “identity” 
that opposed an unregulated nuclear arms industry and promoted international cooperation. 
When others took his lead by using satire to challenge the legitimacy of congressional 
committees infringing on Americans’ First Amendment rights during McCarthyite witch hunts 
they were disputing the “boundaries” being transgressed. And when Feiffer took aim at the 
period’s misleading uniformity in the larger culture he was “negotiating appearances” of the age 
on terms more representative of the cultural pluralist milieu of mid-fifties New York.  
Humor, however, could also reinforce dominant discourses. The sitcom remains a telling 
example of how humor worked to establish cultural norms. I Love Lucy and The Honeymooners 
may have featured characters representative of a diverse ethnicity and working class within the 
US but in the end their ambitions and goals did not differ significantly from the millions of 
Americans who had fled to the suburbs following WWII. When Lucille Ball, television’s highest 
paid star, was accused of harbouring communist sympathies her fictional and real-life husband 
Desi Arnez defended her by appealing to consumer culture: “The only thing red about this kid is 
her hair—and even that is not legitimately red.”67    
No war is without casualties. Those who did not follow Arnez’ lead ran the risk of being 
tarred with the Communist brush. Many learned the hard way after being fired, blacklisted, or 
forced to testify in front of congressional committees. This more immediate threat to basic civil 
liberties seems like a more pressing concern from hindsight’s perch. But satirists in the fifties 
often did not distinguish between the civil liberties threat and the nuclear threat. For many the 
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two were entwined. Throughout the Cold War the existential stirred with the political in an 
unholy mix of dread.    
Given how stultifying Cold War culture could be, one might expect satirists to tread 
carefully. MAD magazine, which debuted in 1952 and quickly became a cultural sensation, 
steered clear of controversial political issues. Instead it created controversy by satirizing 
consumer and celebrity culture. Their parodies of popular culture prompted a host of letters to 
FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover from concerned parents wanting to know if the magazine was 
spreading communist ideas. Such worries seem “quaint” from today’s perspective but to many 
Americans who watched Cold War fantasies projected into their living rooms via television the 
threat of communist infiltration seemed frighteningly real.68  
Perhaps the parents who wrote Hoover may have canceled their subscriptions to the 
Washington Post a few years prior after encountering a Herblock cartoon.  No doubt they would 
have done so if they came across Jules Feiffer’s work in the Village Voice. Both men offered far 
more trenchant commentary on postwar America than MAD ever attempted. However, in most 
accounts of humor in this period MAD often overshadows other forms of visual satire. This study 
hopes to correct this imbalance by looking at two visual satirists whose insights into postwar 
American culture were more penetrating than MAD’s caustic but apolitical approach.69  
In some ways our understanding of the era’s atomic culture remains as monochromatic as 
the black-and-white civil defense films which history has recorded. This study concurs with 
Boyer that: “post-1945 American culture makes no sense without taking into account the atomic 
bomb.”70 However, in Boyer’s otherwise exhaustive account humor bears mentioning only in a 
few sparse footnotes. Anti-nuke satire was a constitutive element of atomic culture as it added 
some splashes of colour to the period’s palette by asking Americans to reflect on their 
government’s nuclear policy. Seen this way, Herblock and Feiffer were not mere jesters. Given 
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their criticism of postwar trends it is hard to imagine those holding court ever forming a 
receptive audience for their satire.71  
To the readers who encountered anti-nuke cartoons in the Post and Voice during “the 
long fifties,”72 this satire provoked more than laughter. It also presented a counter-image of how 
to survive in the nuclear age. In doing so, it helped change contemporary notions of humor by 
selecting targets of derision—military and governmental leadership—immune from critical 
mockery during WWII. Like MAD, Herblock and Feiffer can be seen as a bridge to later sixties 
satirists who used humor to frame their opposition to the Vietnam War.        
As much as anti-Communist zealots facilitated a climate of fear, they also inspired 
opposition. Herblock’s and Feiffer’s anti-nuke satire suggested Americans did not need to accept 
the logic of nuclear deterrence in order to stay safe. Other options remained available, if only 
their leaders would pursue them. Likewise, their satire expressed misgivings towards civil 
defense that many of their readers may have shared. Such scepticism raised important questions: 
Wouldn’t those Americans “lucky” enough to survive an atomic attack be too staggered by the 
sight of charred corpses and ashen landscapes to rebuild their ruined cities? After an attack—
while governments conducted relief efforts from underground bunkers and anxious Americans 
huddled around radios waited for the latest CONELRAD update—would radioactive fallout 
prove to be more the lethal, lasting threat? In such a post-apocalyptic world, wouldn’t the living 
then envy the dead?  
Both Herblock and Feiffer illustrated cartoons that suggested that in the event of an 
attack, answers to these questions would register in the affirmative. By using humor to 
problematize issues related to the bomb, Herblock and Feiffer demonstrated how laughter took 
on larger social meaning when the source of mockery is institutionalized authority. But the 
question remains whether their satire challenged existing relations of power or served to 
                                                          
71 Then Vice-President Nixon is rumoured to have canceled his subscription to the Washington Post after 
encountering a particularly unflattering Herblock caricature of himself.  
72 Decades rarely conform neatly to what our calendars tell us. The “long fifties” may have started in 1946-47 when 
Leo P. Ribuffo argues “the anticommunist consensus congealed” and lasted until 1964-65 “when opposition to the 
Vietnam War prompted the reopening of dormant questions about the American way of life.” See Leo P. Ribuffo 
“Will the Sixties Never End? Or Perhaps at least the Thirties? Or maybe Even the Progressive Era? Contrarian 
Thoughts on Change and Continuity in American Political Culture at the Turn of the Millennium,” in Rethinking Cold 






consolidate them. Was it a “surrogate for action”73 or a “coalescing agent”74 that forged a sense 
of community among readers who “got” the joke? 
To borrow Michael Cohen’s phrase, the possible enjoyment Post and Voice readers took 
from anti-nuke cartoons had the potential to create a “politics of laughter”75 that challenged Cold 
War discourses, foreign policies, military strategies, defense spending, and civil defense plans 
because of the incisive criticisms embedded within these humor texts. When the “politics of 
laughter” were directed towards the cultural symbolism of “bomb power”76 laughter in the Cold 
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1.1: The Day the West Stood Still77  
Gloria Nutter’s response on September 24, 1949, suggested “atomic anxiety” could be activated 
at any moment. The Washington Post asked the British Admiralty employee78 for her response to 
recent news the United States had gathered evidence of an “atomic explosion” in the Soviet 
Union.79 When asked for her take on how this development would affect Soviet-American 
relations, the unfortunately named Ms. Nutter replied: “Nothing can be done by people like me.” 
Although she did not fear an immediate nuclear war between the two superpowers, Ms. Nutter 
added that “diplomatic relations are bound to be strained” now that both sides possessed nuclear 
capabilities. Summing up her feelings, Ms. Nutter stated, she felt “just helpless.”80  
The Americans interviewed for the Post’s “man-on-the-street” column echoed Ms. 
Nutter’s belief that any future negotiations with the Soviets over international control of atomic 
energy would be “strained.” However, the American interviewees also seemed to reflect an 
emerging consensus that the US needed to shift its focus from negotiation to increased bomb 
production. C. Almario, “a technical assistant to the Philippine Embassy,” said Americans 
“should be worried.” In order to alleviate these worries Almario suggested the US needed to get 
“tougher” in its dealing with the Soviets while improving “our own atomic weapons.” Mrs. 
Hallie Jetton, a Washington housewife, added, “We ought to think seriously about how we can 
make our bombs do the most good right now.”81  
The Post’s survey, while hardly scientific, did capture the uneasy mood at the capitol. 
But not everyone was moved by the “momentous news.”82 Federal employee Raph H. Gibeaux 
told the Post the news was already “old” since the announcement confirmed what US officials 
                                                          
77 The popular sci-film The Day the Earth Stood Still (directed by Robert Wise, Twentieth Century Fox) was not 
released until 1951, two years after the Soviets acquired nuclear capabilities. The film’s message—an alien visits 
earth and warns humanity it must find a way to coexist peacefully—seems particularly well-tailored to moments of 
crisis in the Cold War. 
78 Ms. Nutter was the only British citizen interviewed for this column. Most interviewees were American citizens, 
many of whom worked for the federal government.  
79 The administration released its statement announcing it had “evidence” of an “atomic explosion” late in the 
evening of September 23. Edward T. Folliard, “President’s Announcement Does Not Say Reds Have Bomb,” 
Washington Post, September 24, 1949.   
80 Benjamin C. Bradlee, “At 13 and F Sts. N.W.: A-Blast News Is Sobering But Few Express Fear,” Washington Post, 
September 24, 1949. 
81 Ibid.  






had been stating since 1945—the US’s nuclear monopoly would not last.83 At the UN an 
unperturbed Secretary of State Dean Acheson echoed this sentiment. The Post paraphrased 
Acheson as saying “that people should not be shocked by the announcement” since he, the 
president and AEC chairman David E. Lilienthal had been preparing the nation for this 
eventuality. For Acheson the “business” of preserving peace would continue to “proceed in a 
normal way.”84  
An editorial from that day’s Post tried to describe what this “normal” might look like.85 
Now that “the existence of a Russian bomb” had altered “the balance of power in the world,” the 
editorial stated, the US needed to pursue “a calm and sensible policy” while avoiding “panic.” A 
renewed emphasis on “quantity” and “quality” in nuclear production would help quell fears and 
prevent a “hysterical reaction” from Americans. The editorial urged readers to consider that “the 
tactical offensive use of the atom bomb” was already considered “limited” within military 
circles. Quoting General Omar Bradley, who in August was appointed Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, the Post argued the bomb had become more “defensive instrument” than 
offensive weapon.86  
While the editorial urged that negotiations in the UN Security Council should continue 
being pursued “vigorously,” it offset this conciliatory tone by recommending the US strengthen 
ties with its western European allies while ensuring a “full partnership” with Britain and Canada 
in nuclear research. Reminding its readers that the news might “be the impetus that will weld the 
Western World together,”87 the Post echoed the assumptions underpinning George Kennan’s 
formulation of containment which the Truman Doctrine adopted in its handling of the Greece 
                                                          
83 Bradlee, “A-Blast News Is Sobering But Few Express Fear.” 
84 “World Should Not Be Shocked By Atom Blast, Acheson Says,” Washington Post, September24, 1949. 
85 In London the New York Times reported the Daily Herald “called for the renewal of efforts to attain international 
control of atomic energy” while the Daily Mail argued the Soviet Union “would be less likely now to submit to 
control,” suggesting talks would hold little promise for joint-agreement. Taking stock of the public mood on the 
island nation whose memories of the London Blitz remained vivid, the Times also reported that “no firm and 
unanimous opinion” on the Soviet threat had emerged in Britain but the news “reminded Britons that their island 
is extremely vulnerable to atomic attack.” See Clifton Daniel, “British Also Urge Effective Control,” New York Times, 
September 24, 1949. The Times also noted that “diplomatic observers” in Moscow believed a “great disparity of 
bargaining powers” had been “removed” following the successful test, prompting the paper to suggest the new 
nuclear “equality” could become “A Spur to Peace.” See “A Spur to Peace Seen in Moscow,” New York Times, 
September 26, 1949. 
86 This early formulation of nuclear deterrence was a precursor to the Eisenhower administration’s policy of 
massive retaliation.  






crisis in early 1947. Failing to criticize what Patterson describes as “half-hearted efforts to 
accommodate the Soviets,”88 the Post missed an opportunity to highlight how proposals such as 
the Baruch Plan tilted towards the US and its allies.89 The Soviets, unlikely to submit to 
international inspection as the Baruch Plan proposed, were made to seem as transgressors.  
In this way the Post’s bylines on September 24 spoke to concerns that had been mounting 
for four years: “Grave Senate Hears Soviet A-Bomb News”90 read one; “Stockpiling May Be 
Speeded”91 read another. By mirroring the administration’s “studied language”92 the Post’s 
editorial avoided fear-laced rhetoric and instead embraced what it called “hard thinking.”93 But 
“hard thinking,” as formulated by the Post, also reflected “the simplification of Cold War 
thinking.”94 Given this editorial slant one might expect their editorial cartoonist to express a 
similar position. Did Herblock’s September 24 cartoon offer an alternative reading of events? 
 
FIGURE 3: Herblock, “Mr. Atom Footprint,” Washington Post, September 24, 1949. 
                                                          
88 Patterson identifies three distinct phases in Truman’s foreign policy. The first lasted until early 1946 and 
“exposed a good deal of floundering and inconsistency.” The second phase began late in ’46 and featured “a 
stiffening of purpose” towards the Soviets. The final phase in ’47 saw the creation of “a more consistent, clearly 
articulated policy” of containment. See Patterson, Great Expectations, ch.5, 105-136. 
89 The Baruch Plan was based on the Acheson-Lilienthal Report and proposed to the UNAEC in June, 1946. The 
proposal called on the US to destroy its nuclear arsenal if each signee to the proposed treaty refrained from 
producing their own weapons while opening themselves up to international inspection teams. An international 
governing body then would regulate the production of atomic energy. But it was a plan the Soviets were likely to 
reject while the US remained the only nuclear power. Abstaining from the Security Council vote in 1946, the Soviet 
Union did just this and by early 1947 the proposal was dead. See Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko, The 
Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008), introduction, 
1-43. 
90 Robert C. Albright, “Grave Senate Hears Soviet A-Bomb News,” Washington Post, September 24, 1949. 
91 “Truman Reveals Red A-Blast; No Widespread Alarm Felt; Stockpiling May Be Speeded,” Washington Post.  
September 24, 1949.   
92 Folliard, “President’s Announcement Does Not Say Reds Have Bomb.” 
93 “Editorial—The Russian Bomb.”    






Next to the Post’s editorial on page six, and placed above published “Letters to the 
Editors,” readers could find one of Herblock’s most salient Mr. Atom cartoons. The 
anthropomorphic character—with short arms and stout legs—wore a sad expression on his face 
that day. Standing alone on the shore, Mr. Atom gazes down at a large footprint made in the 
sand. He holds an umbrella (perhaps to shield himself from radioactive fallout?) topped with an 
American flag. Taking stock of the unseen colossus’ mark, Mr. Atom’s face registers the 
presence of another. No longer alone on his island, Mr. Atom’s solitude, much like the US’s 
nuclear monopoly, is no more. Post readers that day could imagine that beyond Mr. Atom’s 
island lay a calm blue sea whose placidity had been disrupted by the era’s atomic tests. 
Eventually, the relentless waves would wash up on the shore and erase from view the giant 
footprint that had captured Mr. Atom’s attention. While the footprint will dissolve into water, the 
radioactive residue will remain, mixing the contaminated sand with the salty sea, and leaving the 
ocean to carry to other distant shores its toxic mixture.95 
This chapter will situate this Herblock cartoon, along with several others that appeared in 
the Post between 1946 and 1955, in the larger atomic culture that had taken root in the US 
following Hiroshima. It will also chart the evolution of Herblock’s Mr. Atom character in order 
to show how the Post’s cartoonist responded to the failure of what he referred to in his cartoons 
as “world atomic control.” With the liberal goal of international cooperation seemingly 
disappearing in a billowing mushroom cloud after news of the Soviet atomic test, Herblock 
shifted the focus of his Mr. Atom cartoons to address emerging debates centered on proposals to 
build a “super bomb.”    
Ms. Nutter, the British interviewee for the Post’s “man-on-the-street” column, had cause 
to feel “helpless” that day. The “strange disquiet” and “very great apprehension” that theologian 
Reinhold Niebuhr believed was taking hold in “the more sober and thoughtful sections” of the 
nation following Hiroshima began resurfacing as the 1940s drew to a close.96 As Boyer observes, 
such fears were not confined to intellectual circles as Americans wrote letters to the editor with 
bylines that read, “Science Moving Too Fast.”97  
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After learning of the successful Alamogordo test on July 16, 1945, Truman confided 
similar fears in his diary: “I fear machines are ahead of mortals. . . we are only termites on a 
planet and maybe when we bore too deeply into the planet there’ll [be] a reckoning—who 
knows?”98 Was Ms. Nutter’s “helpless” feeling related to the unimpeded speed in nuclear 
development and research? Would science burrow further? If Ms. Nutter had encountered 
Herblock’s September 24 cartoon would she have read Mr. Atom’s pensive expression as a sad 
lament for the goal of world atomic energy?  
* * * * 
1.2: Mr. Herblock Goes to Washington  
Given his position as an editorial cartoonist for a leading daily based in the nation’s capital, one 
might assume that Herblock was the ultimate “Beltway” cartoonist. However, Herblock’s 
independent streak often made him an outsider in Washington politics. At times he clashed with 
his own paper’s editorial board. After the Washington Post endorsed Eisenhower for president in 
1952 Herblock, one of the few prominent voices who proclaimed he didn’t “like Ike,” stopped 
cartooning for the Post for a brief period.99  
His penchant for independence is perhaps one reason why Kercher argues his fellow 
cartoonists considered Herblock “by far the most skilled and most influential member of their 
profession.”100 Contemporaries like the St. Louis Dispatch’s cartoonist Daniel Fitzgerald, lauded 
Herblock for his fearlessness in attacking Red-baiting politicians like Nixon and McCarthy.101 
Many Post readers agreed. Washington resident Elbert Baldwin wrote a “Letter to the Editor” 
praising Herblock as a “great cartoonist” who had “the ability to make an issue succinctly 
graphic in slashingly (sic) strong drawing.”102 Another Washington resident, Jeremiah Digges, 
hailed Herblock as an “outstanding artist” who would one day rank alongside the legendary 
Thomas Nast as one of the nation’s “greatest” cartoonists.103 Following Herblock’s September 
                                                          
98 As quoted in Boyer, Fallout, 32. 
99 Eisenhower remained a favourite satiric target for Herblock. School integration was usually one issue Herblock 
took the president to task for in his cartoons. The genial grandfatherly image the ex-general projected also was 
critiqued by Herblock in his Eisenhower caricatures as the Post’s cartoonist interpreted the president’s aloofness as 
a sign of irresponsible leadership.     
100 Kercher, The Limits of Irreverence, 29. 
101 Fitzpatrick was no stranger himself to satirizing the bomb in postwar America. The St. Louis Dispatch cartoonist 
won two Pulitzer Prizes during his time at the Dispatch (1913-58). The second of these prizes was awarded in 1955 
for a cartoon critiquing the US and French involvement in Indochina.      
102 Elbert Baldwin, “Letters to the Editor,” Washington Post, October 13, 1947. 






24 Mr. Atom cartoon, Anne Norton of Oak Ridge, Texas wrote: “There is no better man in the 
business than your Herblock.”104 With such fanfare it’s no wonder the New Yorker’s Richard 
Rovere singled out Herblock in the 1950s as “possibly the country’s best bet to revive an 
American art that can stand plenty of reviving.”105  
Born in 1909 to a Catholic mother and a Jewish father, the precocious Herbert Block 
exhibited an early talent for drawing that would later position him as a candidate to revive this 
“American art.” Encouraged by his father, himself an amateur cartoonist, Block began taking 
drawing classes at the Art Institute of Chicago at the age of eleven. Soon after, his older brother, 
a reporter for the Chicago Tribune, exposed Herblock to “the fast-pace world of print 
journalism.”106 While still in high school Block began submitting his first cartoons for 
publication in the Evanston News-Index; the familiar moniker, “Herblock,” already 
accompanying his drawings. 
 In 1929 Herblock ended his formal education after leaving Forest Hills College in his 
second year to work for the Chicago Daily News as a staff cartoonist. While with the Daily News 
he worked alongside one of the era’s most respected cartoonists, Vaughn “Shoes” Shoemaker, 
famous for his creation of the recurring John Q. Public character.107 Like Shoemaker, Herblock 
buttressed his social satire with established drawing techniques then popular within the 
profession. Herblock used “vertical orientation” in his drawings along with “heavy crayon 
shading” that made “the clear, simple labeling” of his characters stand out.108  
In 1933 Herblock left the Daily News for Cleveland where he landed a position with the 
Newspaper Enterprise Association (NEA), which syndicated his cartoons to a national audience. 
Surrounded by “progressive columnists and editorialists” at the NEA, Herblock’s raised profile 
coincided with his embrace of New Deal-era liberalism.109 Yet Herblock’s staunch support for 
Roosevelt did not prevent the cartoonist from satirizing the president. After Roosevelt’s “court-
packing scheme” drew accusations of unconstitutional overreach, Herblock drew the dapper 
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patrician politician whacking a bamboozled congress with a cartoonish Supreme Court building. 
The caption that day read: “YOU CAN’T HAVE EVERYTHING.”110 
When war broke out in Europe caricatures remained a potent tool in Herblock’s 
cartooning arsenal. Naturally, Hitler and Mussolini received the Herblock treatment. Already 
politicized by the Great Depression, Herblock gave “graphic form and visual power”111 to Nazi 
atrocities. Before the US entered the war, Herblock’s cartoons also took aim at isolationists at 
home. After Pearl Harbor Herblock continued satirizing fascism and in 1942 he was awarded the 
first of an eventual three Pulitzer Prizes for his efforts.112 A year later he was drafted and he 
began drawing cartoons for the Army. When the war in the Pacific drew to a close following the 
atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Herblock quickly landed a position with the then 
“struggling” Washington Post113 where he would remain until his death in 2001.  
In the postwar years the Post’s influence grew alongside Herblock’s own. By 1958 
Herblock’s cartoons were syndicated in 266 newspapers through the Post and the Hall Syndicate. 
His work was also reprinted in progressive magazines such as the New Republic and The 
Progressive which helped to burnish his liberal credentials.114 Winning numerous accolades 
along the way—including a Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1994—Herblock became a 
cultural institution.115 But rarely did he rest on his laurels.  
In the early fifties Herblock began publishing his most renowned cartoons in anthologies 
accompanied with his own commentary.116 In these books Herblock adopted a “plain and folksy” 
tone which “helped defuse what many might consider subversive about his message.” The ideals 
articulated in these books—democratic rights, equality, freedom of expression—coalesced into 
what Kercher describes as a “traditional civic idealism.”117 This “traditional civic idealism” 
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reflected the optimism of postwar liberalism and underscored Herblock’s faith in American 
approaches to democracy. For Herblock, “trust in each other, dedication to free inquiry, and 
confidence in the collective wisdom of an informed public,” were the building blocks found in 
any democracy.118  
In the late 1940s and early 1950s these liberals ideals were threatened by the era’s anti-
Communist zealots whose tendency to view dissent as “communistic” stifled public debate of 
pressing issues such as world atomic control. Given Herblock’s support for this goal, anti-
Communist rhetorical excesses became an important target for his cartoons.  
Herblock’s approach to cartoons about anticommunism’s infringement on Americans’ 
civil liberties were similar to the cartoons he drew criticizing Roosevelt’s constitutional 
overreach in the late thirties. In both cases Herblock supported the general aims but took issue 
with the methods used to achieve them. In this way, his “traditional civic idealism” reaffirmed 
the importance of placing checks on presidential and congressional authority in order to preserve 
a democratic balance. In the case of his cartoons criticizing anticommunism, Herblock placed 
“dedication to free inquiry” above the hunt for “Reds” and “fellow travellers.”  
However, Herblock’s relationship to anticommunism was more complex then is often 
remembered. As his 1953 Pulitzer-winning cartoon commenting on the death of Joseph Stalin 
showed, Herblock’s liberalism viewed the Soviet system as inherently antithetical to his ideals. 
Like many postwar liberals Herblock considered Marxist ideology as a threat to the “collective 
wisdom of an informed public.” His celebrated caricatures of Richard Nixon and Joseph 
McCarthy need to be balanced with his own anti-Communist cartoons.119 Herblock did not 
displace the Soviet Union as a foe that needed to be confronted; rather his critiques of 
communism fit within the framework of his “traditional civic idealism.” 
Kercher argues that Herblock’s cartoons commenting on communism reflected ideas 
“more consistent with views of mainstream, anticommunist Democrats.”120 However, Kercher 
adds that Mr. Atom represented a “significant caveat to cold war foreign policy” by warning his 
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readers “against the dangers of expanding nuclear arsenals.”121 Herblock viewed the nuclear 
issue as a similar destabilizing postwar trend that needed to be solved within the venue of the 
UN. Mr. Atom, who proved to have a longer shelf-life than McCarthy and more comebacks than 
Nixon, was an equally important character in Herblock’s oeuvre that demonstrated how his 
liberalism approached the issue of world atomic control. 
* * * * 
On August 3, 1946, Herblock marked the one year anniversary of the bombing of 
Hiroshima with a cartoon that spoke to the bomb’s contentious past and uncertain future. 
Herblock used the occasion to remind his readers that negotiations within the UNAEC had yet to 
achieve any results. In that day’s Post he drew the Grim Reaper’s skeletal hands clutching an 
atomic weapon. The bomb hangs over the globe like the sword of Damocles as faceless 
bureaucrats try to hammer out agreements on “WORLD ATOMIC CONTROL.”122     
In the following weeks the Post published a number of Herblock cartoons that explored 
nuclear themes. On August 11 he drew a nuclear weapon aimed at the sun. A team of UN 
inspectors huddle around the weapon while a character resembling Truman works on the bomb 
with a screwdriver.123 Two days later Herblock referenced the recent atomic tests that took place 
in the Bikini Atoll of the Marshall Islands a month earlier. In this August 13 cartoon Herblock 
drew a question mark in the form of a mushroom cloud. Within it contained a question: “SHAPE 
OF THINGS TO COME?”124   
As an editorial cartoonist it is hardly surprising Herblock would feature commentary in 
his cartoons that reflected contemporary events. In the summer of 1946 Herblock had ample 
evidence from the wider culture to suggest the nation was both fascinated and horrified by the 
bomb. In July the Bikini Tests that were part of Operation Crossroads signalled that the atomic 
age was more than an instant flash in the sky over the doomed cities of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki.125 A preliminary report released by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on July 31 noted that the 
first bomb tested in Operation Crossroads produced a “flash of radiation [that] was not of high 
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order.” However, the explosion from the second bomb turned the sleek decks of nearby anchored 
battleships into “radioactive stoves” after waves of “highly radioactive water” washed “into the 
hulls of the vessels.” According to the report these “radioactive stoves” would have “burned all 
living things aboard them with invisible and painless but deadly radiation.”126 
Only a few weeks before the report’s release the New Yorker published John Hersey’s 
article detailing the harrowing experiences of Hiroshima survivors. Later released in book form 
as Hiroshima, Hersey’s account provided a human component to the “mind-numbing statistics” 
and abstract science of the bomb. According to Boyer, Hersey’s “gripping interwoven narrative” 
of six individuals who survived the Hiroshima blast deepened “emotional sensibilities” of the 
bomb’s use by personalizing the horrors experienced by those on the ground.127            
In his early explorations of nuclear themes Herblock’s cartoons lacked such “emotional 
sensibilities.” Rather, he focused on political leaders like the president and UN diplomats. While 
his cartoons reflected their author’s preoccupation with the movement for international control of 
atomic energy, as well his worries over the ecological effects of the Bikini tests, none of these 
early efforts encapsulated his concerns effectively as Mr. Atom.  
 
FIGURE 4: Herblock, “Pardon Me, Mister—Do You Know What Time It Is?” Washington Post, August 27, 
1946.  
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On August 27, Post readers encountered  an early incarnation of Mr. Atom who is 
dressed in respectable clothes—blazer, tie and shoes—lending the character a human form that 
later cartoons dropped. In subsequent versions Mr. Atom usually dwarfed the human characters 
in the drawings which further distinguished humanity from the anthropomorphic bomb. In his 
debut Mr. Atom’s near human dimensions make him appear more peer than monster. 
Proportionally, the man holding the briefcase labelled, “WORLD DEMOCRACY” meets Mr. 
Atom at eye level which emphasizes their similar facial expressions. It is difficult to gauge who 
is more frightened: the startled man ostensibly working through the UNAEC to procure 
agreements on atomic energy or the anthropomorphic bomb whose explosiveness has made such 
efforts so crucial to preserving the postwar peace. Unlike the character who would greet news of 
the successful Soviet blast in 1949 with sad resignation, the Mr. Atom portrayed here appears 
lost. His face, gripped with fear, suggests he too is frightened by what lies ahead.  
The clandestine setting in this drawing anticipates the aura of secrecy that would envelop 
Cold War culture in the 1950s. Mr. Atom’s placement in what appears to be a back alley invokes 
the secrecy that pervaded the Manhattan Project. But it also would frame the “cloak-and-dagger” 
espionage that the Alger Hiss hearings in the House Un-American Activities (HUAC) conducted 
in 1948.  
As in most of Herblock’s cartoons, the caption framed the issues at stake. When 
formulated as a question, these captions asked readers to reflect on the discourse embedded in 
Herblock’s cartoons. In this case the question, “Do You Know What Time It Is?” introduced a 
time motif that Herblock would return to in future cartoons. This emphasis on time underscored 
the sense of urgency that liberals like Herblock believed was needed if negotiations within the 
UN were to prove successful. 
 This early version of Mr. Atom hinted at the “strange disquiet” that Niebuhr identified in 
the aftermath of Hiroshima. In his debut Mr. Atom seems as frightened as the humans he is 
haunting. Former Manhattan Project scientists used fear as a tactic in their campaign to warn the 
public of nuclear proliferation.128 The newly-created AEC,129 led by David Lilienthal, 
counteracted this public discourse with a campaign of its own. Through Lilienthal’s efforts 
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articles detailing the benefits of atomic energy began cropping up in mainstream news outlets.130 
Herblock’s Mr. Atom seemed to side with the scientists. By depicting both characters as scared, 
Herblock foreshadows later public worries that the bright future of atomic energy that many 
contemporaries in the 1940s clung to also contained some dark currents.  
The day after Herblock introduced his Mr. Atom character he returned to the nuclear 
theme. On August 28 Herblock presented Post readers with “BIKINI MICE.” The cartoon 
showed mice gathered around a newspaper with headlines detailing how the “BIKINI MICE 
ARE STILL FERTILE.” One mouse holds a placard proclaiming the rodents’ intentions to claim 
the earth. The cartoon’s caption screams: “One More War And Then We Take Over!”131 But like 
Herblock’s other nuclear-themed cartoons published in the Post in the weeks leading up to Mr. 
Atom’s debut, “BIKINI MICE” did not distill the issues surrounding public debate of world 
atomic control as effectively as Mr. Atom. Herblock’s personification of the bomb made the 
abstract fears of a future nuclear arms race more identifiable by presenting Post readers with a 
character that embodied these worries.  
Post readers would encounter Mr. Atom five more times in 1946.132 These early efforts 
continued referencing negotiations in the UN while urging some form of international agreement 
on the nuclear issue. By 1947 these debates intensified and Herblock responded to the public 
discourse by illustrating several cartoons that highlighted the issues at stake. 
 
FIGURE 5: Herblock, “Don’t Mind Me—Just Go Right On Talking!” Washington Post. February 5, 1947. 
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On February 5 Herblock addressed these debates by presenting Post readers with a 
domineering Mr. Atom. In this cartoon Herblock substituted Mr. Atom’s frightful expression for 
a blasé one. His size is notably different than his near-human proportions featured in his debut. 
Together this suggests the bomb is controlling the agenda—not the faceless men crouched over 
their boardroom table discussing how atomic energy could be regulated through an international 
governing body. Measuring the circumference of the globe in cool detachment, Mr. Atom 
appears to be the one dictating the agenda if sensible men fail to find agreement over his control. 
The understated caption contrasts with Mr. Atom’s looming presence and speaks to worries that 
the Baruch Plan was stalled. “Don’t Mind Me—Just Go Right On Talking,” addresses the 
cartoon’s non-descript bureaucrats and policymakers while also inviting Post readers to consider 
if “Talking” in the UN could lead to anything of substance.  
Four days later on February 9 Herblock briefly restored Mr. Atom to his original 
proportions in order to show him on par with an angry character labeled “ARMAMENTS.” Both 
struggle to find entrance into the UN while jostling with the other. If both had made it inside 
while the UN had been in session, perhaps they would have encountered more struggle as the 
Baruch Plan seemed at an impasse by 1947. 
 
FIGURE 6: Herblock, “Quit Your Shoving!” Washington Post, February 9, 1947. 
This impasse, frustrating to liberals like Herblock who placed so much faith in the newly-
established UN, prompted more comment from the Post’s cartoonist on March 11. In this cartoon 
Herblock once again portrayed Mr. Atom as an out-sized monster who appears more in control 
than his previous appearance implied. The caption, “You Tell ‘Em Kid—I’m A Sovereign Power 







FIGURE 7: Herblock, “You Tell ‘Em, Kid—I’m A Sovereign Power Myself.” Washington Post, March 11, 
1947. 
The “Kid” in this cartoon is Soviet Ambassador to the UN Andrei Gromyko, who was 
then proposing an alternative plan for atomic energy which would move the debate to the UN’s 
Security Council. With Mr. Atom leaning nonchalantly behind him the Soviet diplomat reads a 
bulletin with the heading “NO INTERNATIONAL CONTROL.” Standing behind a lectern the 
reader can imagine that Gromyko’s audience consists of UN diplomats. Herblock’s cartoon 
suggests Gromyko would be better served by paying attention to who was behind him. 
This set of cartoons from 1947 did an effective job of addressing public worries of the 
fate of efforts to secure some form of world atomic control. In the early part of 1947 the Post 
stressed a similar tone in its coverage of negotiations at the UN. A February 9 editorial posed the 
question if it was not more prudent to worry “less about secrecy and more about international 
control?” During these heady months the Post urged readers to consider that US security “does 
not lie in monopoly.”133 Herblock echoed this editorial line in a February 27 cartoon depicting 
the US as an old man stranded alone on an “ATOMIC SECRET ISLAND.” The old man 
searches for a footprint that would not appear until September, 1949.134  
Debates over the future of world atomic control coincided with an increase of 
anticommunism in the US. In March, 1947, Truman asked Congress for military aid for 
Communist-besieged Greece. A March 16 Post editorial voiced support for this decision—it 
called it “novel” and “daring”—but its editorial that day failed to connect how the 
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administration’s foreign policy might hinder efforts to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on 
a host of issues, including atomic energy.135   
Through the remainder of the year into 1949 Herblock refrained from demonstrating this 
relationship in his Mr. Atom cartoons. Instead he kept the focus of his Mr. Atom cartoons trained 
on the UN. Mr. Atom remained an important vehicle for this commentary, appearing in the Post 
a total ten times in 1947. In 1948 Herblock drew six Mr. Atom cartoons that the Post 
published.136   
 
FIGURE 8: Herblock, “Tick-Tock, Tick-Tock,” Washington Post, January 11, 1949. 
In his first Mr. Atom cartoon in 1949 Herblock drew a self-assured Mr. Atom twirling 
what appears to be the symbol for the AEC. As was quickly becoming a trend in Mr. Atom 
cartoons, Herblock positioned his character so he could tower over the human subjects. To the 
reader his presence looms large. But to the human subjects in these cartoons Mr. Atom’s 
presence goes unacknowledged. This way of presenting Mr. Atom rendered the character a more 
haunting figure.  
The caption in this cartoon references the recently created atomic clock scientists had 
developed to measure time more accurately. Such a reference invoked the presence of another 
clock—the “Doomsday Clock” which had adorned the cover of the Bulletin of the Atomic 
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Scientists since June, 1947.137 The Bulletin’s clock showed the minute hand indicating the time 
was seven minutes to midnight—the hour when humanity’s “time” would run out. To Post 
readers who were aware of the Bulletin’s clock, connections between Herblock’s “Tick-Tock, 
Tick-Tock” and the “doomsday” clock could easily be made, rendering this Mr. Atom cartoon a 
particularly gloomy portrait.  
According to data assembled by Sasha Hoffman, 1949 was one of the peak years for 
Herblock cartoons containing nuclear themes.138 In this pivotal year Mr. Atom appeared in the 
Post on eight occasions, including an August 3 cartoon commemorating the four year 
anniversary of Hiroshima. On a day of reflection Herblock chose to show Mr. Atom blowing out 
the earth’s candles. The headlines in Herblock’s cartoon newspapers declare the “U.N. 
COMMISSION GIVES UP ON ATOM CONTROL” and “A.E.C. REPORTS MORE 
EFFECTIVE A-WEAPONS.”139 Within weeks real newspapers would be reporting the Soviets 
now had the bomb.  
The idyllic scenery of Herblock’s September 24, 1949 cartoon marking news of the 
Soviet’s successful test, represented a brief pause in the character’s evolution. Given the spate of 
tests conducted by the US in the South Pacific since 1946, choosing an island for this drawing 
spoke to the bomb’s past while also hinting at its possible future. But what would this future 
entail now that Soviets also had the bomb? 
In Mr. Atom cartoons featured from 1947-49 Herblock’s alarm-raising tone reminded 
readers that a grim future awaited the US if world atomic control failed. While subscribers to the 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists would have agreed with the tone of Herblock’s cartoons, 
commentators in the late forties who believed the Soviets lagged behind in the necessary science 
and technological knowledge needed to construct an atomic bomb were proven wrong. The 
Bulletin’s “doomsday” clock and Herblock’s Mr. Atom cartoons did a better job of anticipating 
the end of the US’s nuclear monopoly. Through the remainder of the year into 1950, public 
debates in the US began centering on how the US should respond to the Soviet’s ascension into 
the nuclear club. As the Post editorial at the beginning of this chapter suggested, the question 
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hinged on building a “super bomb” or pursuing an agreement with the Soviets on world atomic 
control. Liberals like Herblock pressed for the latter.    
 
FIGURE 9: Herblock, “Want To Meet My Friend Too?” Washington Post, January 17, 1950. 
Debate continued in 1950. Herblock waded into the discussion by subjecting his lead 
character to a supporting role. The character’s proportions in this cartoon are revealing as the 
giant hand labelled “SUPER BOMB” dwarfs Mr. Atom’s body. His facial expression, so crucial 
to deciphering past Mr. Atom cartoons, is also harder to discern. The reader’s eyes shift to the 
giant hand stretching out from the overcast skies. A bottle imprinted with the AEC’s symbol 
releases a billow of smoke that curls into the darkened clouds. For those opposing the hydrogen 
bomb project Herblock did not draw a silver lining in this cartoon.  
On January 31 Truman confirmed that the US would move forward on construction and 
development of the “Super”—a decision many liberals lamented.140 Herblock protested this 
decision in his work. Through the remainder of the year the Post continued publishing nuclear-
themed cartoons from Herblock. However, only four from 1950 included Mr. Atom, two of 
which also featured a reference to the “Super.” From 1951-52 Mr. Atom appeared in the Post’s 
editorial section a total of ten times, a drop from its peak in 1949.141  
After debates over the “Super” began fading from public discourse, Herblock began 
using Mr. Atom to comment on the issue of joint collaboration of atomic science with Britain in 
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a series of cartoons from 1952. With proposals for world atomic control stalled, and the new 
realities of this “frigid” phase of the Cold War hardening positions between the two Cold War 
rivals,142 this theme suggested Herblock supported goals to strengthen the US’s nuclear position. 
The framing of joint collaboration in these cartoons from 1952 also complemented Herblock’s 
approach to drawing cartoons that commented on civil defense. From 1950-55 the Post published 
twelve Herblock cartoons featuring some reference to civil defense, five of which included Mr. 
Atom.143         
As the bombs grew in size so too did the need for establishing a civil defense 
infrastructure. In the last years of the Truman administration civil defense exercises and its 
attending propaganda added a new component to Cold War culture. In 1953 these civil defense 
programs were being expanded by the incoming Eisenhower administration whose “New Look” 
defense policy adopted “massive retaliation” as a military strategy that would deter any possible 
Soviet attack. As part of this reshuffling of defense priorities the FCDA requested more funding 
from Congress for civil defense. Herblock responded to the FCDA requests by using his Mr. 
Atom to comment on the massive federal appropriations that would be earmarked for civil 
defense programs. However, Herblock’s ambivalence to civil defense complicate any reading of 
Mr. Atom’s appearance.   
 
FIGURE 10: Herblock, “It Looks Darling,” Washington Post, July 23, 1953. 
                                                          
142 Patterson, “Red Scares Abroad and at Home, Grand Expectations, ch.7, 165-205. 







In this cartoon from 1953 Herblock renders a hapless Uncle Sam a quaint figure next to 
the imposing Mr. Atom. Holding an umbrella labelled, “CIVIL DEFENSE APPROPIATIONS,” 
Uncle Sam peers out to the reader in desperation. The cartoon’s caption, “It Looks Darling,” 
mocks the faith the FCDA placed in their goals of cultivating a culture of “preparedness.” Mr. 
Atom offers a limp wave as if to say such funds were unnecessary—his destructive capabilities 
would render any funds devoted to civil defense a waste of spending.   
Nine Mr. Atom cartoons made it into the Post from 1953-54. A December 8, 1953 
cartoon is worth singling out for it featured Mr. Atom casting his shadow over the UN.144 The 
UN was a recurring setting used by Herblock even after the goal of world atomic control was no 
longer being pursued. By this point in the character’s evolution Mr. Atom had become more 
specter than comic figure.   
In the mid-fifties fears over the ecological effects of radioactive fallout shifted debates of 
the nuclear issue from world atomic control to securing an international ban on atmospheric 
testing. Boyer traces the origins of the public alarm over fallout to the US’s Bravo tests in 
March, 1954. Although the world’s first thermonuclear explosion occurred in the Pacific Atoll of 
Eniwetok in November, 1952, the Bravo tests in ’54 is what first alerted the world to fallout 
dangers.145 The fifteen megaton blast “proved to be 750 times more powerful than the A-bomb 
dropped at Hiroshima”146 and created a crater “250 feet deep and more than a mile across” that 
was detected as far as 200 miles away from the test site. Japanese fisherman aboard the fishing 
vessel Lucky Dragon, and anchored some 80 miles from the test site, were exposed to radioactive 
fallout carried downwind. Most of the crew showed some signs of radiation sickness in the 
following weeks and soon the thermonuclear age claimed its first victim after one crewman died.  
Herblock referenced “fallout” in three cartoons in 1955,147 none of which included Mr. 
Atom.  But as he did in his December, 1953 cartoon, Herblock used the shadow of a bomb to 
invoke Mr. Atom presence. On February 20, 1955 the Post published Herblock’s “Shape of 
Things to Go.” The reader can only glimpse the bottom half of the imposing figure whose feet 
are firmly planted on the globe. He projects a shadow whose silhouette resembles an atomic 
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bomb. A black pall darkens a large swath of the planet. Written into the bomb’s shadow are the 
words, “H-BOMB FALL-OUT AREA.” The cartoon’s caption, “Shape of Things To Go,” 
reconfigures a question posed in an earlier cartoon from August, 1946—“Shape of Things to 
Come?” Herblock then asked.148 In 1955 Herblock dropped the question mark and reworded the 
phrase to read as a declarative statement. 
 
FIGURE 11: Herblock, “Shape of Things to Go,” Washington Post, February 20, 1955. 
* * * * 
Concern that radiation was a cancer-causing agent that could also lead to “long-term 
genetic damage,” centered on the radioactive isotope strontium 90, which was “pumped into the 
earth by thermonuclear explosions” and returned to earth in rain before entering the food chain. 
Such worries prompted Khrushchev’s remark to Eisenhower, “We get your dust, you get our 
dust, the winds blow, and nobody’s safe.”149 Publicly the Eisenhower administration tended 
towards obfuscation of the effects of radiation and continued “to ignore or to dismiss such 
alarming reports.”150  
Given Herblock’s continuing criticism of the Eisenhower administration’s policy of 
“massive retaliation” and unrestrained atmospheric testing, the Post cartoonist most likely would 
have concurred with the Soviet leader’s dour assessment. Unfortunately for test-ban advocates 
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like Herblock, neither side was willing to curtail atmospheric testing until the Eisenhower 
administration called for a moratorium in 1958. 
  By this point in the cultural history of the bomb fallout fears had rescinded the optimism 
that liberals like Herblock had exhibited in their earlier quest for world atomic control. 
Herblock’s 1955 cartoon featuring the shadow of a bomb looming over the globe did not signal 
the end of the character’s presence in the Post. Between 1946 and 1964 the Post published 
ninety-four Mr. Atom cartoons, fifty-seven of which appeared between 1946 and 1955, the 
timeframe being discussed here.151  
But by the mid-sixties Herblock expressed doubts that his character was making a 
difference in changing the public’s perceptions of the nuclear issue. Reflecting on the meaning of 
his Mr. Atom creation in 1964, Herblock lamented that many readers may have missed the point 
of his character:  
“If in some way the happy day should come when there would be no nuclear weapons to  
fear and no possibility of war in the world ever again, I know that some kind, well- 
meaning person would come running to share my ‘misfortune’ and to say, ‘Golly, it’s too  
bad you won’t have your old A-bomb character to draw any more. Tough luck!”152 
 
No doubt Herblock would have welcomed such “tough luck” in 1947 if the Baruch Plan 
succeeded in keeping the nuclear threat in check. Had world atomic control been implemented 
and enforced by the UN the need for illustrating Mr. Atom would have not been as apparent. 
History, of course, did not oblige Herblock’s aims. However, Herblock never relinquished the 
liberal dream that bilateral negotiations with the Soviets could alleviate some of the global risks 
engendered by the nuclear arms race. In 1968 Herblock elaborated on this goal: “After a couple 
decades in the nuclear age, we’re reconciled to living with the Bombs—as long as we can keep 
on living.” For liberals like Herblock the only path to a “safer and saner world” was through 
negotiation since unilateral disarmament was a non-starter in the frigidity of Cold War politics. 
For Herblock “more progress in bomb control” lay in the twin features of “diplomatic restraint 
and patience.”153  
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Post readers who encountered Mr. Atom between 1946 and 1949 may not have 
recognized Herblock’s plea for “patience” in these cartoons. Like his other nuclear-themed 
cartoons Mr. Atom communicated a sense of urgency that Herblock clearly intended to convey 
to his readership. As the culture around them began incorporating nuclear themes into popular 
songs, films, and literature, Americans in the late forties were increasingly exposed to an “atomic 
culture” which Herblock’s Mr. Atom cartoons helped define. Only instead of capitalizing on the 
bomb’s power to inspire kitsch consumer goods, and sensational science fiction plots, Herblock’s 
contributions to atomic culture encouraged a critical reading of the US’s “half-hearted” effort at 
wooing the Soviets. Readers who encountered Herblock’s Mr. Atom cartoons in the Post or in 
syndication through the vast newspaper network of the Hall syndicate may have not detected a 
change in Herblock’s approach to drawing Mr. Atom after 1949. But those readers who followed 
the character’s evolution since 1946 could see how Mr. Atom became an increasingly 
domineering presence in Herblock’s cartoons. The cynicism Mr. Atom seemed to convey 
reflected a growing pessimism that many liberals felt towards the nuclear threat in the 1950s.  
* * * * 
1.3: Laughing in Cold War Culture  
Sociologists George E.C. Paton and Chris Powell argue scholars who study “the use of humor by 
social actors” can contextualize a humor text by evaluating how it registered “a means of social 
control or resistance to such control.” Through such a lens Paton and Powell contend scholars 
can approach humor as a “social indicator of historical developments and social change.”154  
Contrasting Herblock’s Mr. Atom cartoons in the late 1940s with his nuclear-themed 
cartoons from the 1950s indicates “social change” on the nuclear issue had taken place. The arc 
in Mr. Atom’s character evolution parallels Herblock’s shifting concerns on the topic. 
Herblock’s Mr. Atom cartoons from 1950-55 lacked the urgency of earlier cartoons because 
there was no obvious goal for internationalist liberals like himself to promote once the realities 
of the arms race became entrenched. His framing of civil defense during this period was 
ambiguous, suggesting he remained ambivalent towards the FCDA’s efforts to cultivate a culture 
of “preparedness.” In the early fifties Mr. Atom began reflecting cynicism and defeat. Not until 
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1955, when fallout fears reignited public worries over the ecological consequences of 
atmospheric testing, did Herblock recapture the focus of his earlier work. Working towards a ban 
on atmospheric testing replaced world atomic control as a goal for liberal activists.      
However, defining what Mr. Atom meant to readers within Patton and Powell’s binary 
notions of “resistance” and “social control” poses problems. For one, Herblock’s nuclear-themed 
cartoons in the 1940s did not adopt or advocate “resistance” so much as they urged readers to 
consider how the goal of world atomic control could be achieved through an institutional 
framework such as the UN. As much as Herblock’s Mr. Atom cartoons mocked the inefficacy of 
UNAEC to solve this issue, his cartoons did not put forth alternative solutions. Rather, the motif 
of time in Herblock’s early Mr. Atom cartoons suggested the US needed to prioritize efforts like 
the Baruch Plan in order to avoid a future arms race. Likewise, employing binary notions of 
“resistance” to explain Mr. Atom does not account for the many ways Herblock’s “traditional 
civic idealism” complemented editorials from the Post—a newspaper that reflected discourses 
from within the “Beltway.” Only after the Soviets obtained the bomb did Herblock’s nuclear-
themed cartoons depart from the Post’s editorial line and even then such disparities were rare 
and subtle. Where subtleties did exist, as in the case of Herblock’s September, 1949 cartoon 
commenting on the successful Soviet test, readers may not have necessarily picked up on these 
discrepancies.  
Given the stultifying political culture of the Cold War, comparing Herblock’s nuclear-
themed cartoons to cartooning traditions in authoritarian cultures would appear to be one way of 
explaining how readers read the Post cartoonist’s work. On the surface such comparisons appear 
inviting. In the immediate postwar years anti-Communist excesses undermined the image of a 
free, democratic society that Cold Warriors projected abroad when contrasting the US with the 
Soviet Union. However, despite the litany of civil liberty abuses that dated to the Truman 
administration’s loyalty oath program for federal employees in the late forties, and which 
continued into the McCarthy era, the Cold War consensus was never complete. Even as many 
elites continued viewing the struggle against international communism through what Alan 
Brinkley calls “the prism of a simple ideological lens,”155 critics like Herblock found important 
crevices in Cold War culture from which to articulate their critiques. The public-building 
consensus mechanisms which characterize many authoritarian cultures shared similarities with 
                                                          






postwar America but important caveats need to be registered—the postwar economic boom, the 
creation of a mass consumer culture promoting consumer participation, and appeals to 
constitutionally protected speech provided some counterweights to the authoritarian impulses 
embedded within Cold War culture. Using a comparative framework that draws examples from 
cartoonists labouring in authoritarian cultures then can lead to a totalizing explanation of 
Herblock’s work that fails in capturing the nuances and ambiguities that softened the blunt edges 
of Cold War culture.   
Comparing Herblock’s cartoons to American cartoonists from earlier eras also has its 
difficulties. Nineteenth-century cartoonist Thomas Nast seems at first glance like a fitting 
comparison. A Post reader quoted at the beginning of this chapter made this link.156 Both Nash 
and Herblock exhibited a healthy distrust of public officials and used their cartoons to draw the 
public’s attention to corruption and abuses of power. However, important differences remained. 
Nash never shared Herblock’s faith in the ability of government to deliver social good.157 
Likewise, Nash’s libertarianism, pronounced anti-Catholicism, and his reliance on racialized 
caricatures typical of the “scurrility” of late nineteenth-century American political cartooning, 
makes him a problematic candidate for comparison with the liberal Herblock.158   
From the Progressive era, socialist cartoonist Art Young, whose satire “riotously mocked 
the values of the capitalist system” while dramatizing “radical solutions,”159 shared some 
common traits with Herblock. However, Young’s invocation “that laughing at the capitalist 
system was a necessary element in defeating it,”160 places him further left on the political 
spectrum to the Post cartoonist. In the case of the Baruch Plan, Herblock did not urge its defeat. 
Instead, like many postwar liberals Herblock stressed working within existing power structures. 
Likewise Young’s socialist readership had a far more articulated set of goals than Post readers in 
the late forties and early fifties that further complicates any comparison between the two 
cartoonists.     
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While the comparisons to Nast and Young fall short, Michael Cohen’s recent work on 
Progressive era radical cartooning does provide some insights that can be applied to Herblock’s 
Mr. Atom cartoons. Cohen argues that radical cartoonists from the Progressive era “established a 
coherent visual vocabulary of class struggle and socialist possibility that influenced the entire 
movement.”161 Herblock’s liberalism precluded any support for “class struggle.” However, like 
Young, Herblock created “a coherent visual vocabulary” for his readers. In his early Mr. Atom 
cartoons Herblock framed what was at stake if the movement for world atomic control failed to 
procure meaningful commitments from nations. Herblock achieved this by illustrating Mr. Atom 
as an imposing figure who often loomed over the shoulders of UN delegates. By incorporating 
the recurring time motif in these cartoons Herblock underscored a sense of urgency that other 
world atomic control advocates stressed in their discourses. Likewise, his choice of setting for 
Mr. Atom cartoons—back alleyways, deserted islands—spoke to fears that the US would not 
remain the sole nuclear power for long. To readers who picked up on these visual cues Mr. Atom 
cartoons could be read as both a portent of doom or call to action, depending on one’s faith in the 
ability of the UN to solve the nuclear issue. 
Using Cohen’s concept of “visual vocabulary” can tease out similarities between 
Herblock’s nuclear-themed cartoons and his cartoons criticizing anti-Communist excesses. The 
Post cartoonist’s framing of the nuclear issue resembled his approach to caricaturing noted anti-
Communists such as Nixon and McCarthy. As already discussed, Herblock’s “traditional civic 
liberalism” placed a premium on protection of civil liberties. Despite his own anticommunism, in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s Herblock remained vigilant against assaults on free speech that 
many liberal commentators believed characterized HUAC’s hearings and McCarthy’s 
demagoguery. A mere six weeks after McCarthy made headlines by claiming he had a list of 
“250 subversives” in the State Department, Herblock turned the junior senator from Wisconsin 
into an “ism” when he coined the phrase “McCarthyism” in a March 29, 1950 cartoon.162 
Throughout the second Red Scare Herblock displayed his partisanship by drawing the 
Republican Party as a cowering elephant being led by a demagogic McCarthy.   
Just as his branding of “McCarthyism” helped define the era, so too did Herblock’s 
caricatures of Richard Nixon come to define the man. The permanent five o’clock shadow, the 
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arched bushy eyebrows and gyrating jowls—Herblock exaggerated these features to great effect, 
and by doing so crafted an image of Nixon that followed him throughout his political life.163  
Arthur P. Dudden described the flood of anti-Nixon satire which dominated the 
Watergate era as “malicious,” “violent,” and “without quarter.”164 But the discursive groundwork 
for this humor had been established a generation earlier. Before Nixon became a “comic figure” 
and “a magnetic field that attracted the darts of deflation”165 his anti-Communist rhetoric made 
him a satirical target for cartoonists like Herblock who feared his Red-baiting stifled public 
debate. Will Kaufman identifies Herblock as one of the original progenitors of anti-Nixon satire. 
For Kaufman “an awesome barrage of comedic weaponry had been trained on Nixon” since he 
first appeared on the national stage during his senatorial campaign.166 In 1948 Herblock drew 
then Congressman Nixon as a Puritan scaling a witch-clad Statue of Liberty in order to light its 
torch. Another Herblock cartoon from 1954 featured then Vice-President Nixon crawling out of a 
sewer on his way to a campaign stop. Whitfield names this caricature as Herblock’s “most 
famous” or “notorious” cartoon and a good example of how Nixon became “virtually a serial 
character” in postwar American politics.167 
But beyond mocking Nixon what did Herblock’s caricatures achieve? Anti-Nixon satire 
from the 1940s and the 1950s did not dissuade the electorate from granting “Tricky Dick” a 
landslide re-election in 1972; nor did it curb the presidential abuses of authority while he held 
office. Even “Nixon’s henchmen” Bob Haldeman and John Erlichman saw little harm in 
Herblock’s caricatures. They asked the Post cartoonist for originals so they could display them 
proudly in their West Wing offices.168 The question then of what effect Herblock’s anti-Nixon 
satire had on Post readers in the late forties and early fifties needs to be reformulated so as to 
consider how such cartoons created a reservoir of counter-images that helped forge later public 
perceptions of Nixon. The same can be said for Herblock’s caricatures of McCarthy. Both 
created a “visual vocabulary” for others cartoonists to use in their critiques of anticommunism. 
Herblock’s choice of setting in these cartoons—sewers, circuses—along with the heavy shading 
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he applied to Nixon and McCarthy ensured that readers would interpret these visual cues as 
disapproval with the methods employed by anti-Communists. In the process, this “visual 
vocabulary” demonstrated how criticism of anti-Communists could be framed during periods 
when liberals remained on the defensive.  
 As Kercher reminds us, it was no accident that Nixon and McCarthy featured a similar 
five o’clock shadow to the one Herblock gave Mr. Atom.169 For Herblock all three represented 
threats to individual liberties.  However, caricaturing the two “practitioners of the Black-Magic 
oaths,”170 during times when neither Nixon nor McCarthy welded power served little purpose for 
the editorial cartoonist. While Nixon and McCarthy commanded the nation’s political stage, 
Herblock showed “no quarter.” But when Red-baiting lost its ability to move voters Herblock 
moved on to other topics.171 In the case of Nixon, however, the image of a tar-smearing 
duplicitous politician stuck. When later Nixon critics wanted to take their own tar brush to the 
president during the Watergate era, they already had a good idea of what that image would look 
like. Herblock’s “visual vocabulary” had already given Americans that version of Nixon in the 
1950s. 
The parallels between Herblock’s nuclear themed cartoons from 1946-55 and his anti-
Nixon cartoons are worth noting for several reasons. For one, both sets of cartoons shared a 
“visual vocabulary” that exhibited similar aesthetic features. Readers who encountered a 
Herblock caricature of Nixon and McCarthy could also draw connections with the Post 
cartoonist’s approach to illustrating Mr. Atom. From there readers could interpret caricatures of 
Nixon and McCarthy as belonging to a larger pool of cartoons critiquing Cold War culture.  
Secondly, while neither form of satire succeeded in advancing Herblock’s goals—world 
atomic control failed and Nixon kept making “comebacks”—both sets of cartoons also contained 
appeals to core liberal values that allowed Herblock to promote his own political ideals. This 
liberal approach to caricaturing anti-Communists and drawing Mr. Atom had the ancillary effect 
of protecting Herblock from the censoring tendencies of the era. Both sets of cartoons reinforced 
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liberal themes of international cooperation and protection of civil liberties that anti-Communists 
tried to project in their rhetoric. Given this dynamic, attacking a liberal cartoonist like Herblock 
would prove difficult. 
Finally, recalling how Herblock’s caricatures of Nixon helped spawn a cottage-industry 
of anti-Nixon satire reminds us that images can remain potent long after the issue which sparked 
their creation ceases to exist. When Watergate prompted a new generation of cartoonists to mock 
“Tricky Dick” Herblock’s Nixon resurfaced to devastating effect. This new wave of anti-Nixon 
satire in the 1970s did not focus on Nixon’s anti-Communist rhetoric or the tactics he employed 
against political opponents. It did, however, make use of the duplicitousness associated with 
Nixon, and thus contributed to the public discourse surrounding Watergate. In this way the 
“visual vocabulary” Herblock established two decades earlier demonstrated the malleability of 
his caricaturized Nixon. Future satirists could work within the established forms and update the 
content to address their own concerns.  
Herblock’s Mr. Atom cartoons had a similar effect. The Post cartoonist did not intend his 
creation to become a “serial character” the same way Nixon had. Reflecting on Mr. Atom 
Herblock wrote: 
“He wasn’t planned as a continuing character, but after his first appearance he kept  
muscling into the pictures as a warning that he wasn’t going to be permanently on our  
side alone and that if he weren’t controlled he would cut loose on the whole world.”172 
 
By the mid-fifties it appeared Mr. Atom had been “cut loose on the whole world.” Icy 
relations with the Soviets continued into the Eisenhower years. Efforts like the “Atoms For 
Peace” speech Eisenhower gave in the UN in December, 1953 did not achieve much. By mid-
decade both superpowers had completed and tested hydrogen bombs that contained far more 
explosive power than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  
Other political cartoonists who shared Herblock’s concerns began incorporating nuclear 
themes into their cartoons in the 1950s. However, many took a different tack than Herblock by 
adopting an aggressive anti-Soviet stance in their cartoons. In 1953 the NEA’s John Fischetti 
illustrated a cartoon that commented on the Soviet’s “peace offensive.” Fishetti drew a giant 
stick labeled “SOVIET DEEDS” with a carrot dangling from it. Above the carrot “PEACE 
                                                          







TALK” was inscribed. Also in 1953 the St. Louis Globe-Democrat’s Don Hesse illustrated a 
nuclear missile with the words “FREE WORLD DEFENSE” scribbled on it.173 
Both cartoons from Fischetti and Hesse demonstrate a more conservative approach to 
drawing the bomb. Herblock’s staunch liberalism and willingness to stake unpopular positions 
ensured his nuclear-theme cartoons would adopt a more critical perspective on the bomb.        
*  *  *  * 
As an editorial cartoonist Herblock needed to be topical in order to correspond to the 
day’s news. This became a limiting factor in his approach to satirizing the bomb. By the mid-
fifties another media form, the comic book, whose roots date to the 1930s, allowed for presented 
new ways of illustrating and commenting on contemporary events.  
In 1952 the first issue of MAD was released. Four years later it developed from a comic 
satirizing other comics, to a magazine that incorporated parodies of consumer and celebrity 
culture. The demographic make-up of its readership—mostly young, white teenage males— 
signalled a market shift in the consumers of satire. By 1960 MAD’s circulation reached over one 
million with “a pass-along rate estimated to be six times that.”174  
The commercial success of MAD shared many resemblances with the cultural impact 
newspaper comic strips had on consumer habits a half-century before MAD’s debut. Ian Gordon 
argues that comic strips were “an outcome of the process of modernization” that took place in the 
last decades of the nineteenth century and were a “humor-based response to the problems of 
representation faced by a society in transition.”175 Linking this visual culture to a growing 
newspaper industry Gordon also argues these “visual images were an important element in the 
emergence of the culture of consumption.”176  
In the 1950s this “culture of consumption” was being bolstered by the pent-up consumer 
demands unleashed by postwar spending habits. MAD was both a by-product and benefactor of 
the 1950s consumer culture. Thompson argues MAD was also instrumental in satire’s 1950s 
revival. By promoting “parody as a strategy to negotiate [the] contradictions of postwar life,” 
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MAD helped popularize the new “sick comedy” that expanded satire’s topical terrain in the 
1950s.177  
Within this changing cultural climate Jules Feiffer began illustrating long-form comics 
that borrowed the narrative structures found in comic books. By the mid-fifties the expanding 
possibilities that comics provided were incorporated into Feiffer’s satire. Readers who were 
familiar with the specter of an imposing Mr. Atom looming large over UN delegates, already had 
a counter-image of the bomb they could use to frame their reading of the nuclear issue. Feiffer 
used similar images only within a narrative structure that allowed him to explore more issues 
related to the bomb.   
As the following chapter will discuss, Feiffer expanded criticism of the US’s nuclear 
policy by taking aim at a host of issues buried in the subtext of Herblock’s nuclear-themed 
cartoons. Unlike Herblock, Feiffer did not work for a leading daily. Instead he criticized 
atmospheric testing, the expansion of civil defense, and the encroaching military-industrial 
complex that the nuclear arms industry helped facilitate from the confines of a progressive 
weekly whose audience was small in comparison to the Post. The Village Voice’s counter-culture 
ethic provided Feiffer a chance to “map out” his own “psychic geography.”178 Within Feiffer’s 
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2.1: What’s So Funny about Fallout? 
The pamphlet’s title made its intentions clear while simultaneously obfuscating them: “What you 
should know about RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT.” As a matter of phrasing, the title’s wording in 
this 1958 pamphlet from the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) is revealing for 
several reasons. By using the demonstrative “should” the authors limited the scope of inquiry of 
“what” Americans should know about fallout to what the FCDA deemed worth knowing. In 
other words, inside the pamphlet readers would only encounter what the FCDA’s authors were 
willing to share about exposure to radioactive fallout.  
The use of “you” as a subject in its title is also telling. By using “you” the FCDA authors 
reinforced the notion that individual Americans would be responsible for knowing how to 
survive in a post-attack world. However, one major obstacle for the FCDA in the late fifties was 
convincing Americans they still stood a chance to see this post-attack world if they survived an 
initial attack. In the late 1950s no national strategy for shelter construction had been 
implemented. The dirty secret of civil defense was that in the event of an attack millions of 
Americans would be left without shelter. In order to compensate for this shelter shortage an 
overlap of civil defense agencies at the municipal, state and federal levels refocused their efforts 
on coordinating and promoting evacuation plans.179 The 1958 FCDA pamphlet reflected this new 
focus by detailing how a civil defense infrastructure comprised of “warning systems, operational 
exercises, and drills” would “remove civilians from the areas of blast and fire damage.”180 But 
the dangers would not end there; surviving in this post-attack world would be equally perilous.   
Since the Bikini tests in 1946 the dangers associated with releasing radioactive materials 
into the atmosphere had been acknowledged by those who had encountered the bomb firsthand. 
Army physician David Bradley, who would become an outspoken critic of atomic testing, urged 
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the marines he encountered during Operation Crossroads to take precautions when boarding the 
test ships’ “radioactive stoves.”181 His 1948 book No Place to Hide followed in the tradition of 
Hersey’s Hiroshima, which had detailed the harrowing circumstances survivors confronted long 
after the last fires from Fat Man had been extinguished. Both books inserted fallout into the 
national conversation of atomic weapons. However, despite mounting evidence of the calamitous 
effects of atomic blasts, the American public’s understanding of the impact of fallout remained 
in its infancy until the 1954 Bravo test. Following the Bravo test a shaken Eisenhower admitted 
at a press conference that scientists were “surprised” and “astonished” with the results. Fallout, 
and its subsequent capacity to wreak untold environmental damage long after the last bombs 
were dropped, made the prospects of “thermonuclear conflagration” all the more terrifying.182   
Given the ensuing controversy the FCDA had little choice but to acknowledge Bravo had 
unleashed what it termed “terrors of the unknown.” According to the pamphlet’s authors, 
“rumors” and “conflicting reports” of fallout prompted President Eisenhower to authorize the 
AEC and FCDA to educate the American public on the “facts” of fallout. Since “people are 
always inclined to fear what they do not fully understand” explained the authors, demystifying 
this “new peril to civilian populations” was crucial for combating its deleterious effects.183  
One way to condition the public to accept the possibility of thermonuclear war was to 
create a narrative that projected an image of scientific mastery over “the unknown.” The FCDA 
authors, who described fallout as being “composed of particles of dirt, stone and other 
debris…contaminated by radioactive products of the bomb,” did this by linking a new 
“unknown” with known natural forms of radiation such as “cosmic rays” and other “mildly 
radioactive materials.”184 Presumably such a link would soften the public’s perceptions of 
fallout.  
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This strategy also complemented the FCDA’s goal of projecting authority over the 
evacuation process that would follow an attack even if their presence was not felt. In a section 
titled “Household Decontamination” the FCDA authors highlighted safe ways to consume water 
and food following an attack. If possible contamination was suspected, the pamphlet urged 
survivors to find alternative food sources and bury their clothing. These “protective measures” 
ostensibly were designed to keep Americans safe while they awaited “official information” 
updating levels of radiation in a designated “Fallout Area.”185  
As other civil defense pamphlets from this era demonstrate, evacuees would need to rely 
on official organs for fallout updates. A pamphlet from the Milwaukee Civil Defense 
Administration made a similar point when it reminded its readers that when it came to fallout, 
“You can’t smell it”; “You can’t taste it”; “You can’t hear it”; and “You can’t touch it.”186 
Because of this invisible, nearly undetectable threat, the FCDA could claim an unchallenged 
leadership role in coordinating a response to fallout. Concluding their 1958 pamphlet the FCDA 
authors wrote: “You should wait until fallout has stopped and authorities have declared your area 
safe before you go outside.”187 
This projection of authority, which was an integral trope in civil defense discourse, 
conformed perfectly with Cold War discourses emphasizing governmental leadership in crisis 
management. But in the era of Bikini such leadership was being called into question by critics of 
nuclear testing. The FCDA tried to counter this growing criticism by telling an official “story of 
fallout.” But their “story of fallout” was woven into a larger narrative reinforcing support for 
Cold War policies of containment, sustained nuclear production, and the deterrence doctrine 
known as “massive retaliation” which became official policy of the Eisenhower 
administration.188 If Americans were to accept the logic of “massive retaliation” then civil 
defense agencies like the FCDA needed to convince civilians that surviving a nuclear attack was 
possible.  
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But convincing Americans of the favourable prospects for survival was not the only goal. 
Tracy C. Davis has noted how civil defense exercises took on the characteristics of “rehearsal” 
rather than “performance.” This distinction allows us to see how “moments of resemblance” 
rehearsed in civil defense drills became part of a Cold War performative culture.189 Following 
Davis’ insight, David Monteyne has argued in his study of civil defense-inspired architecture that 
“the performative nature of Cold War civil defense” suggests authorities “strove for more than 
mere intellectual persuasion; they aspired to instill behaviours as well as beliefs.”190  
This effort to “instill behaviours” and “beliefs” undercut the FCDA’s claims of neutrality. 
Survivors huddled around radio sets—provided, of course, their shelter came equipped with 
one—were instructed to tune into 640 or 1240 on their AM dials for CONELRAD updates. 
Presumably such broadcasts would inform survivors when it was safe to return outside. But the 
reliance on “official instructions” would not end there. In civil defense scenarios the task of 
rebuilding remained an equally as important goal as surviving the initial blast.  
Seen this way, the FCDA’s “story of fallout” as told in this 1958 pamphlet remained 
unfinished. Before an attack Americans were expected to educate themselves on fallout. During 
an attack they would be expected to perform the roles rehearsed in civil defense drills. After an 
attack the long, arduous task of rebuilding their country would fall to those who had prepared 
and followed instructions. Faithfully following each stage would complete a circle whose center 
was held by civil defense authorities. 
But circles are rarely as self-containing as their authors imagine them to be. Satirists in 
the mid-fifties started pointing out kinks in this civil defense chain. One of these satirists was 
Jules Feiffer, an emerging voice in American cultural critique who parodied civil defense 
through a “counter-attack on mindless authority”191 that encouraged readers to imagine an 
alternative way of surviving in the thermonuclear age.  
* * * * 
 As Ethan Thompson has argued, parody and satire in the 1950s often “went beyond a 
text” to critique “the broader culture that produced it.”192 Jules Feiffer encouraged his readers to 
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go “beyond a text” and critique civil defense discursive practices like the one exhibited in the 
1958 FCDA pamphlet.  
First as an independent cartoonist experimenting with long-form comics, then later as an 
editorial cartoonist for the Village Voice after 1956, Feiffer became one of the era’s most 
effective and influential satirists in part because his work “went beyond the text” to ask probing 
questions of Cold War culture. His talent for drawing anxiety-riddled characters perplexed by 
modernity also presented an ideal venue to explore the feelings of existential dread inspired by 
the bomb’s uneasy presence. His penchant for using an adolescent voice to narrate his stories 
also lent his work an innocence that was belied by the stinging critiques he offered of the 
postwar economy’s reliance on militarization and his country’s passive acceptance of it. 
 
FIGURE 12: Jules Feiffer, excerpt from Boom, 1959. 
His long-form comic Boom demonstrates how Feiffer “refunctioned” existing discourses 
in order to lay bare the “Strangelovian”193 logic underpinning the arm’s race. In Boom atomic 
testing produces “BLACK FLOATING SPECKS” that cause alarm in the populace but no 
                                                          






meaningful protest. An industry devoted to selling “SPECK PROOF FILTERS” thrives in this 
climate of fear subordinating the economies of bomb-producing countries to the sustained 
existence of fallout. When testing slows so does the world economy as the “BLACK 
FLOATING SPECKS” begin to disappear. The solution, readily supported in a propagandistic 
soaked referendum, becomes the construction of a bomb “THAT WILL BLOW UP THE 
WHOLE WORKS” and be “THE ULTIMATE DETERRRENT FOR PEACE!”194    
Biting commentary like this does not jibe with popular notions of conformity being the 
ordering principle of 1950s culture. But as Feiffer’s work demonstrated, and as will be discussed 
further in this chapter, satire remained one of the few avenues available to dissenters challenging 
official views endorsed by the era’s dominant Cold War consensus. A changing political climate 
following McCarthyism’s ebbing midway through the decade provided more favourable 
conditions for satire as anticommunism began to lose some of its intensity. But the Cold War 
consensus remained a powerful force in postwar culture. With the international movement to 
control the atom dead following the Soviet’s successful test in 1949, and civil defense programs 
in full bloom by the mid-fifties, the bomb had become an expression of this power. Feiffer’s 
work, however, suggested this power needed to be confronted rather than passively accepted.     
This chapter will explore how Jules Feiffer’s anti-nuke satire shaped and was shaped by 
the subtle shifts in Cold War culture in the mid-fifties. It will also discuss Feiffer’s work in 
relation to Herblock’s Mr. Atom cartoons in order to show how the former furnished much 
harsher critiques of postwar American society than the latter’s “traditional civic idealism” was 
able to muster. Describing himself as having a “more left perspective” that was “based on a 
radical analysis of US history,” Feiffer positioned himself outside the mainstream of American 
ideology and satirized conservatives and liberals with equal aplomb.195 This “radical” 
perspective also informed his “refunctioning” of civil defense discourses and allowed Feiffer to 
touch on a host of attendant issues related to what Gary Wills termed ”bomb power.”196  
In order to see how Feiffer’s satire encouraged readers to go “beyond the text” and 
“refunction” civil defense discourses in order to critique them, this chapter will analyze four of 
Feiffer most iconic anti-nuke cartoons that appeared in the Village Voice between 1956 and 
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1958. In addition to his work with the Voice, this chapter will also subject Feiffer’s long-form 
comic Boom to a close reading. Two other long-form comics—Munro, published with Boom in 
Passionela and Other Stories (1959), and an unpublished work, Rollie—will also be briefly 
discussed. In Munro the military, a celebrated institution in Cold War culture, is mercilessly 
mocked for its rigid thinking. In Rollie Feiffer satirizes civil defense and domestic Cold War 
notions of acceptable behaviour. And in Boom the emerging military-industrial complex, 
consumer culture, and economic dependence on bomb production are all brought to the fore.   
 
2.2: Boom! 
Before Jules Feiffer became an acerbic wit lamenting the anxieties of postwar America, he was a 
lonely kid in the Bronx replicating drawings of his favourite comic book heroes. Born to a 
Jewish household in 1929, the future Pulitzer Prize winning cartoonist spent his youth devouring 
Terry and the Pirates, Li’I Abner and Abbie an’ Slats. Feiffer “studied the way they cropped the 
panels down, the dialogue, [and] how many panels they would use on a Sunday page” in addition 
to mimicking their drawing techniques.197 This early devotion to mimicry would serve Feiffer 
well when one of his childhood heroes, the legendary cartoonist Will Eisner, creator of the 
popular The Spirit comic which ran in many Sunday newspapers as an seven-page insert, hired 
Feiffer as an assistant in 1946.198 According to Feiffer, Eisner told his young apprentice he had 
“no drawing talent”199 and assigned him the gritty task of working on “ruling panel borders, 
filling in blacks, signing Eisner’s signature” and whatever “dirty work” that needed to be 
done.200  
Like Herblock, Feiffer supplemented his apprenticeship with formal schooling, studying 
at the Art Students League then later the Pratt Institute. But it was under Eisner’s tutelage, 
working alongside other aspiring cartoonists in Eisner’s “five-man shop”201 where later admirers 
believed Feiffer developed his “graphic style” of cartooning that seemed “as natural as 
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handwriting.”202 However, Feiffer recalls spending most of his Eisner years developing his story-
telling skills by writing the dialogue and stories for Spirit.203  
In 1949, after Feiffer threatened to quit following a contractual dispute, Eisner allotted 
one of his few remaining assistants a space of his own in Spirit, which Feiffer turned into 
Clifford. Making use of the “childhood theme” then becoming in vogue—Charles Schultz’s 
Peanuts strip first appeared in 1950, and Hank Ketcham’s Dennis The Menace began a year 
later—Clifford ran as part of Spirit until 1951. Although Clifford was “calculated to be 
commercially acceptable” it never matched the commercial success of Schultz’ or Ketcham’s 
strips despite predating both. Feiffer managed to imprint a “distinctively personal element” on 
Clifford’s stories by placing his lead character in an urban setting resembling his native Bronx. 
But as a “kid strip” the opportunities for political comment remained limited.204  
Clifford‘s run was cut short by the US-led “police action” on the Korean Peninsula. 
Drafted in 1951, Feiffer, like Herblock, accrued his military service during wartime. But in 
contrast to the moral certainty of WWII, the aims of the Korean conflict seemed foggy except 
when seen through the ideological lens of the Cold War. This “loosened a rage” in Feiffer that 
led him to view his military service as an exercise in “mindless authority.”205  
During his army stint Feiffer was assigned to what he described as “an office job in 
something called the Civilian Corps publication center, which was a civilian-run operation that 
employed GIs, run in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, during the heyday of McCarthyism.” 
According to Feiffer the McCarthy committee would visit Fort Monmouth on occasion but failed 
to see they had a “nest of vipers in their midst” because the draftees’ “boyish” appearance made 
Feiffer and his comrades seem “harmless.”206 Using this “harmless” appearance to his advantage 
Feiffer went to work on a series he dubbed “Army Types” that Robert Boyd described as “gentle 
satire.” Indeed “Army Types” seems innocuous stuff by Feiffer’s standards but as Boyd writes 
“in the McCarthyite Cold War atmosphere of the early ‘50s even gentle satire was too much.” 
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These caption-less cartoons of anthropomorphized animals in military garb never made it into 
the Army’s popular Stars N’ Stripes magazine; but nor did they land Feiffer in trouble. Instead 
the episode was Feiffer’s first encounter with what he later termed, “benign censorship,” which 
Boyd interprets as a “tacit agreement” not to publish “disagreeable” ideas, even if just “gentle 
satire.”207     
Feiffer continued to stir in his “nest,” however, and began work on a long-form comic 
that transcended the “gentle satire” of “Army Types.” Munro, the story of a four-year-old boy 
drafted into the army and forced to participate in basic training, became in Feiffer’s words, a 
“subversive attack on the military” and a “counter-attack on mindless authority.”208  
The “rage” and the “loss of identity”209 Feiffer experienced while enlisted found an outlet 
in Munro’s ludicrous plot. Reporting to basic training the prepubescent Munro looks comically 
unprepared for the difficulties awaiting him. Pleading his case to a cadre of military 
professionals—his drill Sergeant, a psychiatrist, a chaplain, and a Draft Board consisting of 
former social workers—Munro, however, is unable to convince the army’s brain-trust of his 
youth. Each professional dismisses Munro’s pleas of being a mere four-year-old before accusing 
him of skirting his patriotic duty. The psychiatrist accuses him of “BUCKING FOR A PSYCHO 
DISCHARGE” while the chaplain gently suggests he must “FACE REALITIES.” Only when 
Munro breaks down into an uncontrollable fit of sobbing does the Army revisit their initial 
assessment of the boy. A general screams at Munro that “SOLDIERS DON’T CRY…ONLY 
LITTLE BOYS CRY.” Since Munro continues to cry by the general’s own logic Munro must not 
be a soldier. The Army reverses its position and declares Munro a “LITTLE BABY BOY.” The 
Army then grants Munro his discharge but not before they try to spin their mishap. A hastily-
called parade is arranged which sees Munro receive a medal for bravery, some military brushes, 
and “a whole box of toy nuclear weapons.” A special message from the president is read, 
praising the young lad’s putative patriotism and alleged willingness to “ENLIST HIMSELF IN 
THE SERVICE OF HIS COUNTRY.” The story ends with Munro learning the consequences of 
behaving badly as his mother reminds him of his time in the Army whenever he refuses to eat or 
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acts “cranky.” Thus in an ironic twist Munro internalizes the virtue of obedience instilled by the 
Army even after he is released from its dogmatic clutch.210  
 
FIGURE 13: Jules Feiffer, excerpt from Munro, 1959. 
Munro’s narrative contained themes that would preoccupy Feiffer throughout his career: 
the struggle against authority; the corruption of innocence; and the quest for individuality in a 
culture whose ideological certainty does not allow for second-guessing. Munro also mocks the 
military’s rigid thinking and inability, or unwillingness, to re-evaluate positions despite evidence 
to the contrary. When they do acknowledge their mistake they quickly spin it to make it appear 
as if Munro voluntarily enlisted in the Army. He becomes a propaganda coup for the “CAUSE” 
and is celebrated as a “HERO.” 
While Munro’s content is striking, its form is also notable. Spanning seventy pages, 
Munro far exceeded the length of the Spirit cartoons that Feiffer had been developing in Eisner’s 
shop before the war. However, its length, along with its content, made Munro a tough sell in the 
mid-fifties. Feiffer shopped his long-form comic to Simon and Schuster, which was beginning to 
publish “sophisticated cartoon books” mid-decade, but the publishers shied away from Feiffer’s 
                                                          






overt satirizing of army life.211 In his memoirs Feiffer describes repeating this exercise with other 
publishers who admired his work but failed to imagine a market for it.212 In a 2009 interview 
Feiffer elaborated on the meaning of his early failure: 
“There was no way of doing what I was doing in the mainstream. The mainstream was   
not interested in anyone with my opinions and certainly anyone working in the form I  
did. No one was working in the form was working in at that except me. I made up that  
form to fit the direction I was moving in…I knew I needed an outlet for my political rage  
and I knew that…in this particular time of suppression, I had to be entertaining. I had to  
be funny. It couldn’t be a polemic…It had to in a sense be disguised as something else in  
order to make the point I wanted to make…[so] I started fooling with a form which was  
essentially narrative and long, and such things generally weren’t published. And it told  
what were considered subversive stories at the time if someone really got the point.”213 
 
Feiffer fans would have to wait until 1959 to see if they got “the point” of Munro. This 
lack of publishing success, however, did not stop Feiffer from continuing his experimentations in 
genre. In the unpublished Rollie, which dated from this period, a hip bass player creates 
unusually hypnotic jazz that interferes with unnamed satellites, which prompts a visit from “Civil 
Defense.” Mistaking his music for incoming missiles the civil defense officials tell Rollie, “WE 
CAN’T IDENTIFY THE MISSILES YOU SEND UP!” Rollie remains true to his muse, 
however, and continues plucking his upright bass to his own beat. This lands him on a blacklist 
of sorts after “Civil Defense” classifies him as a “THREAT.” The Army goes a step further, 
claiming Rollie’s unidentifiable music is a “NATIONAL EMERGENCY!” Eventually Rollie is 
placed in solitary confinement where he continues playing. But no one but the birds can hear him 
as he and his muse have been deemed “CLASSIFIED.”214       
Rollie, later published in 1992, was not an overt anti-nuke satire. However, like Feiffer’s 
other long-form comics from this period Rollie does touch on issues related to the bomb and 
Cold War culture. By targeting Rollie’s music as subversive “Civil Defense” extends its 
authority to matters that far exceed its jurisdiction. As an agency ostensibly created to protect 
Americans this extension of authority is significant for several reasons. For one, Feiffer’s comic 
suggests the real-life agencies like the FCDA and the AEC were becoming unruly bureaucratic 
giants overstepping their bounds by probing the domestic domain in a way not covered by their 
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original mandate. Secondly, the plot in Rollie speaks to issues of anonymity and individualism. 
The authorities are so alarmed by Rollie’s playing that they label him a “THREAT” and declare 
a “NATIONAL EMERGENCY!” For them Rollie’s music steps outside roles prescribed by Cold 
War discourses and promoted within civil defense propaganda that stressed a subservient attitude 
towards authority. By continuing to play his bass Rollie exerts his individuality in a way that 
shows contempt for the power structure trying to circumscribe his self-expression.  
 
 
FIGURE 14: Jules Feiffer, excerpt from Rollie, 1959. 
Lastly, in Rollie Feiffer satirizes Cold War notions of taste, picking up on a recurring 
conservative cultural critique that marked jazz as subversive both because of its roots in African-
American culture, and its associations with beat poetry and counterculture. “Civil Defense” 
alleges Rollie’s music is interfering with satellites but Feiffer does not elaborate on how this 
happens. Perhaps Feiffer left it purposefully vague to stress the absurdity of authorities policing 
and enforcing standards of taste in the first place. As was the case in many areas of Cold War 
culture foreign concerns comingle and interact with domestic ones, which Rollie’s plot satirizes 






This blending of the public and private spheres was a common theme in Feiffer’s work. 
In a 2013 interview for the Village Voice Feiffer described his approach to cartooning as an 
effort “to decode the public conversation and the private conversation.”215 In Munro Feiffer does 
not “decode” a “public conversation” so much as he tries to create one by instigating a discussion 
about the draft. In addition to replenishing its ranks, the draft remained an important symbol for 
the army’s authority. But Feiffer’s Munro mocks the Army’s leadership and as such creates an 
opportunity to question the basis of “mindless authority.” In Rollie Feiffer parodies Cold 
Warriors’ infiltration into private domains and by doing so decodes the “constellation of 
attitudes” that comprised and propelled the Cold War consensus. In both Feiffer satirizes the 
growing militarization of postwar America by subjecting military and civil defense authorities to 
absurd situations their inflexible thinking strains to solve. The bomb, as an expression of their 
authority, looms in the background.  
In Boom the bomb comes to the fore. This long-form comic represents Feiffer’s attempt 
to “decode” the bomb’s cultural presence and serves as an ideal example of what Thompson 
argues that satire in the 1950s was striving to achieve: encouraging readers to go “beyond the 
text” and refashion existing discourses in order to offer a “broader critique” of the culture 
nurturing them. 
 
FIGURE 15: Jules Feiffer, excerpt from Boom, 1959. 
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The plot in Boom begins with a simple but anxiety-inducing premise: “Almost every 
country had its own bomb.” From this starting point Feiffer recounts an alternative history of 
nuclear testing. In a parallel to real-world events, he describes a fictionalized scenario whereby 
every country armed with a bomb began an endless barrage of nuclear tests in the hopes of 
building “better” bombs. Following each test black clouds consisting of fallout begin dotting the 
skies prompting scientists to test for “APPRECIABLE” amounts of radioactive material in the 
atmosphere. Unsurprisingly, government scientists find nothing which leads to the story’s first 
refrain: “THIS TEST HAS ADDED NO APPRECIABLE AMOUNT OF RADIO ACTIVE 
FALLOUT TO THE ATMOSPHERE.” Subsequent tests elicit the same response even as “the 
skies began to grow darker.” People become concerned because of noticeable changes in the 
atmosphere but fail to voice their anxieties in any meaningful way. Instead they mutter in quiet 
resignation, “I GUESS THE GOVERNMENT MUST HAVE ITS SOUND REASONS,” before 
going “about their business.”  
 
FIGURE 16: Jules Feiffer, excerpt from Boom, 1959. 
The lack of public opposition emboldens other countries to build their own bombs, 
creating in the process an asymmetrical arm’s race of sorts. Naturally, this leads to a hastily-






refuse to halt their bomb production until they catch up with those leading in this fictionalized 
arm’s race. When news of the failed conference reaches the public no outcry is heard. Instead 
people passively lament, “THAT’S THE WAY THE BALL BOUNCES” and “THATS (sic) 
THE WAY THE COOKIE CRUMBLES” by way of explanation before going “about their 
business” again.  
With no solution in sight, and a potentially explosive international environment, some 
towns even begin building nuclear programs, which leads to more testing. Scientists remain 
adamant “THIS TEST HAS ADDED NO APPRECIABLE AMOUNT OF RADIO ACTIVE 
FALLOUT TO THE ATMOSPHERE” even as the skies darken. Worried “PEOPLE MAY GET 
TO THINK THOSE BIG BLACK FLOATING SPECKS ARE HARMFUL” the government 
hires “a public relations outfit” to spin the environment hazards as harmless. But the campaign 
fails to quell fear of the “BIG BLACK FLOATING SPECKS” so the firm changes tactics and 
launches an ad campaign promoting “SPECK PROOF FILTERS!" This creates a cottage 
industry devoted to selling “SPECK PROOF EYEGLASSES” and “SPECK PROOF 
TRANQUILIZERS.” Industry thrives, the economy booms, and a “new renaissance” is declared.        
 






This “new renaissance,” however, coincides with a drop-off in bomb production. With a 
lack of testing the “BIG BLACK FLOATING SPECKS” begin to disappear creating a slump in 
the market. With their economies now tied to bomb production countries are forced to 
recommence testing in order to summon the “BIG BLACK FLOATING SPECKS.” On queue 
the skies begin darkening. Each country becomes a participant in the “BIG BLACK FLOATING 
SPECKS” economy as half of humanity devotes itself to making bombs while the other half 
produces “salves, medication, and storm windows” designed to protect against fallout.      
The uneasy peace is short-lived. Emboldened by the lack of public resistance one 
unspecified country decides to raise the stakes by proposing the construction of a “super bomb” 
which military leaders believe would be the ultimate “DETERRENT FOR PEACE.” But 
“propagandists” from rival countries believe the project is a “BLUFF!” which prompts “men on 
the inside” to test their new “super bomb” as proof of their nuclear superiority. The question is 
posed in a referendum and another propaganda campaign commences trumping the benefits of 
testing their new Frankenstein creation. In a show of national unity the referendum passes 
leading to one last test. The “super bomb” is exploded and the world goes “BOOM!”216   
While all ten pages of Boom consist of multiple frames the final page has only one 
drawing: the era’s ubiquitous mushroom cloud. Only Feiffer’s black shading and cartoon 
lettering of the word Boom plastered in the middle of this picturesque destruction gives the 
drawing a feeling of innocence that the testing of the “super bomb” destroys.   
In an ending foreshadowing Dr. Strangelove’s cinematic coda, Boom concludes with an 
explosion with unknown consequences. Only instead of nuclear Armageddon being triggered by 
a doomsday device, the apocalypse in Boom is the result of one final test agreed upon by a 
referendum. Human folly prevails in both but the lack of any hints suggesting continual human 
existence in Boom paints an even bleaker portrait despite its “Strangelovian” undertones. Unlike 
the underground bunker filled with military and political elites (with a female to male ratio of ten 
to one) in Kubrick’s classic, the question of who survives in Boom is left unanswered.      
Reflecting on Boom in 2011 Feiffer described himself writing and illustrating his anti-
nuke satire “in a fury.”217 And indeed, Feiffer’s comic reads as a call to action of sorts, even if 
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readers would not encounter it until 1959, one year after The Committee for a SANE Nuclear 
Policy (SANE) was created. Before SANE few avenues existed for protesting against US nuclear 
policy. In the context of mid-fifties Cold War America, Feiffer’s portrayal of a passive 
population acquiescing to their leaders’ plans for nuclear bomb production was not far off the 
mark. As Paul Boyer discovered in his survey of opinion polls from the 1950s, Truman’s 
decision to greenlight Edward Teller’s hydrogen bomb project in 1950 garnered broad support 
amongst the electorate.218 Truman’s successor also remained a remarkably popular president 
even as the Eisenhower administration formulated the US’s policy of nuclear deterrence under 
the banner of “massive retaliation.” As Feiffer was writing and illustrating Boom he could point 
to ample evidence in the wider culture that suggested Americans had not only reconciled 
themselves to the bomb but also supported the construction of “bigger and better bombs” as a 
means of comfort in the nuclear age.219  
In Boom Feiffer speaks to this reality by sprinkling such idiomatic phrases as “THATS 
(sic) THE WAY THE SPEARMINT CHEWS” throughout his story every time news breaks of 
another test. The use of idioms not only infuses everyday language with political significance; it 
also creates the impression that the population granting their government tacit approval for more 
testing is too apathetic to do otherwise. In this way Boom fulfills Feiffer’s aim to tell a story 
“about the conditioning of public attitudes to accept radioactive fallout as a positive rather than a 
negative.”220  
Feiffer’s comic also touches on the “conditioning of public attitudes” towards early 
efforts to control the atom through the UNAEC. Instead of the real-life symmetrical stand-off 
between two superpowers which characterized the Cold War, Feiffer substitutes a fictionalized 
asymmetrical arm’s race. In this Hobbesian world the international community must contend 
with multiple atomic powers jockeying for nuclear superiority rather than just two. This 
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nightmare scenario in Boom, and the failure to resolve it through the usual channels of 
international accord, mock the UN’s ineffectiveness to contain the arm’s race. By satirizing 
international regulatory bodies who exert no authority over sovereign countries, Boom highlights 
the problem of pursuing control of the atom through existing power structures. In this way 
Feiffer parts with the early emphasis on negotiation as advocated in Herblock’s Mr. Atom 
cartoons and suggests a radical rethinking of how better to approach the bomb. 
But the questions remains: Was humor the best way to approach a vexing issue such as 
the arm’s race? Or perhaps more bluntly, could fallout be funny? One way to approach Feiffer’s 
text is to compare it to the structures in speech underpinning joke-telling. Humor scholars have 
noted how a successful punchline must bear some relation to the structure which produces it in 
order for the joke to work. This happens when a joke script—the various plot points, the context, 
and the characters—concludes with a punchline that logically follows the script. The joke script 
may have an endless amount of combinations but the punchline to a specific joke script is by 
definition limited to addressing the points foreshadowed by the script. In other words, the form 
and content of a joke are intimately connected.221  
 Feiffer’s comic follows a similar logic. In Boom the failure to resolve a pending nuclear 
crisis through established channels mirrors the real-life failure of the Baruch Plan and the 
UNAEC’s efforts to regulate the atom in the late forties. But in Feiffer’s comic the failure of the 
disarmament conference is only one plot point in the joke script. The fictionalized asymmetrical 
arm’s race that sprouts up in the wake of the disarmament conference’s failure is another. The 
obsessive need to test each bomb’s destructive capabilities only exacerbates the situation which 
also helps set up the joke’s punchline. But the real turning point in Boom that sets up its 
punchline is the final plot point before the “super bomb” is built and tested: the economic 
downturn followed by the referendum.  
The economies of bomb-producing countries in Boom all become reliant on the 
manufacture of goods promising protection from the “BLACK FLOATING SPECKS.” Seen this 
way, politics in Boom is a mere sideshow distracting from the larger struggle against economic 
dependence on bomb production and the industries it engenders. The real target in Feiffer’s satire 
is an economic system whose health relies on steady levels of fear to drive demand for safety and 
                                                          






protection from the bomb. But without the bomb, and the fear of “BLACK FLOATING 
SPECKS” produced by unregulated testing, the laws of supply and demand are disrupted. This is 
what leads to the referendum and the subsequent test of the new bomb, and thus, the story’s 
punchline. The punchline is not the end of the world, per se, but rather that the participation in a 
bomb economy and tacit approval for atomic testing means the joke is on us. 
Heady stuff, and hardly the typical subject matter for a comic. In order for this punchline 
to work Feiffer needed to set up Madison Avenue, big business and American industrialists as 
unseen villains taking advantage of a climate of fear. Their collective response to “BIG BLACK 
FLOATING SPECKS” is predicated on self-interest, the driving principle of the market. The 
economy experiences a boon until a lull in testing causes the market for “SPECK PROOF 
FILTERS” and other bomb protective materials to sag. In this way Feiffer’s comic suggests a 
radical re-thinking of the postwar economy must be undertaken if disaster is to be averted.  
The connection between the market economy and the referendum also sets up Feiffer’s 
other main critique. In Boom the people grant the ultimate authority to build and test the bomb 
that will destroy the world. Feiffer savagely satirizes the masses for their meek and feeble 
reasons for doing so. Guessing that the “GOVERNMENT MUST HAVE ITS SOUND 
REASONS” to support its actions is hardly the expression of a politically-engaged electorate. 
That the referendum follows yet another propaganda campaign meant to sway the public over to 
the government’s position emphasizes how passive Feiffer believed people had become to the 
bomb’s power.   
Boom suggests that grassroots opposition, and not passive people chewing 
“SPEARMINT” while relying on the judgement of their leaders, is what will end the arm’s race. 
What such opposition might look like is never illustrated in “Boom.” But presumably the 
dissenters would be armed with placards expressing more urgent slogans than “THATS (sic) 
THE WAY THE COOKIE CRUMBLES.” In Herblock’s Mr. Atom cartoons cowering and 
befuddled political leaders resembling the likes of Baruch and Lilienthal were ridiculed for not 
exerting their leadership on the nuclear issue. In Feiffer’s Boom it is the people chewing 
“SPEARMINT” who are made to look like dupes.  
Feiffer’s conclusion seems inevitable. But just as in history, narratives contain alternative 
choices always available to their authors. Feiffer chose to make the failure of the market the 






outcome of this referendum, not the fate of a disarmament conference because unlike Herblock 
Feiffer was working from a “radical” perspective that was informed by a critical reading of 
American history. For Feiffer the Baruchs and Lilienthals of the world should not be counted on 
to solving the nuclear crisis since it was their tepid positions, and staunch liberalism, which 
created the arm’s race. Rather, it would be the masses chewing “SPEARMINT” who would have 
to change the course of history. The problem was that for the majority of Americans in the late 
fifties that wasn’t a real option.    
  
2.2 Sick, Sick, Sick. 
In a 2013 interview for the Village Voice Feiffer described his approach to cartooning: "The 
nature of my Voice cartoon was essentially…To show, in six or eight panels, what men and 
women were saying to each other when they said something else. What the government was 
saying when it said one thing or another. To get at the truth of the subtext, as opposed to the 
bullshit that was the cover for the subtext."222 
In 1986 Jules Feiffer was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for three decades of getting “at the 
truth of the subtext” and unearthing the “bullshit” which covered it. By this point in his career 
Feiffer’s work had appeared in publications as diverse as Playboy, The Nation, Esquire and The 
New Yorker. He had been nominated for an Oscar for his original screenplay of Carnal 
Knowledge in 1971. An animated short of Munro had also won the Oscar for best animated short 
a few years previously. Throughout the seventies he continued branching out, writing plays such 
as the critically-acclaimed Little Murders before turning his attention to children’s literature. He 
served a brief stint as the New York Times’ first editorial cartoonist in the early 2000s. But it was 
through his work for the Voice that Feiffer achieved national fame which allowed him to branch 
out into other media forms in the 1960s. 
Appearing for the first time in the Village Voice in 1956, two years after the Senate 
censured Senator McCarthy in 1954, Feiffer’s cartoons found the ideal vehicle to reach a 
sophisticated audience who could appreciate his dark ruminations on modern life. Featuring 
writers like Norman Mailer, the Voice represented the hipness of mid-fifties avant-garde New 
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York. Catering to a niche intellectual milieu allowed the Voice editors to feature contributors 
who delved into topical terrains often left unexplored by mainstream publications like the New 
Yorker.  
Feiffer made use of this intellectual freedom while also perfecting what Sam Adams 
described as “a deceptively simple style” of cartooning.223 Feiffer’s “loose, sketchy drawings” 
first started appearing in the Voice in October, 1956. Originally titled Sick, Sick, Sick, the strip 
was changed to Feiffer in 1959 after the Hall Syndicate, the same company syndicating 
Herblock, started nationally syndicating Feiffer’s Voice cartoons.224 Eschewing the traditional 
borders that separated multiple panels in comic books, Feiffer opted for a borderless approach, 
similar to Munro and “Boom.” Instead of frames packed with detail, Feiffer placed his characters 
against a simple backdrop which gave the impression of his characters “floating in a sea of white 
space with no background cover…to hide behind.”225 With “no background cover” the reader’s 
attention was drawn to the characters’ facial expressions and the accompanying dialogue. But 
instead of traditional speech bubbles confining the dialogue Feiffer used “free-floating word 
clusters” which hovered “in the vicinity of the character speaking or…thinking.”226 These “free-
floating word clusters” gave the appearance of an internal monologue that accentuated his 
characters’ loneliness and isolation.   
Feiffer’s use of narrative further distinguished his approach from traditional cartooning. 
Feiffer usually “stacked” the frames “in two horizontal rows”227 which allowed him to advance a 
narrative, however brief, in a limited space. By doing so the long story-arcs used in Munro and 
Boom were transposed to his Voice cartoons in condensed form. Originally Feiffer had imagined 
his Voice space to run serialized snippets taken from his long-form comics but the idea was 
scrapped once Feiffer discovered his penchant for topical commentary. Still, his love of narrative 
persisted and his Voice cartoons featured the story-telling skills he first developed while 
apprenticing in Eisner’s shop. Introducing this comic book aesthetic into political cartooning 
allowed Feiffer to adopt a story-telling approach similar to joke-telling. 
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As far as content, Feiffer’s Voice strip also featured characters not traditionally associated 
with comic books or political cartoons. Feiffer introduced a self-conscious subjectivity in his 
work that allowed him to explore gender politics, psychoanalysis, and sex. His characters often 
appeared alone in a cartoon, further deepening the sense of existential dread permeating his best 
work. Perhaps this is the reason why scholars have mostly viewed his early work for the Voice 
and Playboy as personal explorations. Debra Claire Schwartz has noted that not until Feiffer 
turned to playwriting and screenwriting did his work take on explicit political themes.228 But this 
neat demarcation fails to capture how the personal was political for Feiffer long before New Left 
radicalism and feminism made such connections fashionable.  
 
FIGURE 18: Jules Feiffer, “Sick, Sick, Sick!” Village Voice, November 28, 1956. 
Given the era’s fascination with psychoanalysis it is hardly surprising Feiffer explored 
the intersections between the personal and the political through a Freudian lens. But as a self-
described radical Feiffer was never content with confining himself to the private domain.  
In October, 1956, in just his third cartoon for the Voice, Feiffer explored another 
intersection: mass consumer culture and marketing. In contrast to the masses in Boom eagerly 
buying “SPECK PROOF FILTERS,” the ad man’s blunt assessment suggests no such market 
exists since the American public had become “NEGATIVE FALLOUT CONSCIOUS.” But in 
the spirit of 1950s marketing this Madison Avenue caricature believes he can replicate the 
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success of “BIG BLACK FLOATING SPECKS” economy by launching a “SATURATION 
CAMPAIGN” that will make people “POSTIVE FALLOUT CONSCIOUS.” So how can the 
public become “POSITIVE FALLOUT CONSCIOUS”? In Feiffer’s hands the question turns the 
apocalyptic into farce. Selling the public “POSITIVE FALLOUT CONSCIOUS” seems no 
different than selling soap. “I LIKE FALLOUT” buttons and decals featuring the slogan “YOUR 
GOVERNMENT KNOWS BEST” are proposed. A “MR AND MRS MUTATION” contest 
meant to alter contemporary notions of beauty by normalizing genetic mutations is floated as 
another possible idea. When an unseen audience member asks about the role scientists will play 
in this “SATURATION CAMPAIGN” the ad man proposes isolating them by painting them as 
an “ORGANIZED” group of enemies, not unlike alleged communists made to recant in front of 
HUAAC, or McCarthy’s Senate committee. The ad man, quite pleased with this suggestion, ends 
his presentation with: “IT’S ONE OF OUR MOST SUCCESSFUL SALES DEVICES.229     
 
FIGURE 19: Jules Feiffer, “Sick, Sick, Sick!” Village Voice, July 10, 1957. 
In 1957 Feiffer returned to the fallout theme with a cartoon featuring a conniving 
government bureaucrat. Using wild gesticulations to express his delight, the bureaucrat explains 
to his effusive audience how a “100% CLEAN” bomb came to be built. In eleven borderless 
panels—three or four more than the typical Feiffer cartoon—the history of fallout is sketched. 
The first bomb, presumably in reference to the one dropped on Hiroshima, was “RELATIVELY” 
                                                          






small by today’s standards. It produced a lot of radioactive material but because “FALLOUT 
WAS NOT YET A FAD” no one paid attention. A bigger bomb was built, producing even more 
fallout, which the bureaucrat admits, troubled officials enough that they rethought their strategy. 
So troubled in fact, that the man and his wife “DOUBLED” their donations to charities. An even 
bigger bomb was built and produced even less fallout. In an echo of Boom one final bomb was 
built that had the potential to “BLOW UP EVERYTHING!” Even more impressive, it produced 
no fallout which prompts the bureaucrat to conclude his presentation on a self-congratulatory 
note: “WE FEEL OUR PROGRESS HAS BEEN AMAZING.”230   
Later that same year Feiffer set his sights on the era’s obsession with new electronic 
gadgets by illustrating a character who would not have seemed out of place chewing 
“SPEARMINT” in “Boom.” Only instead of buying “SPECK PROOF FILTERS” this Feiffer 
creation uses his electronic devices to record the sounds of the thermonuclear age.  
 
FIGURE 20: Jules Feiffer, “Sick, Sick, Sick!” Village Voice, December 4, 1957. 
A well-contented man in a smoking jacket, replete with a smug smile, explains to his 
unseen friend Charlie how “FULL” his life has become thanks to the life-altering consumer 
goods he has purchased. First up in his list of fulfilling consumer goods is a car with 
“PERFUMED EXHAUST” that “RIDES LIKE A DREAM—FANTASTIC!” Next up, a camera 
that “TAKES PICTURES LIKE A DREAM” followed by a “50 INCH-FULL COLOR-MULTI-
IMAGE PICTURE TUBE.” Also playing like a “DREAM” is his “6 ELECTRO-HYDRO-
                                                          






TWEETERS-8 WALL TO WALL WOOFERS-WITH A 1200 WATT PRE-AMP STEREO 
OUTPUT” which he uses to record an “H-BOMB BLAST RECORDED RIGHT ON THE 
SPOT.” The final permutation of the man shows him telling his friend, “IT’S A FULL LIFE, 
CHARLIE.”231  
  In a 1958 cartoon Feiffer revisited the theme of an alternative history of nuclear weapons 
much like he did in “Boom.” In it a boy recounts for his friend how the “ACCIDENTAL BOMB 
DROPPING PROGRAM” came into existence. According to the boy, one day a “BIG BOMB” 
had been accidently dropped creating a “GIANT BIG HOLE” that gnashed a scar into the earth. 
Naturally, no one liked the hole so the government hired unemployed workers to fill it. Luckily, 
this solved another problem: “UNEMPLOYMENT.” Solving two problems at once, the 
government decided to drop more bombs in order to create more holes which required more 
workers to fill them. When the boy’s friend asks if anyone objected to this “ACCIDENTAL 
BOMB DROPPING PROGRAM” becoming an intentional program, the young narrator replies: 
“NOBODY COMPLAINS ABOUT NATIONAL DEFENSE, DOPEY.”232 
 
FIGURE 21: Jules Feiffer, “Sick, Sick, Sick!” Village Voice, March 19, 1958. 
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One final cartoon, also from 1958, and which would later be reprinted in the underground 
humor magazine The Realist, satirizes the apathy that Feiffer believed characterized the 
Eisenhower years.233 In it two men lie next to each other discussing their difficulty getting 
“AROUSED” which leads to a word association game meant to provoke some excitement. The 
second man yells “MISSILE MADNESS!” in the hopes of arousing his friend but to no avail. 
They repeat the exercise with different phrases: “ATOMIC HOLOCAUST,” 
“BRINKSMANSHIP,” and “GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY!” are all yelled in succession. Because 
of these phrases’ currency the trick nearly works and the first man feels “ALMOST” aroused but 
remains unmoved. The second man asks the first, “DO YOU THINK WE’VE TURNED 
APATHETIC?” The first man replies,” APATHY IS SUCH A BAD WORD. I’D HATE TO 
THINK ITS APATHY WE SUFFER FROM.” In the final frame the first man suggests “FAITH” 
is the real culprit.234     
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* * * * 
What kind of “FAITH” was compelling Feiffer’s two characters to lie down in defeat? 
Was it “FAITH” in the ability of civil defense to promise survival in the event of an attack? Or 
was it “FAITH” in nuclear deterrence to prevent such an attack from occurring? And if so would 
not this “FAITH” engender feelings of comfort instead of feelings of dread?   
Feiffer’s association of “FAITH” with “APATHY” spoke to the same concerns explored 
in “Boom.” In subsequent years Feiffer addressed the political nature of his work and how his 
self-described “radical” interpretation of US history helped informed his “progressive-left” 
perspective. But what did his readers think when thumbing through the pages of Munro or Boom 
after both were published in 1959? And how did their own subject-positions influence how they 
read Feiffer’s strip in that week’s Village Voice? Asking such questions calls to mind Michel de 
Certeau’s insight into the lack of “reading traces” left behind by readers for historians to 
analyze.235  
A digression into how fans of parody read a satiric magazine from earlier in the decade 
may provide clues into what these “reading traces” looked like. In his study of postwar television 
culture Ethan Thompson devotes a chapter of his study to how the popular MAD influenced 
readers’ “decoding practices.” Thompson argues that scholars approaching MAD should not 
focus on whether its creators had radical political sympathies or whether their texts had “direct 
political effects.” Rather, the focus should be on “how such texts work in the formation of 
individual identities.” Only through such a methodological perspective can scholars see “how the 
structure of parodic texts encourages a critical relationship to mediated culture.” In the case of 
MAD, Thompson argues the magazine’s parodies of television culture “armed its readers with 
protocols for the reading of television texts based on strategies of recycling, reappropriation, and 
recombination.” These reading strategies encouraged MAD readers “to go outside the immediate 
text” and make connections “from text to cultural context” in order to “uncover its meaning.”236 
Applying this same insight to Feiffer’s work can help shed light on how readers may 
have used “strategies of recycling, reappropriation, and recombination” when encountering the 
“POSITIVE FALLOUT CONSCIOUS” or the campaign for “SPECK PROOF FILTERS” in 
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“Boom.” Like Feiffer, the consumers of this content may have read about fallout in I.F. Stone’s 
Weekly detailing the dangers of fallout. At the very least they would have encountered pamphlets 
promoting the FCDA’s “story of fallout.” Whatever their source, Feiffer’s readership would have 
had many of the same points of reference as the Voice cartoonist. But after reading a Feiffer 
cartoon readers were “armed” with new “protocols” for approaching this material.  
To understand what made the “MUTATION CONTEST” subversive we need to go 
outside the text just as readers at the time may have done.  For a readership used to seeing their 
favourite television programs sponsored by corporations, the proposed “MR AND MRS 
MUTATION CONTEST” in Feiffer’s November 28, 1956 cartoon could have been read as an 
effort to decode discourses promoting television’s crass commercialism. In 1950s mass 
consumer culture the nuclear theme became a gimmick to hawk wares. Children rifled through 
KIX cereal boxes in search of “atomic rings” while families played boardgames devoted to the 
search for uranium.237 After encountering a Feiffer cartoon readers may have used “decoding 
strategies” which would allow them to adopt a critical stance towards mass consumer culture, 
assuming they had not already staked out such a position. The “MUTATION CONTEST” 
parodying a culture which allowed the atom to be commoditized can be read as an attack on 
mass consumer culture just as the parody of the bomb economy in Boom can be read as an attack 
on the military-industrial complex’s reach into America’s hinterlands.  
Feiffer also satirizes this commodification in his December 4, 1957 cartoon while 
parodying Americans’ growing obsession with electronic goods. The contented man regaling his 
friend Charlie with tales of how “FULL” his life has become is actually confessing to how empty 
his life has become. Content with capturing the roar of an “H-BOMB” explosion with his new-
fangled camera, the man is unable to see how obsessive gadget use can blind one to social ills. 
Nuclear testing is conflated with the man’s own electronic testing—both have trivialized a 
pressing social concern by subordinating it to technological obsessions. In this Feiffer cartoon, 
the pursuit of “bigger and better” gadgets parallels the pursuit of “bigger and better” bombs that 
characterized postwar bomb production.  
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In Feiffer’s March 19, 1958 cartoon, the passive interlocutor “DOPEY” can be forgiven 
for wondering why no one objected to the circuitous logic inherent to the “ACCIDENTAL 
BOMB DROPPING PROGRAM.” Introduced nearly three years before President Eisenhower 
warned of an emerging “military-industrial complex” in his farewell address to the nation, this 
Feiffer cartoon anticipated the president’s warnings while also raising concerns over the nation’s 
nuclear weapons infrastructure designed to prevent such imagined accidents from occurring. This 
theme would be echoed in Boom. Fans of both may have shared the same concerns over the rise 
of the national security state that Feiffer did. If they did not, however, they would have been 
encouraged to consider its implications after reading the “ACCIDENTAL BOMB PROGRAM” 
as this Feiffer cartoon promoted a “critical relationship to mediated culture” which shrouded the 
bomb’s cultural power.   
How readers may have read the two characters discussing “MISSILE MADNESS” in 
Feiffer’s September 17, 1958 cartoon may have also depended on their familiarity with 
psychoanalysis. Like thousands of Americans in the 1950s, Feiffer visited a psychoanalyst on a 
regular basis. Like them, he too bought into the benefits of plunging into the depths of the 
subconscious. But in “MISSILE MADNESS” Feiffer uses it as a backdrop to explore America’s 
“psychic numbing.”238  
This “psychic numbing” could have been used to describe the tacit support for civil 
defense. The two were intertwined and Feiffer’s cartoon can be read as an attempt to disentangle 
the messy knots weaving both together. If readers “went outside the text” into the political realm 
to make connections, perhaps they would have found “MISSILE MADNESS” was commenting 
on what Oakes argues was an “institutional strategy” on the part of civil defense authorities 
trying to forge a “Cold War ethic.”239 This “Cold War ethic” suppressed dissent and interacted 
with familiar American tropes emphasizing rugged individualism. Oakes argues that civil 
defense authorities tapped into a mythologized American tradition of two seemingly opposed 
strands of thinking—self-reliance and community-building—in order to tie civil defense with a 
longstanding American tradition of frontier defense. Truman endorsed this view when he told the 
nation that survival of the Soviet nuclear threat hinged on the “revival of the old American 
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tradition of community self-defense.”240 Likening Soviet invaders to marauding Indians, Truman 
helped create a template for the Eisenhower administration to later exploit in its pursuit of a 
policy of nuclear crisis management—a policy which Feiffer’s “MISSILE MADNESS” 
suggested bred apathy. In Feiffer’s world the logic of “massive retaliation” could not be 
confronted by lying down in passive defeat.     
Cinema-going members of Feiffer’s readership would have found many opportunities to 
“recycle” the plots from the era’s sci-fi films when reading his anti-nuke satires. On trips to their 
local cinema they would have encountered films featuring the latest mutated creation that had 
escaped from the confines of the laboratory. The era’s ubiquity of monster films has been 
labelled by Jerome F. Shapiro as “atomic bomb cinema.” For Shapiro “atomic bomb cinema” 
represented filmmakers’ engagement with an “apocalyptic imagination” whose roots can be 
found in apocalyptic literature and oral traditions that extend beyond the heritage of exclusive 
American narratives. In particular, Shapiro believes this “apocalyptic imagination” that moved 
filmmakers to frame the nuclear threat in this narrative structure was influenced by a distinct 
Jewish apocalyptic tradition rather than the more well-known Christian apocalyptic tradition 
articulated in the Book of Revelation. According to Shapiro this Jewish tradition of apocalyptic 
literature often concludes with a stage of rebirth, or rebuilding process, which bridges the gap 
between the initial episode of destruction and a utopian future.241  
As a Jewish cartoonist Feiffer may have been familiar with this apocalyptic tradition. But 
whereas this tradition featured stories which concluded with a stage of “rebirth” following a 
cataclysmic event, the stories in Boom and his “ACCIDENTAL BOMB DROPPING 
PROGRAM” suggest no one would be left to do the rebuilding. After Hiroshima storytellers did 
not have to evoke the awesome powers of deities or reference environmental cataclysms in order 
to imagine the end of the world; humanity could achieve the same result, and arguably much 
more efficiently, all by itself. In Feiffer’s cartoons the bomb’s technological novelty is captured. 
It is precisely this novelty which moved Truman to say the US had harnessed “the basic power of 
the universe” in his first statement released after the bombing of Hiroshima.   
Perhaps Feiffer fans would have recognized his flirtation with the “apocalyptic 
imagination” as an opportunity to employ “decoding strategies” in their next viewing of films 
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culled from Shapiro’s “atomic bomb cinema.” From such a starting point Feiffer fans could 
restructure a radiation-saturated monster such as Godzilla as a stand-in for the nuclear menace.  
These same “decoding strategies” that Feiffer’s satire promoted also endorsed a critical 
reading of Hollywood’s obsession with “The Good War.” Just as it had in Munro and Boom the 
military remained a favourite target in Feiffer’s Voice cartoons. Ample opportunities existed to 
make connections with films expressing “Cold War obsessions” that both raised “the specter of 
communism” and glorified “strong military leadership.”242   
Scholars have noted how the Army in particular, venerated for its role in liberating 
Europe from fascist rule in WWII, remained a celebrated institution in Cold War culture. In his 
discussion of WWII films from the 1950s Christian G. Appy has identified how “sentimental 
militarism” coloured Hollywood’s representation of “history’s bloodiest war.” While explicit 
anti-communist films tended to become “box office flops,” plots using WWII as a setting were 
popular in the fifties. According to Appy filmmakers in the fifties used WWII as a “frame” for 
“many Cold War fictions.” “The Good War” provided filmmakers “a blanket of moral certitude 
and nostalgia under which Cold War militarization is hidden, justified, or comforted.”243 The 
unyielding patriotism seen in White Christmas (1954) included “a constellation of attitudes and 
values that were central to the way dominant American culture denied, evaded, and justified the 
actualities of its increasingly militarized society.” By denying “the reality of militarization” and 
promoting “deference to military authority” such “historical sentimentality” accommodated the 
acceptance of “a permanent national security state.”244 
The “historical sentimentality” Appy identified coursing through a number of “Cold War 
fictions” is absent in Feiffer’s work. In Boom Feiffer uses a fictionalized history to elucidate how 
nuclear weapons came to dominate military strategy which has the effect of presenting a counter-
narrative to civil defense discourses. This same narrative strategy found expression in the 
“ACCIDENTAL BOMB DROPPING PROGRAM.” Both texts encouraged a critical reading of 
American history that clashed with the “historical sentimentality” that coloured Hollywood’s 
celluloid projections of the “Cold War ethic.” 
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  As a self-described “radical” working from a revisionist position of US history, it is 
hardly surprising Feiffer’s work shows contempt for any form of “historical sentimentality.” The 
ways in which Feiffer used “decoding strategies” that encouraged readers to recycle, 
reappropriate, and restructure signs and symbols from Cold War culture made his “radical” 
perspective and flirtations with an “apocalyptic imagination” a potent tool for critique. His 
readers may have followed Feiffer by undertaking their own critique by going “outside the text” 
and making similar connections. Just as foreign and domestic concerns interacted and influenced 
each other in postwar discourses, Feiffer’s work demonstrated Cold War cultural texts and 
discourses interacted with and influenced his satirical long-form comics and Voice cartoons. 
Only instead of upholding the status quo, his satire subverted it. 
 
* * * * 
 
FIGURE 23: Jules Feiffer, “Untitled,” from My Mind Went All To Pieces, Dial Press, 1958. 
In My Mind Went All to Pieces a befuddled man in military uniform stares vacantly into 
the distance. Airplanes buzz around him, a cartoon cannon fires as a floating tower breaks into 
two. The caption reads: “I’m certain the way I feel is different from anyone in history.”245  
                                                          






These were not Feiffer’s words but they could have easily been expressed by one of his 
anxiety-riddled creations. Instead they were recorded by a therapist treating a real-life patient. 
These recorded exchanges were then used as captions for Feiffer’s illustrations.246 Whatever the 
source of this anonymous person’s fears and anxiety, the patient, like the cartoonist who 
rendered the cartoon visage, was not alone in feeling this way.   
If Feiffer had cast a gaze at other cultural creators in the twilight years of the “long 
fifties” he would have seen others following his lead. By the early sixties humor was becoming a 
fashionable way to capture the bomb’s capacity to inspire existential dread. As the last chapter in 
this study will illustrate, satirists across the cultural spectrum engaged the bomb through satire, 
and in doing so, shone a light on the US’s policy of nuclear deterrence, the ubiquity of civil 
defense, and the country’s deepening entrenchment in an unwinnable arm’s race. 
In print a slew of authors penning satirical prose in the pages of underground humor 
magazines such as Paul Krassner’s The Realist and Victor Navasky’s Monocle mocked civil 
defense discourses. In literature Joseph Heller’s Catch-22 spoofed “Cold War obsessions” with 
its fantastical plot and unflattering portrayal of the military. In song Tom Lehrer sardonically 
sung his “Survival Hymn” for an audience grown wary of the atomic age. And in film, the era’s 
most influential medium, Kubrick released his “Strangelovian” masterpiece, Dr. Strangelove. 
The collective effect these works had on Cold War mentalities is hard to measure. But by the 
early sixties the presence of so many satirical works in the cultural marketplace helped forge a 









                                                          








FIGURE 24: Frank Interlandi. Published in the Realist, issue 23, February, 1961. 
3.1: Survival Hymns    
Did readers who encountered anti-nuke satire in the 1940s and 1950s change the way they 
viewed the arms race, civil defense, or atmospheric tests? After finding a Herblock Mr. Atom 
cartoon in that day’s Washington Post, did they read the featured editorial a little more critically? 
Did Herblock’s personification of the bomb encourage them to seek out the harrowing accounts 
detailed in John Hersey’s Hiroshima or the horrors imagined in David Bradley’s No Place To 
Hide? When they came across images of destruction and mass death in these portrayals, or saw 
the era’s ubiquitous mushroom cloud in footage taken from Operation Crossroads and Bravo, did 
they still laugh at Herblock’s Mr. Atom? If so, was this a “politics of laughter”? When readers 
encountered a Feiffer Village Voice cartoon or one of his long-form comics in the late fifties, did 
they make similar connections with cultural works critical of US nuclear policy? After reading 
Boom, did readers scoff the next time they saw a civil defense poster promoting “awareness” and 
“alertness”? Did Feiffer’s “refunctioning” of civil defense discourses encourage critical reading 






This study has tried to engage these questions by asking how readers in the 1940s and 
1950s encountered anti-nuke cartoons on their own terms. By linking Herblock’s and Feiffer’s 
cartoons with other discourses critiquing Cold War culture, this study tried to look at the 
connections readers would have made when perusing a copy of the Post or Voice during the early 
decades of the Cold War.    
Returning to the question that opened this study—was anti-nuke satire a “surrogate for 
action” or a “coalescing agent”?—recalls some of the methodological and interpretive 
difficulties inherent to studying humor texts within a socio-historical context.  
Nathanial Hong found that in his study of humorous Danish scrapbooks compiled during 
Nazi occupation in WWII, the act of scrapbooking became an “equivocal tool.”247 Hong argues 
scrapbooking replaced modes of resistance rather than encourage them. Hong’s work challenges 
us to reconsider previous approaches to studying humor that stressed its ability to bind social 
groups together.248 Hong’s insight also asks us to rethink applying binary categories of 
“resistance” and “social control” to humor texts by considering how humor can often be mere 
entertainment with little social or political effects.  
 This study has reframed the question of humor’s political and social effects to ask a 
different question: if anti-nuke satire reflected and reinforced discourses that were critical of the 
arms race and civil defense, did fans of this satire fashion counter-narratives to make sense of 
their own experiences within the “age of anxiety”? And if so, did these counter-narratives link up 
with other critical discourses?     
 Herblock and Feiffer did not illustrate their cartoons in a social vacuum. In the late forties 
a number of former Manhattan Project scientists who comprised the “scientists movement” 
became “a seminal force in American life.”249 Scientists added to the public discourse on nuclear 
weapons by authoring a number of articles for popular magazines such as Life and Time that 
stressed the urgency needed to secure meaningful commitments. A duty-bound sense of 
obligation—not to mention a sense of lingering guilt—compelled many scientists to adopt an 
activist approach to solving the crisis of world atomic energy. In 1946 a chemist wrote in the 
professional magazine Chemical and Engineering News: 
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“Because chemists had a major share in bringing the bomb into being, chemists have a 
special responsibility . . . to educate the public and especially our politicians of the  
necessity for intelligent action before it is too late.”250          
  
 Boyer argues that the “near-veneration of atomic scientists” for a “brief but crucial 
interval” in the 1940s helped mold “the public’s earliest nuclear perceptions and attitudes.”251 In 
addition to atomic scientists’ contributions to the public discourse on nuclear weapons, a number 
of influential magazines in the late forties featured in-depth articles detailing the dangers 
associated with the bomb. In November 1945, Life published the “The 36-Hour War” which 
detailed “scenarios of atomic destruction” that were accompanied by illustrations depicting a 
devastated Washington and New York. One illustration included an early rendering of a 
mushroom cloud, an image that political cartoonists and other cultural creators quickly latched 
onto and incorporated into their own work.252  
In March 1946 the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) published One World or 
None, an eighty-page compilation of writings from atomic scientists that became a bestseller. 
The book’s principle aim was to warn Americans about the dangers of nuclear warfare while 
stressing the need for meaningful international agreements. Only through such an effort, the FAS 
authors urged, would a future nuclear arms race be avoided.253  
Five months after One World or None was published Herblock created Mr. Atom. His 
subsequent Mr. Atom cartoons from 1946-1949 echoed the sentiments expressed by the atomic 
scientists during this period, along with the dire warnings reproduced in works like One World or 
None. After news broke of the Soviets’ successful atomic test in the autumn of 1949, “a fault line 
through the culture” could be detected and public attitudes towards the goals expressed by the 
“scientists movement” shifted considerably.254 But before the movement for world atomic energy 
collapsed, Herblock’s Mr. Atom cartoons echoed the sentiments expressed in One World or 
None and other discourses stressing the need for urgency in solving the nuclear dilemma.  
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Feiffer’s anti-nuke satire mirrored similar discourses that resurfaced in the mid-fifties. As 
Feiffer began his career with the Voice fallout fears sparked by Operation Bravo in 1954 
recommenced another round of anti-nuke activism. Just as the “scientists movement” in the 
1940s was comprised of many famous former Manhattan scientists, activist groups in the late 
fifties also had their celebrity spokespeople. Dr. Benjamin Spock, whose child-rearing advice 
was hugely popular with parents in the 1940s and the 1950s, joined SANE’s board of directors 
and became a vocal advocate for enacting a ban on atmospheric tests. The shift in public 
attitudes to nuclear testing put pressure on the Eisenhower administration to place a temporary 
ban on atmospheric testing in 1958.  
It was within this discursive climate that Herblock and Feiffer fastened their critiques. 
Each cartoonist spoke to a specific set of concerns related to a specific moment in the postwar 
development of nuclear weapons. In the case of Herblock, his critique stemmed from the failure 
of the world atomic control movement in the late 1940s to establish international controls and 
regulations for atomic energy. Feiffer’s criticism focused on US nuclear policy in the 1950s, 
specifically the themes of civilian preparedness projected in civil defense propaganda, and 
opposition to the nuclear arms race.  
While Feiffer’s anti-nuke cartoons were more probing from a policy perspective, insofar 
as they explored the relationship between nuclear weapons and the emerging military-industrial 
complex, Herblock’s cartoons in the 1940s laid out baseline fears that the US had become a 
society where the ideal of peace was predicated on the nation’s monopoly of the bomb. While 
each cartoonist was aiming at a distinctive readership, and was drawing anti-nuke cartoons at 
different points in the bomb’s cultural history, the similar ways they framed and articulated their 
critiques of postwar US nuclear policy demonstrated their shared concerns. Taken together, their 
efforts also signalled that satire was an effective means for voicing dissent within Cold War 
culture.          
The impact of their approaches is suggested by a cartoon drawn in figure 27 by Frank 
Interlandi. Done for the underground humor magazine the Realist, Figure 27 demonstrates how 
Herblock’s and Feiffer’s approach to satirizing “atomic culture” was echoed by later cartoonists 
in the early sixties. Interlandi wanted to draw a cartoon that captured his own “feeling of being 
helpless and returning to infantilism” that civil defense propaganda had engendered.255 In doing 
                                                          






so Interlandi refunctioned civil defense discourses that stressed the importance of preparation for 
a nuclear attack. His cartoon also spoke to the ubiquity of civil defense propaganda in these 
years. At first the man in the cartoon does not seemed startled with the poster’s question asking, 
“IF A BOMB FALLS, WHAT WOULD YOU DO???” Only in the cartoon’s final iteration of 
the man does his pallid face become animated as he forms his answer.  
In conveying this feeling of helplessness, Interlandi spoke to fears held by many 
Americans in the late fifties and early sixties. When confronted with the question of how they 
should respond to a nuclear attack, many Americans might have given an answer similar to 
Interlandi’s character. In the absence of any comprehensive civil defense plan ensuring 
survival—not to mention protection from radioactive fallout—fear and futility seemed like an 
appropriate response. 
Interlandi’s cartoon fits alongside the other anti-nuke cartoons analyzed in this study 
because it subverted notions of preparedness that civil defense propaganda tried to instill. Like 
Herblock’s Mr. Atom cartoons, Interlandi’s cartoon made use of an existing “visual vocabulary” 
that readers could recognize. In this way his cartoon framed the issue of civil defense in order to 
express the absurdity of preparing for a nuclear war that most Americans would not survive.  
Similar to Feiffer’s Village Voice work, Interlandi’s use of vulgar language reflected the 
insurgence of “sick” humor that began in the early-fifties with MAD and which Feiffer 
contributed to in the mid-fifties. Paul Krassner, who founded the Realist in 1958, was not the 
only editor publishing cartoons like Interlandi’s in the early sixties. Victor Navasky’s Monocle, 
founded in 1956, featured similar satirical cartoons and essays satirizing the bomb’s enduring 
presence in postwar America. Navasky was an early fan of Herblock when the former took a job 
as a tour guide at the Post in 1953. For Navasky, Herblock’s images were “indelible” and his 
impact “incalculable.”256 When he began his own humor publication Navasky hired cartoonists 
who took a similar critical approach to cartooning as Herblock did. What is more, the themes and 
style of the Monocle’s cartoonists also bore some resemblance to Feiffer’s aesthetic approach to 
cartooning.      
As much as Krassner and Navasky were responding to a wider trend of “sick” humor 
which subverted 1950s notions of taste, the anti-nuke satires published in their magazines also 
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reflected a growing market for smart, incisive commentary that explored questions of postwar 
militarization through a humorous lens. By the time Krassner and Navasky launched their 
publications, a thriving sub-culture of satire focused on criticizing the role nuclear weapons 
played in postwar militarization of America had emerged.  
Fans of this brand of satire could sing along to Tom Lehrer’s 1959 hit, “We Will All Go 
Together When We Go”: “And we will all go together when we go/What a comforting fact the is 
to know/Universal bereavement/An inspiring achievement/Yes, we all will go together when we 
go.”257 Set to a jaunty piano line Lehrer’s topical song, with rhyming couplets referencing 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), was a musical counterpart to Herblock’s and 
Feiffer’s dark satire. Lehrer’s catchy number recast the specter of nuclear war as a vaudevillian 
musical which invited listeners to sing along to his anti-anthem for the upcoming nuclear 
apocalypse. 
In literature Joseph Heller’s best-selling satiric 1961 novel Catch-22 cast its lead 
character Yossarian as an anti-hero. Although set in the Second World War, Stephen Whitfield 
has argued “the dimensions of Heller’s antic and macabre imagination”258 more closely 
resembled Cold War realities and thus its subtext can be read as commentary on the passions that 
ignited postwar patriotism. Readers who identified with Yossarian’s pacifism may have read the 
character’s eventual desertion as a rebuke of unquestioning public complicity and enlistment in 
the Cold War struggle.   
In 1963 comedy fans could listen to Bill Dana’s José Jiménez character impersonate a 
hapless and naïve civil defense drill sergeant whose attempts at explanation call into the question 
the whole premise of civil defense. In a routine recorded for one of Dana’s comedy albums, a 
commentator asks Jiménez what materials he should use for constructing a fallout shelter. 
Recognizing the futility in building self-made bomb shelters, Jiménez replies, “chicken-wire.” 
Dana spoke for a lot of Americans when his Jiménez character deadpanned, “It doesn’t really 
matter” how one prepares for a nuclear attack since survival had such long odds.259 
A year later Americans lined up to see Stanley Kubrick’s 1964 classic Dr. Strangelove: 
Or How I Learned To Stop Worrying and Loved the Bomb. The Nazi-saluting mad scientist 
                                                          
257 Tom Lehrer, “We Will All Go Together When We Go,” An Evening Wasted with Tom Lehrer (Lehrer Records, 
1959),  
258 Whitfield, “Still the Best Catch There Is,” in Rethinking Cold War Culture, ch.8, 175-200. 






Kubrick crafted for his eponymously titled character was a composite of real-life personas 
associated with the bomb, including nuclear strategist Herman Kahn whose 1959 book, On 
Thermonuclear War, strategized possible nuclear warfare scenarios. Art, in these years, came to 
borrow from life regularly. Kubrick’s film worked because its fantastical plot followed a similar 
logic. The scenarios that Kahn presented as realistic became fodder for the fantastic surrealism of 
the film’s plot. In 1964 those who read Kahn’s cold assessment of nuclear strategy had a real-life 
counterpart to Kubrick’s rogue General ordering his own nuclear attack. Perhaps a “doomsday 
device” was not so far-fetched after all. 
The glowing skyline closing Kubrick’s film—with a cacophony of nuclear weapons 
exploding in disharmonious unison as the logic of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) 
implodes—provided a brilliant capstone for two decades worth of anti-nuke satire. The cultural 
marketplace for anti-nuke satire in the late fifties and early sixties was teaming with works that 
subverted notions of a winnable nuclear war, and Kubrick’s cinematic canvas writ those attitudes 
large.  
Collectively, these works also forged a sub-culture of dissent that contrasted sharply with 
the 1950s’ cultivation of conformity. In doing so they set the stage for later sixties activists who 
disseminated jokes along with their anti-war literature at anti-Vietnam rallies. 
The young adults of the sixties were the children of the fifties. The baby boomer 
generation born after WWII were raised in comparative affluence in contrast to their parents’ 
upbringing. Their childhoods were also informed by the commercial products of atomic culture. 
They played board-games like Uranium Rush, and rifled through cereal boxes looking for prized 
atomic rings. These individual encounters with atomic culture represented what Susman calls 
“everyday unassuming acts.” For Susman these “everyday unassuming acts” also reflect 
“implicit knowledge” and “fundamental assumptions” that constitute the bonds which holds a 
culture together.260 In the case of Cold War culture “fundamental assumptions” coalesced around 
anti-Communist fears.  
It is difficult to imagine such an intense and varied cultural engagement with nuclear 
weapons existing in the Cold War era without the continuing presence of anti-Communist 
rhetoric. At their cultural peak during the McCarthy era, rabid anti-Communists muzzled their 
critics by calling into question their patriotism. With chilling obsessiveness Cold Warriors such 
                                                          






as Nixon and McCarthy combed their opponents’ testimonies for inconsistencies in the hopes of 
exposing their allegiances to Moscow.  
What made the Cold War unique from earlier red scares, was the extent to which 1950s 
anticommunism incorporated domestic symbols into its discourse. The products of consumer and 
popular culture were enlisted in the fight against communism in Cold War cultural diplomacy. It 
is telling that Nixon’s famous debate with Khrushchev took place in a remodeled kitchen. Such 
cooption reminded Americans that “everyday unassuming acts” were often politicized. Against 
this political backdrop atomic culture took root. 
Most boomers were too young to read a Herblock cartoon that confronted anti-
Communist excesses in the early fifties. Perhaps they encountered Herblock as teenagers in the 
early sixties. The Cuban missile crisis prompted a fresh batch of Mr. Atom cartoons that 
lamented the lack of any meaningful commitments between the two nuclear superpowers. 
Herblock’s cartoons from the fall of 1962 criticized the Kennedy administration for its dangerous 
nuclear brinkmanship.    
While most baby boomers were too young to read a Herblock or Feiffer cartoon in the 
1950s, many were seeing their adolescence come to a close when Lyndon Johnson ran for 
president in 1964. Like John F. Kennedy, who during the 1960 campaign played on fears that a 
“missile gap” existed between the US and the Sputnik-launching Soviet Union, Johnson played 
the nuclear card to his political advantage. During the 1964 campaign the Democrats released an 
anti-Goldwater ad that quickly gained infamy. The so-called “daisy spot” featured a little girl 
plucking pedals from a flower while frolicking in a pristine field. She counts aloud as the pedals 
fall to the ground. The camera freezes on her face and a muffled voice intones a countdown. 
Johnson’s voice interrupts when the countdown reaches zero: “These are the stakes—to make a 
world in which all of God’s children can live, or go on into the dark. We must either love each 
other, or we must die.”261   
The White House received a flood of calls protesting the ad’s provocative suggestion that 
a Goldwater presidency would entail nuclear Armageddon. Johnson’s team pulled the ad after 
one airing but the ad continued to be replayed on evening news programs.262 Many boomers who 
saw the ad replayed on the evening news would have recognized the irony in a Democratic 
                                                          







president accusing his presidential rival of nuclear sabre-rattling. After all, it was Johnson’s party 
who gave birth to the bomb. Roosevelt commissioned it and Truman used it. As much as Truman 
boasted publicly that he never wavered in his decision, privately he feared humanity had become 
“termites” burrowing too deep in the earth.263 Kennedy, the president who came closest to 
engaging in nuclear war, would have opted for more soaring rhetoric than Truman’s terse prose. 
Within the glowing vistas of his New Frontier there was no imaginary space for billowing 
mushroom clouds. But like Truman, Kennedy shared the attitudes of hardline Cold Warriors who 
throughout the 1950s openly considered using nuclear weapons when their foreign policy backed 
them into corners.  
 
 
* * * * 
Like the Cold War era’s ubiquitous Geiger counters, this study has attempted to detect 
the traces of humor radiating within atomic culture in order to show how satire coursed through 
the crevices. In doing so it has engaged the question of whether anti-nuke was seen by 
contemporaries as a “surrogate for action” or a “coalescing agent.” But the question needs to be 
reconfigured to reflect a more complex relationship between humor and readers of humor texts. 
In his 1971 essay on cultural representations of the Sambo stereotype in American culture 
Joseph Boskin used the Freudian notion that jokes are “tendentious” to explain how “humor is 
inextricably related to aggression.”264 Relating his work to the wider history of racialized 
discourses in the US, Boskin concludes that “humor lessened the chance of further violence in a 
system already determined by violence.”265  
By placing Herblock’s and Feiffer’s cartoons in a larger discursive framework as Boskin 
did with his source-base, we can see how anti-nuke satire also operated within a “system” that 
was “determined by violence.” Only this violence was exported to Korea in the early fifties and 
Vietnam in the mid-sixties and early seventies. Both wars were a consequence of 
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anticommunism hysteria that encouraged Americans during the Cold War to form a “self-
referential perspective” that led many to “believe in an image of a world that did not exist.”266   
Even though they drew cartoon characters, and operated within a field not always 
associated with serious reflection, Herblock and Feiffer had a better sense of reality than many 
cold warriors. The bomb became a frequent target of derision for both visual satirists because 
they recognized contradictions within the AEC’s projection of a “soothing image of a peaceful 
atom” and the FCDA’s endless barrage of civil defense drills and exercises. Herblock and Feiffer 
developed a “visual vocabulary” that refashioned these contradictions as critiques to undercut the 
AEC’s sunny assessment of atomic energy’s future and the FCDA’s culture of preparedness. 
Through their efforts, Herblock and Feiffer provided their readers with a visual companion to the 
fears and anxieties associated with the atomic age.  
  A culture’s humor is rarely innocuous. Embedded within jokes are ideas, attitudes, 
beliefs, and discourses that need to be scrutinized in order to highlight their subtexts. Analyzing 
historical humor texts complicates this aim because distance and time creates space between the 
historical actors who told jokes and the historians who study them. In order to understand what 
made a humor text funny in a specific time and context, we must ask why a text was created, and 
what socio-political circumstances shaped its creation.   
In the first stage of anti-nuke satire, Herblock’s Mr. Atom cartoons framed the goals of 
the movement for world atomic control. The battle for world atomic control in the late forties 
represented a struggle between two different visions for postwar America. On one side liberals 
like Herblock urged restraint and compromise, while on the other side hardliners suspicious of 
Soviet intentions advocated for more atomic testing and increased nuclear weapons production. 
After the Soviets’ successful atomic test, liberal reserves were somewhat depleted as many 
abandoned hopes for a negotiated settlement and supported plans to build the “super.” Herblock 
only pivoted back to an international focus in his Mr. Atom cartoons when worries over 
radioactive fallout galvanized anti-nuke activists to work towards a ban on atmospheric testing in 
the late fifties.  
Feiffer did not share Herblock’s faith in institutional solutions but he did express a 
similar “tendentiousness” in his anti-nuke cartoons, and in doing so gave vent to many of the 
same fears and frustrations. The self-described radicalization he experienced while serving in the 
                                                          






army during the Korean War, infused Feiffer’s satire with a range of critiques that swept over the 
cultural landscape of postwar America. In the process his critique of nuclear weapons touched on 
a host of related issues, including civil defense, economic dependence on defense spending, and 
the entrenchment of postwar militarization that was only hinted at in Herblock’s earlier anti-nuke 
cartoons. 
The presence of anti-nuke satire in the 1940s and 1950s signalled to readers that critique 
of Cold War policies could still be levelled even as anticommunism threatened to strangle 
debate. The culture of dissent that anti-nuke satire helped forge seems on the surface its most 
lasting legacy. But as this study has demonstrated, another important legacy of anti-nuke satire 
were the reading practices it encouraged its readers to adopt in their reading of outside 
discourses. Beyond creating a “visual vocabulary” for later satirists, anti-nuke satire also 
encouraged the readers who were subjected to the same civil defense propaganda as Herblock 
and Feiffer to “go outside the text” and make connections with other cultural and social trends in 
order to critically asses them.  
Herblock and Feiffer did not change the trajectory of US nuclear policy. As other 
scholarship focused on political cartooning in authoritarian cultures has demonstrated, authorities 
are more inclined to tolerate critical cartoons then suppress them. Despite the censoring 
tendencies of Cold War culture there remained limits to suppressing putative “subversive” texts. 
It is doubtful that anti-nuke cartoons made much of an impression on US policymakers in the 
1940s and 1950s—many of them remained beholden to the “simplification of Cold War 
thinking” that continued viewing the Soviet Union as an immutable threat. Most failed to heed 
the warnings from atomic scientists in the late forties and the calls from activists in the late fifties 
to ban atmospheric testing.  
While Herblock and Feiffer failed to move policymakers to meaningful action, readers 
could still be influenced by the criticisms embedded in their cartoons. As Thompson reminds us, 
a culture that pulsates with “critical comedy” carries the potential for that humor to subvert 
established norms if people are “in on the joke.”267 In the context of the 1940s and 1950s this 
meant that drawing the bomb could serve as a bridge of sorts to other critical discourses being 
levelled from more traditional forms of media. Asking if anti-nuke was a “surrogate for action” 
or a “coalescing agent” for readers dichotomizes contemporary responses to Herblock’s and 
                                                          






Feiffer’s cartoons, and fails to capture the complex realities of humor’s place in contributing to 
public discourses. In addition to being a “safety-valve,” humor is also a mediator that connects 
readers with debates they might not otherwise engage.  
Hong’s insight—that laughter can create complacency—challenges us to consider new 
ways of approaching historical humor texts. Instead of assuming the formal subversive elements 
of a humor text subverted established norms, a better way to frame the question is to ask how 
such texts encourage readers to approach targets of derision by arming them with new “decoding 
strategies.” This reframing of the question follows Thomson’s approach to studying parody and 
satire and renders moot the question of what the political and social effects of a humor text were 
in a historical period. Instead, it invites us to consider how humor texts often link up with other 
existing discourses and together help to form a discursive climate that encourages a more critical 
reading public. By reframing the question we can better gauge how humor in history is a 
“thermometer” that registers the contemporary concerns, worries, and fears of historical 
actors.268   
Michel de Certeau wrote that “the text of history . . . must always be taken up over and 
over again.” For Certeau history was also a “fragile witness and necessary critique.”269 This 
study has followed Certeau’s insight by revisiting some non-traditional historical sources in 
order to add some complexity to our understanding of Cold War culture. Humor had a place in 
this culture beyond family-orientated sitcoms that reinforced contemporary norms. When humor 
in the Cold War was laced with satiric critiques it also had the capacity to challenge the “Cold 
War ethic” by fashioning an alternative ethic based on a more critical reading of the deepening 
arms race and entrenchment of civil defense. 
Even if the majority of Herblock’s readers did not share his concerns, or even if Feiffer 
was only being read by an audience who already shared his views, their satire encouraged 
readers to make connections with other anti-nuke discourses. In doing so, Herblock and Feiffer 
contributed important critiques to the ongoing public discourse of nuclear weapons during the 
1940s and 1950s. 
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Both visual satirists exhibited different aesthetic styles and illustrated for disparate 
publications. Yet Herblock and Feiffer each grasped how satire could be used as an effective 
discursive strategy. The bomb’s capacity to engender existential reflection, and inspire an 
elemental sense of fear, did not keep Herblock and Feiffer from trying to incorporate one of the 
most pressing issues of the postwar period into their satire. Through their efforts they showed 
how in the Cold War era the bomb was far from the only weapon that had the power to move 































Adams, Sam. “Jules Feiffer.” http://www.avclub.com/article/jules-feiffer-14283 
Albright, Robert C. “Grave Senate Hears Soviet A-Bomb News.” Washington Post. September  
24, 1949. 
“An Interview with Jules Feiffer,” Bookslut April, 2009, accessed March, 2015. 
http://www.bookslut.com/features/2009_04_014319.php  
Appy, Christian G. “’We’ll Follow the Old Man’: The Strains of Sentimental Militarism in  
Popular Films of the Fifties.” In Rethinking Cold War Culture, Peter J. Kuznick and  
James Gilbert, eds., ch. 4, e-book, pdf. 
“A Spur to Peace Seen in Moscow.” New York Times. September 26, 1949. 
Baldwin, Elbert. “Letters to the Editor.” Washington Post, October 13, 1947. 
Baumgartner, Jody C. and Morris, Jonathan S., eds. Laughing Matters: Humor and Politics in  
the Media Age. New York: Routledge, 2008.  
Berger, Arthur Asa. Blind Men and Elephants: Perspectives on Humor. New Brunswick/New  
Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1995. 
Berger, Arthur Asa. “Humor, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies.” In A Decade of Dark Humor:  
 How Comedy, Irony, and Satire Shaped Post-9/11 America. Eds., Ted Gournelos and  
Viveca Greene. Jackson: University Press of Mississipi, 2011.  
Bergson, Henri. “Le rire, essai sur la signification du comique.“ In Œuvres. Paris: Presses  
Universitaires de la France, 1963. 
Bing, Janet and Heller, Dana. “How Many Lesbians Does It Take to Screw in a Lightbulb?”  
HUMOR: International Journal of Humor Research 16, no.2 (2003): 157-182 
Bing, Janet. “Lesbian Jokes: A Reply to Christie Davies.” HUMOR: International Journal of  
Humor Research 17, no. 3 (2004): 323-328. 
Block, Herbert. “Any Prospect Within The Next Year Or So?” Washington Post, August 11,  
1946. 
Block, Herbert. “I Keep Thinking I See Footprints,” Washington Post, February, 27.  
Block, Herbert. “Mr. Atom 1949 Island Imprint.” Washington Post, September 24, 1949. 
Block, Herbert. “One More War And Then We Take Over,” Washington Post, August 28, 1946. 
Block, Herbert. “One Year Since Hiroshima,” Washington Post, August 3, 1946. 






Block, Herbert. “Shape Of Things To Go.” Washington Post, August 13, 1955. 
Block, Herbert. “Untitled,” Washington Post, December 8, 1953. 
Block, Herbert. “Want To See Me Puff Everything Out?” Washington Post, August 3, 1949. 
Block, Herbert. “You Can’t Have Everything,” January 26, 1938. Herblock’s Presidents:  
Puncturing Pomposity. http://www.npg.si.edu/exhibit/herblock/roosevelt.html 
Block, Herbert. Special for Today. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958. 
Block, Herbert. Straight Herblock. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964. 
Block, Herbert. The Herblock Gallery. “Chapter 7: Boom Everyone’s Dead.” New York: Simon  
& Schuster, 1968. 
Block, Herbert. “McCarthyism,” Washington Post, March 29, 1950. 
Boskin, Joseph. Rebellious Laughter: People’s Humour in American Culture. New York:  
Syracuse University Press, 1997. 
Boskin, Joseph. “The Giant and the Child: ‘Cruel’ Humor in American Culture.” Lion and the  
Unicorn 13, (1989): 141-146. 
Boskin, Joseph. Sambo: The Rise and Demise of An American Jester. New York: Oxford  
University, Press, 1986. 
Boskin, Joseph. “The Life and Death of Sambo: An Overview of an Historical Hang-Up,”  
Journal of Popular Culture 4, no.3 (1971): 646-657. 
Boyer, Paul. By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the  
Atomic Age. New York: Pantheon Books, 1985. 
Boyer, Paul. Fallout: A Historian Reflects on America’s Half-Century Encounter with Nuclear  
Weapons (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1998), 
Boyer, Paul S. “Sixty Years and Counting: Nuclear Themes in American Culture, 1945 to the  
Present.” In The Atomic Bomb and American Society: New Perspectives, Rosemary B.  
Mariner and G.Kurt Piehler, eds. TN: The University of Tennessee Press/Knoxville,  
2009. 
Bradlee, Benjamin C. “At 13 and F Sts. N.W.: A-Blast News Is Sobering But Few Express  
Fear.” Washington Post, September 24, 1949. 
Brinkley, Alan. “The Illusion of Unity in Cold War Culture.” In Rethinking Cold War Culture,  
Peter J. Kuznick and James Gilbert, eds. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Books, 2001,  






Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 3, no. 6, June, 1947. 
Carpio, Glenda R. Laughter Fit to Kill: Black humor in the Fictions of Slavery. Oxford: Oxford  
University Press, 2008.  
Carruthers, Susan L. Cold War Captives: Imprisonment, Escape, and Brainwashing. Berkley and  
London: University of California Press, 2009. 
Certeau, Michel de. The Practice of Everyday Life translated by Steven Rendell. Berkley and  
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984. 
Certeau, Michel de. The Writing of History. Translated by Tom Conley. New York: Cambridge  
University Press, 1988. 
Chlopicki, Wladyslaw. “Book Review.” HUMOR: International Journal of Humor Research 16,  
no.4 (2003): 415-424. 
Cowen, William Tynes. “Plantation Comic Modes.” HUMOR: International Journal of Humor  
Research 14, no.1 (2001): 1-24. 
Craig, Campbell. and Radchenko, Sergey. The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War  
New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008. 
Dana, Bill. “The Civil Defense Director,” Jose Jimenez: Our Secret Weapon, 1963. 
Daniel, Clifton. “British Also Urge Effective Control,” New York Times, September 24, 1949. 
Davies, Christie. “Humour and Protest: Jokes under Communism.” In Humour and Social  
Protest, Marjolein’t Hart and Dennis Bos, eds. New York and Cambridge: University of 
Cambridge, 2007, 291-305.    
Davies, Christie. “Lesbian Jokes: Some Methodological Problems. A Reply to Janet Bing and  
Dana Heller.” HUMOR: International Journal of Humor Research17, no.3 (2004): 311-
321. 
Davies, Christie. “Lesbian Jokes: A Reply to Janet Bing’s Reply.” HUMOR: International  
Journal of Humor Research 17, no.3 (2004): 329-330.  
Davies, Christie. Jokes and Targets. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2011. 
Davis, Tracy C. Stages of Emergency: Cold War Nuclear Civil Defense. Durham and London:  
Duke University Press, 2007. 
Dewey, Donald. The Art of Ill Will: The Story of American Cartoons. New York: New York  
University Press, 2007. 






Doherty, Thomas Cold War, Cool Medium: Television, McCarthyism, and American Culture  
New York: University Press, 2003.  
Driessen, Henk. “Humor, Laughter and the Field: Reflections from Anthropology.” In A Cultural  
History of Humour: From Antiquity to the Present Day, Jan Bremmer and Herman  
Roodenburg, eds. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1997. 
Dudden, Arthur Power. “The Record of Political Humor.” American Quarterly 37, no.1 (1985):  
50-70. 
“Editorial—Atomic Monopoly,” Washington Post, February, 9.  
“Editorial—The Russian Bomb.” Washington Post. September 24, 1949.    
“Editorial—Roots of the Truman Doctrine,” Washington Post, March 16, 1947. 
Federal Civil Defense Administration, “What You Should Know About Radioactive Fallout,”  
(1958) in Michael Scheibach, ed., “In Case Atom Bombs Fall”: An Anthology of  
Government Explanations, Instructions and Warnings from the 1940s to the 1960s  
Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2009, 39-44. 
Federal Civil Defense Administration, “This Is Civil Defense.” in Michael Scheibach,  
ed., “In Case Atom Bombs Fall”: An Anthology of Government Explanations,  
Instructions and Warnings from the 1940s to the 1960s Jefferson, NC: McFarland &  
Company, Inc., Publishers, 2009, 
Federal Civil Defense Administration “Women in Civil Defense,” in Michael Scheibach, ed., “In  
Case Atom Bombs Fall”: An Anthology of Government Explanations, Instructions and 
Warnings from the 1940s to the 1960s Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 
Publishers, 2009, 
Feiffer, Jules. “Boom,” Feiffer: The Collected Works, Volume Three. Seattle, WA:  
Fantagraphics Books, 1992, 49-58. 
Feiffer, Jules. “Munro,” Feiffer: The Collected Works, Volume Three. Seattle, WA:  
Fantagraphics Books, 1992, 
Feiffer, Jules. “Rollie,” Feiffer: The Collected Works, Volume Three. Seattle, WA:  
Fantagraphics Books, 1992, 
Feiffer, Jules. “Sick, Sick, Sick.” The Village Voice, September, 17, 1958. 
Feiffer, Jules. “Sick, Sick, Sick.” The Village Voice, March 19, 1958. 






Feiffer, Jules. “Sick, Sick, Sick!” The Village Voice, July 10, 1957. 
Feiffer, Jules. “Sick, Sick, Sick!” The Village Voice, December 4, 1957. 
Feiffer, Jules. “My Mind Went All To Pieces,” in Feiffer: The Collected Works, Volume 3, 86. 
Feiffer, Jules. Backing Into Forward: A Memoir. New York: Nan A. Talese and Doubleday,  
2010. 
Filene, Peter J. “’Cold War Culture’ Doesn’t Say It All.” In Rethinking Cold War Culture Peter 
Kuznick and James Gilbert, Eds. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Books, 2001.  
Firoe, Robert. “Preface,” Feiffer: The Collected Works, Volume One. Seattle, WA: Fantagraphics  
Books, 1988.  
Folliard, Edawrd T. “President’s Announcement Does Not Say Reds Have Bomb,” Washington  
Post. September 24, 1949. 
Frankfort, Ellen. The Voice: Life at the Village Voice. New York: William Morrow and  
Company, 1976.  
Gaddis, John Lewis. We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. New York: Oxford  
University Press, 1997. 
Galanter, Marc. “The Great American Lawyer Joke Explosion.” HUMOR: International Journal  
of Humor Research 21, no.4 (2008): 387-413. 
Gardner, Gerald. The Mocking of the President: A History of Campaign Humor from Ike to  
Ronnie. Detroit: Wayne University Press, 1988. 
George, Alice L. Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
 Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003.  
Groth, Gary. “The Jules Feiffer Interview,” The Comics Journal, February 20, 2011.  
http://www.tcj.com/the-jules-feiffer-interview/2/ 
Gordon, Ian. Comic Strips and Consumer Culture, 1890-1945. Washington and London:  
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998. 
Gunn, Simon. History and Cultural Theory. Edinburgh Gate, UK: Pearson Education Limited,  
2006. 
Gutwirth, Marcel. Laughing Matter: An Essay on the Comic. Ithaca: Cornell University Press,  
1993. 
Hamill, Pete. “Forward,” Feiffer: The Collected Works, Volume One. Seattle, WA:  






Hoffman Sasha. “Drawing the Bomb.” Accessed March, 2015.  
http://nuclearcartoons.sashahoffman.org/SearchResults.php?actors=29&keywords=0 
Hong, Nathanial. “Mow ‘em all down grandma: The “weapon” of humor in two World War II  
occupation scrapbooks.” HUMOR: International Journal of Humor Research 23, no.1 
(2010): 27-64.  
Inge, Thomas M. “Our Priceless Universal Trait: American Humor.” American Studies  
International 25, no.1 (1987): 28-45. 
Inge, Thomas M. Ed, Will Eisner: Conversations Jackson, MS: University of Mississippi Press,  
2011. 
Interlandi, Frank. “Letters to the Editor,” Realist, no. 23, February, 1961: 23. 
“Interview with Jules Feiffer: Chance to tell own stories is draw for writing memoir.” True  
Jersey. Accessed March, 2015.  
http://www.nj.com/entertainment/arts/index.ssf/2010/03/for_cartoonist_jules_feiffer_c.ht
ml 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Evaluation Board, “Section III: Observations and Conclusions, Both Tests,”  
July 31, 1946. Michael Scheibach, ed, “In Case Atom Bombs Fall”: An Anthology of  
Governmental Explanations, Instructions and Warnings from the 1940s to the 1960s  
Jefferson, North Carolina and London: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2009, 
19-24. 
Johnson, Robert R. Romancing the Atom: Nuclear Infatuation from the Radium Girls to  
Fukushima. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2012. 
Kaufman, Will. “What’s So Funny About Richard Nixon? Vonnegut’s ‘Jailbird’ and the Limits  
of Comedy,” Journal of American Studies 41, no.3 (2007): 623-639. 
Kercher, Stephen E. “The Limits of Irreverence: ‘Sick’ Humor and Satire in  
America, 1950-64.” Dissertation. Indiana University, 2000. 
Kercher, Stephen E. Revel with a Cause: Liberal Satire in Postwar America. Chicago: IL:  
University of Chicago Press, 2006. 
Kessel, Martina, “Introduction.” In The Politics of Humour: Laughter, Inclusion and Exclusion  
in the Twentieth Century. Kessel, Martina and Merziger, Patrick, Eds.  Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2012. 






Tom Lehrer.  Lehrer Records, 1959. 
Leo P. Ribuffo, “Will the Sixties Never End? Or Perhaps at least the Thirties? Or maybe Even  
the Progressive Era? Contrarian Thoughts on Change and Continuity in American  
Political Culture at the Turn of the Millennium.” In Rethinking Cold War Culture: Peter  
J. Kuznick and James Gilbert, Eds. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Books, 2001. 201- 
224. 
Lewis, Paul. Comic Effects: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Humor in Literature. Albany, NY:  
State University of New York Press, 1989. 
Library of Congress, “Herblock’s History—Political Cartoons from the Crash to the  
Millennium,” accessed March, 2015.  
http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/herblocks-history/about.html 
Lull, George F. Today’s Health, 1950. 
Mascha, Efharis. “Political Satire and Hegemony: A Case of “Passive Revolution” during  
Mussolini’s Ascendance to Power 1919-1925.” HUMOR: International Journal of 
Humor Research 21, no.1 (2008): 69-98.  
McAtee, Cammie. “Taking Comfort in The Age of Anxiety: Eero Saarinen’s Easy Chair.” In  
Atomic Dwellings: Anxiety, Domesticity, and Postwar Architecture. Ed. Robin 
Schuldenfrei. London and New York: Routledge, 2012. 3-25. 
McAuliffe, Kevin Michael. The Great American Newspaper: The Rise and Fall of the Village  
Voice. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1978. 
McGrory, Mary. “The Pentagon’s Mr. T.K. Jones Shows Both Faces on the Hill.” Washington  
Post, April 1, 1982. 
Merlan, Anne. “Legendary Phantom Tollbooth Illustrator Jules Feiffer On Wanting To  
Overthrow The Government,” The Village Voice Blogs.  
http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/2013/09/legendary_phant.php 
Milwaukee Civil Defense Administration, “Your Civil Defense Manual: A Handbook on  
Personal Survival.” (no date) In Michael Scheibach, ed., “In Case Atom Bombs Fall”: An  
Anthology of Government Explanations, Instructions and Warnings from the 1940s to the  
1960s. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2009. 
Monteyne, David. Fallout Shelter: Designing for Civil Defense in the Cold War. Minneapolis  






Navasky, Victor S. The Art of Controversy. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013. 
New York State Civil Defense Commission, “You and the Atomic Bomb: What to Do in Case of  
an Atomic Attack, Public Pamphlet No.1.” Michael Scheibach, ed., “In Case Atom  
Bombs Fall”: An Anthology of Government Explanations, Instructions and Warnings 
from the 1940s to the 1960s. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 
2009. 
New York State Civil Defense Commission, “Medical Aides.” In Michael Scheibach, ed.,  
“In Case Atom Bombs Fall”: An Anthology of Government Explanations, Instructions 
and Warnings from the 1940s to the 1960s. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 
Publishers, 2009. 69-72 
Norton, Anne. “Letters to the Editor.” Washington Post, October 1, 1949. 
Oakes, Guy. The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture. New York and  
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
Patterson, James T. Great Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974. New York and Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 1996. 
Paton, George E.C. and Powell, Chris. Eds. Humor in Society: Resistance and Control. New  
York, St. Martin’s Press, 1988. 
Powell, Chris. “A Phenomenological Analysis of Humour in Society.” In Humor in Society:  
Resistance and Control. New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1988, 86-105. 
Sayre, Nora. Running Time: Films of the Cold War. New York, 1982. 
Scheer, Robert. “U.S. Could Survive in Administration’s View.” Los Angeles Times, January 16,  
1982. 
Scheer, Robert. With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush, and Nuclear War. New York: Vintage  
Books, 1983. 
Schwartz, Alvin, ed. Witcracks: Jokes and Jests from American Folklore. Philadelphia:  
Lippencott, 1973.   
Schwartz, Debra Claire. The Satire of Jules Feiffer: Changing Form and Ideology, Masters  
Thesis, McGill University, March, 1975. 
Shapiro, Jerome F. Atomic Bomb Cinema: The Apocalyptic Imagination on Film. New York and  
London: Routledge, 2001. 






Sociology 103, no.5 (1998): 1352-1401. 
Stephenson, Anders. “Cold War Degree Zero.” In Uncertain Empire: American History and the  
Idea of the Cold War, eds Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell. Oxford and New York: Oxford  
University Press, 2012. 19-39.  
Stokker, Kathleen. “Quisling Humor in Hitler’s Norway: Its Wartime Function and Its Postwar  
Legacy.” HUMOR: International Journal of Humor Research 14, no.4 (2001): 339-357. 
Susman, Warren I. Culture as History: The Transformation of American Society in the Twentieth  
Century. Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2003. 
Thompson, Ethan. Parody and Taste in Postwar American Television Culture. New York and  
London: Routledge, 2001. 
Truman, Harry. “Statement on Atomic Power, August 7, 1945.” In “In Case Atom  
Bombs Fall”: An Anthology of Governmental Explanations, Instructions and Warnings  
from the 1940s to the 1960s, Michael Scheibach, ed. Jefferson, North Carolina and  
London: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2009. 13-15. 
“The Dirt on T.K. Jones,” New York Times, March 19, 1982. 
“Truman Reveals Red A-Blast; No Widespread Alarm Felt; Stockpiling May Be Speeded,”  
September 24, 1949, Washington Post.   
Westad, Odd Arne. “Exploring the Histories of the Cold War: A Pluralist Approach.” In  
Uncertain Empire: American History and the Idea of the Cold War, eds Joel Isaac and  
Duncan Bell (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. 51-59. 
Whitfield, Stephen J. “Richard Nixon as Comic Figure.” American Quarterly 37, no1. (1985):  
114-132. 
Whitfield, Stephen J. “Still the Best Catch There Is.” In Rethinking Cold War Culture, Peter J.  
Kuznick and James Gilbert, eds. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Books, 2001. 
Whitfield, Stephen J. The Culture of the Cold War. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins  
University Press, 1991.    
Wills, Garry Bomb Power: Presidential Power and the National Security State. New York:  
Penguin Books, 2011. 
“World Should Not Be Shocked By Atom Blast, Acheson Says,” Washington Post,  
September24, 1949. 
